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Abstract
Title: From Independence to Hindraf-The Malaysian Indian Community and 
the negotiation for minority rights.
The Hindraf (Hindu Rights Action Force) Rally in November 2007 drew 
unprecedented global media attention upon the Indian community in 
Malaysia and its plight as a marginalised community for the past 50 years 
since Independence. The fact that the Hindraf leaders were petitioning the 
Queen of England to have their plight redressed metaphorically and actually 
demonstrates that the Indians understood the colonial era and the moment 
of Independence from the Empire as the point of genesis for their suffering. 
Analysts have accurately noted that the class action suit was a ploy for the 
group advocating Hindu Indians Rights in Malaysia to embarrass the 
incumbent UMNO-led Malaysian government. As civic space in Malaysia 
continued to narrow for non-Malay-Muslim minorities over the last fifty years 
beginning from the social bargain at independence to the NEP (affirmative 
action) to rising Islamisation, Indians, like other minorities, began to feel 
increasingly pressured by a lack of opportunities and freedom to practise 
their culture and religion. The Hindraf Rally in 2007 instigated my research in 
this area to understand the problems the Indians in Malaysia have endured 
and how Indian leadership and organisations over a span of 50 years have 
handled these problems. I undertook fieldwork in Malaysia from August 2009 
to July 2010, interviewing journalists, prominent members of the Indian 
community, doing archival research and just talking and interacting with 
Malaysian Indians to understand the situation. The fact that Indians led by 
Hindraf lawyers were leading a protest in 2007, 50 years after Independence, 
suggests that Indian leaders and their organsiations had been inept in the 
management and problem solving approaches against the backdrop of a 
state that was adamant to preserve the rights of only one ethnic group above 
all others. This thesis charts the history of the Malaysian Indian community 
through its organisations and leadership to understand the text and context 
of the Malaysian Indian predicament as a marginalised minority to track a 
slow, haphazard road to the Hindraf Rally. It aims to understand how and 
why the Hindraf Rally of November 2007 occured and what it was a 
culmination of.
Keywords: Hindraf, Indians as a marginalised community, narrowing civic 
space in Malaysia, Islamisation.
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Hindraf supporters holding up pictures of Gandhi to demonstrate a peaceful 
protest but in choosing Gandhi as an icon they also reveal their links 
back to India. (Source: http://www.malaysiakini.com/)
Hindraf leader, P. Uthayakumar 
being arrested at his office before 
the November 2007 Rally.
(Source:http://www. malaysiakini. com/)
Introduction
November 25th 2007, a significant number of Indians 1 (mainly Hindu Tamils) 
demonstrated in the heart of Kuala Lumpur, at the Ampang District to submit 
a petition to the British High Commission. The petition was to urge Her 
Majesty to appoint a Queen’s Counsel to represent Malaysian Indians in a 
suit against the British government. Malaysian Indians were suing the British 
government for their frustrations and resentment, pent up over 50 years 
whilst being resident in post -independence Malaysia, with the claim for 
compensation.2 A claim was made that colonial Britain, while being 
responsible for importing labour from India into Malaya, had failed to 
dispense its duties to the minority Indian community of Malaya at the time of 
decolonization. Citing the Reid Commission Report of February 11th 1957 
which accorded Malays with special privileges and failed to address the 
rights of the Indian community, the Indians felt that they had endured 
‘apartheid’3 in post- colonial Malaysia as a result.
The force behind this protest demonstration was the Hindu Rights Action 
Force (Hindraf), a loose coalition of 30 Hindu/Indian organizations in 
Malaysia. Led by a team of lawyers, Hindraf chairman, Waythamoorthy and 
other Hindraf spokesmen have repeatedly brought up issues associated with 
the Reid Commission at Independence and its impact on minorities in 
Malaysia. Surprised that the Commission’s papers remain classified in 
Malaysia despite having been long declassified in England, Hindraf drew 
attention to a condition brought up during the Commission that, ‘ the special 
privileges of the Malays should have been reviewed 15 years after
1 It remains unclear as to the number of Indians that showed up for the November protest rally. 
Some sources quote as low as 8000 while others as high as 100 000. But the numbers were 
definitely significant in that the Malaysian government felt threathened by the numbers as 
demonstrated by the application of the FRU (Federal Reserve Units).
2 Malaysiakini, 17th November 2007, 'Indians to petition Queen E via British Envoy'.
3 Shawnmorgan, 4th January 2008, 'Malaysia is practising HIDDEN APARTHEID SYSTEM' posted on 
http://hindraf.orR/, accessed in August 2008.
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Independence . It has not happened after 50 years’.4 Waythamoorthy has 
made explicit how non-Muslim minorities in Malaysia have felt pressured into 
not questioning the social contract made in 1957and stands firm in declaring 
that ‘ we are not immigrants and we have been always loyal to the country , 
so why are we being marginalised?’. 5
The Hindraf filed for compensation from the British government amounting to 
one million pounds sterling for every one of the two million Indian 
Malaysians.6 However as analysts have accurately noted, the class action 
suit was simply a ploy for the group advocating Hindu Indian Rights in 
Malaysia to capture international attention for their lobby and to embarrass 
the incumbent UMNO( United Malays national Organisation)- led Malaysian 
government.7 The actual reasons of discontent that were driving Hindraf had 
been made known in a letter of appeal to British Premier, Gordon Brown, 
some ten days earlier. The Hindraf legal adviser, P.Uthayakumar, cited 
several points of grievance in this letter of appeal, which include the 
demolition of Hindu places of worship, the disinclination of the UMNO 
government to hold an inquiry into the Kampung Medan ‘mini genocide’, 
March 2001, when some 100 Indians were slashed and killed, the 
disproportionately high number of Indians who were killed in police custody, 
and the discrimination endured by Indians in gaining admissions to higher 
institutes of learning or skills and training in Malaysia .8
As a student of the Indian Diaspora, I watched these occurrences of 
November 25th, 2007 with interest and surprise. Surprise because since the 
British colonial stereotype of the South Indian migrants being ‘malleable
4 Malaysiakini, 30th July 2007, '18 demands for Indian Malaysian rights'.
5 Ibid.
6 Malaysiakini, 17th November 2007, 'Indians to petition Queen E via British Envoy'.
7 Malaysiakini, 23rd November 2007/ Hindraf- a new face is born'.
8 Letter of appeal from Hindraf to Gordon Brown, 15th November 2007. See http://hindraf.org/, 
accessed in August 2008.
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...and easily manageable’9, seemed to have stuck well into the post- colonial 
Malaysian era , one never heard of Indians in Malaysia being able to 
mobilize effectively before to protest their plight. Interest because the events 
and issues encapsulated in the November 25th episode highlighted the 
common plight of immigration and immigrants in their feelings of 
displacement, longing and belonging, nationality and citizenship, so 
vigorously discussed in the field of diaspora studies. After five decades of 
being resident in post-colonial Malaysia, the processes of assimilation have 
remained incomplete for these Indians and they have somehow been left out 
in the Malay (sian) imagination of nation building and myth making. Their 
appeal to the British government as the source of placation for their plight, 
though symbolic, and the fact that Indian protesters displayed images of 
Gandhi during the demonstration revealed that their sense of connection to 
the colonial era and to India as a motherland had not receded to a distant 
memory.
Media reports of the events described a people in defiance, shouting 
slogans of ‘Makkal sakti (people’s power), undeterred by repeated warnings 
and a court order which allowed the police to 'arrest on sight1, yet they came 
out in the thousands. They stood up against tear gas and chemical- laced 
water cannons chanting slogans10 in both Tamil and English and decrying 
ketuanan Melayu (Malay hegemony).To me these acts though valiant were 
also signs of desperation. I saw it as a breakdown on the part of the Indian 
minority in being able to negotiate effectively for their rights, cultural and 
political, through the avenues of conventional politics in Malaysia. Hindraf 
had performed a daring feat of political activism in Malaysia through the 
demonstration and the class action suit. However, the question also remains 
as to why had this form of activism taken 50 years after Independence to 
materialize? Surely there must have been preceding instances, in the history 
of Malaya (sia) when these otherwise ‘malleable’ Indians would have taken 
matters into their own hands.
9 K.S Sandhu, Indians in Malaya (Cambridge University Press, Great Britain, 1969), 56.
10 Malaysiakini, 26th November 2007/ Fearless Indians fight for rights'.
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This ‘saffron rally’, as dubbed by journalists, in November 2007 therefore 
instigates the inquiry as to how the Indian community in Malaysia, located in 
a post- colonial state of Malaysia that subscribes to an un-egalitarian mode 
of civic consciousness, which favours one particular ethnicity, the Malays, 
over the others, has been able to negotiate a civic space for itse lf. As this 
civic space continued to narrow over the last fifty years beginning from the 
‘social bargain’ at Independence to the New Economic Policy /NEP 
(affirmative action) to rising Islamisation, non- Muslim non- Malays have 
begun to feel increasingly pressured by a lack of opportunities and freedom 
to choose culture and religion. The Hindraf rally of November 2007 was a 
demonstration that the Indians of Malaysia had been pressured to the point 
of defying the state to conduct illegal assembly in the heart of Kuala Lumpur. 
This thesis examines crucial moments in history such as the suppression of 
the trade union movement, the issues up for bargain at Independence, the 
effectiveness of Indian leaders in their actions within given circumstances 
and finally the emergence of non-governmental organisations to deal with 
community concerns where and when the state had failed to provide for 
minority communities. This is to understand how and to question if moments 
in Malaysian history as well as the agents and actors on the historical stage 
representing the Malaysian Indian community interacting with the Malaysian 
state, had acted throughout the previous five decades to have circumstances 
finally culminate in the Hindraf moment in 2007.
The feelings of being discriminated against and repression highlighted by the 
Hindraf activists were actualised within the microcosm of events surrounding 
the demonstration of 25th November 2007. Hindraf was formed in early 2006 
as a response to the demolition of Hindu temples and the controversy 
surrounding religious conversion cases such as that of the Everest Climber, 
M.Moorthy.11 Hindraf tried repeatedly to create a space for negotiation with 
the UMNO government by setting resolutions, through letters of appeal and 
requests for the creation of legislation to protect non- Muslim religious and 
minority rights. When gatherings were initiated to meet with UMNO officials,
11 Malaysiakini, 13th January 2006,' Hindu groups flay PM over 'eyewash".
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such as that of September 12th 2007 when some 40 Malaysian Indians 
gathered outside the Parliament Building wanting to submit a protest note to 
Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi12, the Hindraf met with an indifferent 
government response. However the governmental authorities were quick in 
a knee jerk reaction when the Hindraf leaders announced on November 17th 
2007 that they were planning to gather in the heart of Kuala Lumpur with 
some 100 000 supporters to hand over the petition meant for Queen 
Elizabeth II through the British High Commission.
Within two days of this announcement, the police raided the offices of two 
Hindraf lawyers, P.Uthayakumar and his brother Waythamoorthy, in search 
for published material entitled ‘50 years of violation of the Federal 
constitution by the Malaysian government’ deemed seditious under the 
Sedition Act.13 The police next rejected the Hindraf request for a permit to 
gather on November 25th thus deeming any activity on the stipulated date, 
illegal. The Indian political party in coalition with UMNO, Malayan Indian 
Congress (MIC), condemned the Hindraf rally and urged Indians not to 
attend. Two days before the rally, three Hindraf leaders, P. Uthayakumar, P. 
Waythamoorthy and V. Ganapathy Rao, were also arrested. Finally during 
the rally, protesters were randomly assaulted, arrested and charged with 
chemical-laced water cannon. However, gross injustice was really felt when 
26 Indian protesters were rounded up at the rally and charged with attempted 
murder14, accused of assaulting a policeman. This reaction of the Malaysian 
government to the November rally was revelatory of the authoritarian 
practices that had become endemic of the UMNO-led Malaysian government 
15 especially since the Mahathir era. It was obvious then as over the last 50
12 Malaysiakini, 12th September 2007, 'Message to PM: Don't neglect poor Indians'.
13 Malaysiakini, 19th November, 2007, 'Police raid offices of two Hindraf lawyers'.
14 Malaysiakini, 5th December 2007, 'Attempted murder charge for Hindraf protestors'.
15 See Sumit Mandal & Arial Heryanto, Challenging authoritarianism in Southeast Asia: comparing 
Indonesia and Malaysia (New York, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) & Gary Rodan, Transparency 
and authoritarian rule in Southeast Asia: Singapore and Malaysia (London, New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
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years, that Indians as a minority community in Malaysia were living and 
negotiating within a very tight civic space.
Who are the Indians of Malaysia?
Indian influences in Malaya and what is geographically known as Southeast 
Asia today have been recorded as early as the fourth and fifth centuries. The 
Southeast Asian region was known as Suvarna dvipa and Suvarna bumi 
(lands of gold) for Indian traders, Brahmins (Hindu priests) and Indian rulers 
looking to expand their influence. Although Arasaratnam notes that the Malay 
Peninsula did not witness Indianization on such an extensive scale as 
countries to the north and south, nonetheless there is early evidence of 
Indian presence and influence in Southern Kedah and the Province 
Wellesley region in the form of inscriptions in Indian script of the fourth and 
fifth centuries and later the existence of Buddhist and Hindu structures. This 
is not the era that we are centrally concerned with in this dissertation16, but it 
is an important point of contact to acknowledge between Indian and Malay 
cultures. The ‘Era of Indianized States of Southeast Asia’ has impacted 
Malay culture in custom, ancient royal court practices and other aspects of 
ritual and spirituality. This is being purged in haste within the current contexts 
by Malaysian Malays, particularly with the advent of the dakwah movement, 
to practice a more Arabic version of Islam. Willford explains this through 
Barth’s theory of ‘Boundary maintenance’ between ethnicities. He writes 
that, ‘Malays experience recoil and fascinated unease when witnessing 
(Hindu) rituals that resemble those that a state sponsored Islamic ideology 
asks them to purge from their Malay culture and psyche. In this sense, 
assertive Tamil ritualism is both threatening and enticing and therefore 
produces a schismogenetic counter while vicariously objectifying the Other-
16 Sinnapah Arasaratnam, Indians in Malaysia and Singapore (Kuala Lumpur, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1979), 3 and 4.
that is , as wholly Other-as the surmounted past within the historiographic 
desire Malay Islamic modernism.’17
The Indian community, or should I say, Indian communities of Malaysia being 
discussed here were largely a result of British expansion into Malaysia. As 
the British first came to occupy the Straits Settlements they brought along 
Indian sepoys, lascarines and servants who had been recruited in India. The 
first commercial crops to be grown in these port settlements of Penang, 
Malacca and Singapore were cane and coffee and through a system of 
indenture, Indian labourers were brought in to work on these plantations. The 
Straits Settlements were used to jail convicts who had been captured in 
India. At times these convicts were used in public works and when their 
sentence was complete, they were released within the Straits Settlements 
instead of the British bearing the additional cost of shipping them back to 
India. The practice of jailing Indian convicts in the Straits Settlements was 
stopped in 1860 as the European business community began to protest.18 As 
the British intervention began to expand into the hinterland and more land for 
cash crop cultivation became available, the growth and population 
distribution of Indians in the Malay Peninsula hinterland became closely tied 
to the growth in production of rubber and later oil palm plantations. In 1911 
the Indian population was at 270 000, in 1921 it was 470 000 and in 1931 at 
625 000.19 The Great Depression, the overproduction of rubber in the late 
1920s and finally the Japanese occupation were to affect the inflow of Indian 
immigrants to Malaya as their migration into the colony was closely tied to 
the commercial value and demand and supply forces in the production of 
rubber. Besides being plantation labourers, the British hired the Indians for 
public works, construction and as railway workers. Ninety percent of the 
labourers were of Tamil speaking origin. They came from Tamil areas such 
as North Arcot, South Arcot, Salem, Chingleput, Tanjore, Trichy and
17 Andrew C. Willford, Cage of Freedom, Tamil Identity and the Ethnic Fetish in Malaysia (NUS Press, 
Singapore, 2007), 118.
18 Sinnapah Arasaratham, Indians in Malaysia and Singapore, 28.
19 Ibid., 29.
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Ramnad. There were a small number of Indian labourers who came from 
Telegu districts of North Madras and Malayalam districts of Malabar.20
The complexities of British administration and expansion of commercial 
interests required protection in the form of policing and auxiliary troop 
support. For these purposes the British relied heavily upon their experiences 
with the ‘Martial classes of India’.21 The British recruited Punjabi Sikhs, 
Punjabi Mussulmans as well as some other North Indians including some 
Biharis to be policemen, to provide security services in various Government 
offices and banks and as technical personnel on the railways. It was 
common for these Punjabis to also double up as small- time money lenders 
and petty traders. These North Indians remained aloof of the South Indian 
labourers and associated closely with others of the same regional and 
linguistic community.
The educated Indians and the business communities also remained aloof 
and confined socialisation within their own economic class. Due to the 
positive experiences of British officers in having worked with Ceylonese 
subordinates while on a tour of duty in Ceylon and the network of schools 
created in north Ceylon by Christian missionaries, which created a pool of 
educated men with a good command in English, mathematics and 
accounting, British officers preferred to recruit Ceylonese for junior positions 
in the Government departments in the administration of Malaya. In 1947, 
there were 23000 Ceylonese clerks and subordinates in various aspects of 
British administration which extended to the railways, postal services, 
accounts division and even the Treasury.22 Soon Malayalees from Cochin 
and the Malabar districts of Madras, where there were similarly well 
organised systems of schools with access to higher education, began to 
seek opportunities in Malaya. They began arriving in the 1920s and were 
concentrated in the private sector, in the lower grades of clerical employment
20 Ibid., 25.
21 See Arunajeet Kaur, Sikhs in the policing of British Malaya and Straits Settlements (1874-1957), 
(Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2009).
22 Sinnapah Arasaratnam, Indians in Malaysia and Singapore, 33.
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in European firms and plantations. Educated Indian Tamils were to follow suit 
and professionals such as doctors, lawyers, teachers and journalists began 
seeking opportunities in Malaya as well. But these educated classes were 
mainly concerned with the educational opportunities for their children and 
their continued prospects in Malaya and seldom involved in the affairs of the 
labouring classes.
There were also prosperous Indian business communities who arrived 
seeking opportunities in Malaya. There were other sub-ethnic Indian groups 
such as the Parsees, Sindhis, Marwaris and Gujerati traders and merchants 
who were by the 1940s able to establish the North Indian Chamber of 
Commerce. And of course there was the Nattukottai Chettyar community that 
had not only made its existence felt in Malaya but in most parts of Southeast 
Asia.The Chettyar community had its own religious and social customs that 
restricted their involvement with other Indian communities. As I will explain 
further in Chapter Two, these Indian immigrants who were arriving in Malaya 
did not embody a monolithic identity as Indians. They identified with their 
sub-ethnicities of being Tamils or Malayalees or Punjabi Sikhs. Their world 
views were further fragmented according to their village, linguistic and even 
caste subdivisions. It was the British who classified them in the various 
censuses as Indians and that too according to their geographic origin in India 
and their linguistic affiliation.
Early Indian migrants were first aligned to their family, then village kin, similar 
caste, linguistic orientation, sub -ethnic group and finally they only referred to 
each other as Indian in relation to the other ethnicities such as Chinese or 
Malays of Malaya. Beginning with caste orientation, social ritual with regards 
to commensality, marriage and other ceremonies segregated those of higher 
from the lower castes. Later it would become evident even in the political 
arena that caste affiliation began to play a significant role in even MIC politics 
as displayed in the 1980s and late 1990s (See chapter Four). The Tamil 
community and its concerns dominated the centre stage of Malaysian Indian 
politics. This was because the Tamils make up the largest percentage of the
9
Indian population in Malaysia and it was primarily the South Indians who 
predominated in the plantation economy as labourers.
Malaysian Indians were generally influenced by the variants of Hinduism 
that was consistent with their caste, class and sub -ethnic orientation. Upper 
caste Indians identified with the so- called, ‘greater tradition’ of Hinduism that 
encouraged imbibing Hindu philosophies from scripture such as the Vedas. 
Upper class, urban educated Indians followed suit in pursuing Hindu 
philosophy rather than ritual and looked at famous Hindu philosophers like 
Aurobindo and Vivekananda. South Indian Tamils and the Ceylon Tamils 
followed Tamil Saivism and the Telugus, the Vasnavite tradition while 
Northern Indians and Brahmins adhered to Vedantic traditions. The 
plantation labourers’ lives were centred around the temple. In many cases, 
immigrants brought the soil of the traditional Hindu temples from their 
ancestral lands in India and implanted it on the grounds of the new temples. 
The unlettered plantation labourers also adhered to the ‘lesser tradition’ of 
Hinduism that was centred on ritual, trance and the worship of ‘village deities’ 
or ‘minor deities’.23
Rajoo24 and Wiebe and Mariappen25 write of the ‘ethnic insularity’ of the 
Indians on the plantations. To begin with, very few were educated and could 
relate to the complicated nuances of British governmental and later UMNO- 
led policies and procedures. The middle man, ‘Mando’, negotiated the 
position and views of the plantation workers based on his affiliation with the 
government or authorities of the day. Culturally the Indian labourers were 
preoccupied with the preservation of their own Indian identity, which assured 
them of social and communal security by maintaining links with kin in 
Malaysia and back in India. Their main concern was their own village of
23 R.Rajoo, "World-view of the Indians with regard to their social identity and belonging in 
Malaya, c .19o 0- 57" in Malaysian World view, ed. Mohd. Taib Osman (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1985).
24 Ibid.
25 Paul D. Wiebe and S. Mariappen, Indian Malaysians: The View from the Plantation (New Delhi: 
Manohar publications, 1978).
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origin (ur) or the region they came from. This attitude was encouraged by the 
British, who wanted the Indians to remain distinct and it helped communal 
representation when the Indians remained a separate and identifiable 
community. Wiebe and Mariappen, whose research was conducted at a 
plantation Pudthukuchi in the 1970s, describe the ethnic insularity of the 
Indians vis-a-vis the Malays and Chinese who were also resident on the 
plantation.26 The Chinese, Malays and Indians lived in segregated quarters, 
went to different schools on the plantation and maintained unhealthy 
stereotypes about each other’s community, although there was no actual 
physical confrontation between the various ethnic groups. The sense of 
ethnic insularity and preoccupation with their cultural inheritance from India 
did not help the Malaysian Indian community in being rooted to a Malayan / 
Malaysian consciousness. Though in Chapter Two, I will demonstrate that 
there was a dichotomy between Malayan-born Indians and Indians from India 
in their orientation in loyalty and identity at the point of decolonization. In the 
early days there was ambivalence on the part of the Indian community in 
perceiving Malaya as a nation and homeland when ancestral ties and 
linkages were still fresh in communal memory. In later decades there is an 
assumption of a hyphenated identity. Malaysian-lndian that sutures 
Malaysian national markers, history and emblems with the Indian cultural 
consciousness. But through the Hindraf claim, it is obvious that Malaysian 
Indians expect the Malaysian state to honour Indians as well as the Malays 
as equal citizens.
In terms of political participation, studies conducted in the 1970s and 1980s, 
both Rajoo and Wiebe and Mariappen have highlighted the politically 
apathetic stance of the labourers. It was commonplace for the Malayan 
Indian Congress (MIC) party to form pacts with the ‘Mandos’ to rally up any 
number of labourers to vote for them.27Until the 1970s, the Indian plantation 
labourers were aware of general details of the internal politics within MIC but 
they also maintained an interest in DMK, Tamil Nad politics. And they
26 Ibid., 47.
27 Ibid., 91.
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maintained fervour for Tamil films, particularly those that featured MGR 
(Maruthur Gopalan Ramachandran) and recently Rajnikanth, which to a 
certain level influenced individual and group personality. But there was never 
an actual attempt to engage with the Malaysian political scene. As it will be 
explained in Chapter One, the plantation labourers were active agents of 
change in the post-war Trade and Labour Union movement, but then again 
they were not lobbying for political change or civil rights. Their actions were 
driven by economic reasons of negotiating better wages and living 
standards.
The Indian Muslim community has long portrayed the shadows of 
assimilation and communal boundaries associated with ethnic integration in 
Malaysia. Indian Muslim traders have long been attributed with the 
Islamisation of the Southeast Asian region. In the 18th century, with the 
establishment of the Penang Settlement by the British, Indian Muslim petty 
businessmen also known as Chulias arrived to set up shops .There was a 
regular stream of spontaneous Indian Muslim migrants to the Malay 
Peninsula. Nagata gives an in- depth account of the significant arrival and 
settlement of Indian Muslims in Malaya but also highlights the grey areas that 
involved issues of commonality and distinction between Indian Muslims and 
the Malay community.28 The Malay community often accepted those of 
Islamic faith into the Malay community under the equation of masuk Islam / 
masuk Melayu( to embrace Islam is to become Malay) but the Malays 
maintained differentiation from the Indian Muslims by referring to them as 
Jawi Peranakan ( Jawi in reference to Southeast Asian Muslims and 
Peranakan as being indigenous to the land) and there are also pejorative 
references to ‘Malays’ who have Indian ancestry being referred to as DKK, 
for Darah Keturunan Keling29 Nonetheless, after Independence as the 
benefits of being Malay or bumiputera became obvious, many Indian
28 Judith Nagata, "Religion and Ethnicity among the Indian Muslims of Malaysia" in Indian 
Communities in Southeast Asia, ed. K.S Sandhu et.al (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies 
Publishing, 2006).
29 Ibid.
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Muslims took the option of assimilating into the Malay community to enjoy 
those benefits.
The life and times of Malaysian Indians has received consistent academic 
attention. Sandhu30, Wiebe and Ramachandran31, describe the life of the 
Indian plantation worker in Malaysia .The Indian labourers were made to 
work long hours in difficult circumstances, whereby they had to clear jungle 
growth for plantation land, subjecting them to snake and poisonous insect 
bites and diseases such as malaria, and they faced oppressive treatment by 
the planters and management of the plantation. Medical facilities were poor 
and opportunities and facilities for education on the plantation were meager. 
The harsh conditions of the plantation encouraged social problems such as 
excessive alcoholism amongst the labourers (partly due to the ready 
availability of toddy peddlers on the plantation) and also wife /female, child 
abuse within the family unit. Jain describes life on the plantation as a 
‘community sub- system’32 with the plantation becoming a total institution; 
one is born, educated, gets married, has children and finally dies without 
even having left the plantation. This would have naturally bred a sense of 
alienation amongst these Indian plantation laborers from the indigenous 
Malay (a/sian) people and retarded a sense of assimilation.
As mentioned earlier, there were Indians who arrived as auxiliaries of the 
Empire and as lower level civil servants. But any hope for upward social and 
professional mobility was hampered by colonial policy. As in other parts of 
the Empire, Indians were looked upon as ‘interlopers and middle men’33 to be 
excluded from ‘power and politics’.34 These policy impediments to Indian
30 Kernail Singh Sandhu, Indians in Malaya: some aspects of their immigration and settlement (1786- 
1957) (London: Cambridge U.P. 1969).
31 SelvaKumar Ramachandran, Indian plantation labour in Malaysia, (Malaysia, 1994).
32 Quoted in SelvaKumar Ramachandran, Indian plantation labour in Malaysia, 18.
33 Hugh Tinker, Separate and Unequal, India and the Indians in the British Commonwealth 1920- 
1950 (Great Britain: C. Hurst & Co, 1976), 9.
34 Ibid. 126.
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communal aspirations were to inevitably enmesh large portions of the Indian 
community into a poverty trap well into the post independence era largely 
due to their lack of adequate representation during and after the colonial era.
Rajoo35 and Nagarajan36 highlight that when the plantation economy gave 
way to fragmentation and ownership subdivisions, many Indians lost not only 
their livelihood but their entire world view as they were forced to relocate to 
urban areas. Lacking education and skills and in some instances, even 
adequate documentary evidence of their citizenship status, Indians found 
little opportunity for employment and social mobility. Setting up residence in 
squatter settlements, they were compelled to break out of their cocoons 
when they had to interact with Malays and according to Nagarajan, this led 
them to encounter further racism.
Puthucheary37, Ramasamy38, Jeyakumar39, Thillainathan40 and Oorjitham41 
have highlighted the depreciating economic circumstances of the Indians in 
Malaysia, focusing on the low wages of the Indian urban working class, the 
low level of household income of Indians , the impact of the New Economic
35R. Rajoo, "Indian Squatter settlements: Indian Rural-Urban migration in West Malaysia" in Indian 
Communities in Southeast Asia, ed. K.S. Sandhu et.al (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies Publishing, 2006).
36 S. Nagarajan, "Indians in Malaysia: Towards Vision 2020" in Rising India and Indian Communities 
in East Asia, ed. Kesavapany et al. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008).
37 Mavis Puthucheary, "Indians in the Public Sector in Malaysia" in Indian Communities in Southeast 
Asia, ed. K.S. Sandhu et.al (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Publishing, 2006).
38 P. Ramasamy, "Socio Economic Transformation of Malaysian Indian Plantation Workers" in 
Southeast Asia, ed. K.S. Sandhu et.al (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Publishing, 
2006).
39 D. Jeyakumar, "The Indian poor in Malaysia: problems and solutions" in Indian 
Communities in Southeast Asia, ed. K.S Sandhu et.al (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies Publishing, 2006).
40 R. Thillainathan, "A critical review of Indian economic performance and priorities for action" in 
Rising India and Indian Communities in East Asia, ed. Kesavapany et al (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008).
41 K.A. SusanA Oorjitham, "Urban-Working Class Indians in Malaysia" in Indian Communities in 
Southeast Asia, ed. K.S. Sandhu et.al (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Publishing, 
2006).
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Policy (NEP) and the existence of subsequent barriers of entry for Indians to 
be in the Malaysian Public service , to attain tertiary education and in 
economic enterprise, therefore explaining the low percentage of Indian equity 
ownership.
In the issue of education, Tamil education and access to educational 
opportunities preoccupies the attention of the community. Marimuthu42, 
Arumugam43 and Nadarajah44 highlight the dilemma within the community in 
preserving Tamil language education (although it provides for limited 
opportunity for upward social mobility) versus scraping it. Activists use the 
state of Tamil language schools, being poorly funded and managed, as a 
moot point to highlight the UMNO government’s apathy, if not neglect, for the 
needs of the Indian community and culture. However, recent debates in the 
press regarding ethnic segregation in schooling systems have supported the 
idea of an integrated, national schooling system that takes all of Malaysia’s 
multi cultural communal needs on board. But the fact remains that the ethnic 
quota for university admissions stands against attempts of the Indian 
community to uplift itself and ensure greater professional and economic 
opportunities for the future.
A recent publication, by Appadurai and Dass entitled ‘Malaysian Indians; 
Looking forward’ 45 pointed out detailed statistics of the Malaysian Indian 
income, education and social situation. In 2005, Malaysian Indians consisted 
of 7.5 % of the Malaysian population, which is a significant decrease from 
11.26% of the population at Independence. In 2000, 87.6 % of the Malaysian 
Indian population was Tamil, with Hinduism being practised by 84.10% of the
42 T. Marimuthu, "The plantation School as an agent of Social reproduction" in Indian Communities in 
Southeast Asia, ed. K.S. Sandhu et.al (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Publishing, 
2006).
43 K. Arumugum, "Tamil School education in Malaysia: Challenges and prospects in the new 
Millennium" in Rising India and Indian Communities in East Asia, ed. Kesavapany et al. (Singapore:
I SEAS, 2008).
44 M. Nadarajah, Another Malaysia is possible and other essays (Malaysia:Nohd publications , 2004).
45 Jayanath Appudurai & G.A. David Dass, Malaysian Indians: Looking forward (Malaysia: Strategic 
Information and Research Development Centre, 2008).
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Indian population. The Indian communities were largely concentrated in the 
states of Selangor, Perak and Johor. In 2000, the largest percentage of 
Indians at 12.8% earned the monthly gross household income of RM 2725, 
only 5 % earned RM 3456. Also in 2000, most Indians had only been 
educated up till primary school (33.10%) or lower secondary (28.20%). 
7.15% had qualified from university and other tertiary institutions. This would 
explain why only 10.1% of the Indians were employed in professional fields 
when they largely dominated in the production (39.4%), agriculture (15.1%) 
and services (12.1%) sectors. However the most shocking statistics were 
those involving the percentage of convicted prisoners and crime, 9% of drug 
addiction crimes, 19.7% of murder convictions and 9.5 % of Juvenile crime 
are Indians. 13.37 % of convicted prisoners in Malaysia are Indians .These 
figures are out of proportion in terms of the Indian percentage of the 
population. Appadurai and Dass highlight that Indians as a minority endure 
political and economic marginalisation in Malaysia as their numbers within 
the Malaysian population do not ensure them significant representation or a 
vote bank in most constituencies, and ineffective measures by the MIC and 
the government has kept the Indian community depressed in Malaysia, in 
terms of the percentage economic equity of the country.
Beyond the socio- economic disadvantages of the Malaysian Indian 
community already highlighted, a stinging point for the Indian community in 
Malaysia has always been the negative stereotyping and representation of 
them in the press and media. Nadarajah46 highlights that despite statistical 
evidence, South Indians are made out to be violent and of a criminal nature. 
He discusses the issue of Tamil movies being cited by analysts in Malaysia 
as a major influence in inciting such adverse behaviour within the 
community. This accentuates the feelings of discrimination endured by 
Indians in post- independence Malaysia as they feel that Malaysians, in 
general, take pot shots at south Indians for their culture, language, 
circumstances and to some extent, even their phenotypical features.
46 M. Nadarajah, Another Malaysia is possible and other essays, 140.
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However, the most recent form of discrimination Indians (and other non- 
Muslim minorities) have endured in Malaysia is due to the increasing 
Islamisation of Malaysian state and population. Wilford47 addresses this 
issue when highlighting that Tamils in Malaysia are experiencing a 
heightened sense of religiosity in response to ethnicity and religion, 
increasingly being used in a conflated state to legitimise the local political 
system.48 His publication precedes the Hindraf rally in November 2007, 
giving evidence that his observations were accurate, as Hindraf was inspired 
chiefly by the suppression of Hindu rights in Malaysia through the demolition 
of Hindu temples and controversies over religious conversions.
Supernor49,like other analysts, attributes blame for the Indian community’s 
plight to the Malaysian context that privileges the Malay Community 
/bumiputera(sor\ of the soil), the inherent divisions within the community 
according to class and sub- ethnicities and finally an ineffective Indian 
leadership . However, in my study I attempt to explore the issue beyond 
these generalisations as reasons for failure. Although my study will analyse 
a post- colonial Malaysian society, it would be important to begin at the 
decolonizing moment, (post- war and well past 1957, possibly until 1969) as 
it is during this time that interest groups were forming and propagating their 
individual ‘nations of intent’.50 It is important to understand how Indians were 
negotiating their identity, cultural and national orientation from this moment 
onwards as it would have impacted their role as stakeholders in the 
Malaysian nation and hence their determination in agitating for rights and 
mobilising, politically or otherwise .
47 Andrew C Willford, Cage of Freedom, Tamil Identity and the Ethnic Fetish in Malaysia, 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2007).
48 Ibid., 1.
49 Dennis E. Supernor, Tamils in Malaysia: Problems in Socio-Economic development for an 
immigrant minority group, Thesis PH.D. 1983 RICE UNIVERSITY.
50 A. B Shamsul, "Nations of Intent in Malaysia" in Asia in theories of Nationalism and national 
identity in Asian forms of the Nation, ed. Stein Tossenson et.al (Great Britain: Nordic Institute of 
Asian Studies, 1996).
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Indian attempts at political mobilisation and negotiation of minority 
rights in Malaysia
Attempts to study political mobilisation and negotiation amongst Indians in 
Malaysia have been few and fragmented. Perhaps this is revelatory of the 
extent of political activity within the Malaysian Indian community itself. 
Scholars studying the indenture and migration of Indian plantation labour in 
other contexts, such as Lai51 and Carter52, have observed reluctance 
amongst Indian labourers in the Empire to resist, at least in the conventional 
manner of protests and boycotts, the oppression experienced on the 
plantation. Lai posits several reasons for this: the sojourner’s mentality that 
was focused on remitting back earnings; ‘individual achievement and 
personal survival’; ineffective or ‘lackey’ leadership amongst Indians that 
served the goals of plantation management rather than labour; the inability to 
comprehend law and justice amongst labourers, hence disempowering them 
legally to have organised protest; and the psychological burden of having 
experienced the brutality and instruments of power employed by planters that 
kept labourers oppressed . This was true of the Indian labourers brought to 
Malaya as well. However, the influence of communism (through interaction 
with mainly Chinese labour in Malaya) and the advent of Indian nationalism 
were able to rouse the Indian population to significant political activity, 
culminating first in the 1941 Klang strikes.
In contrast Stenson53 and Brown54 both observe that the efforts made by the 
Indian community to express discontent and to lobby minority rights were
51 Brij Lai V., Cholo jahaji (Canberra: Division of Pacific and Asian History, Australian National 
University and Fiji Museum, 2000).
52 Marina Carter, Voices from indenture: experiences of Indian migrants in the British Empire, 
(London, New York, Leicester University Press, 1996).
53 Michael Stenson, Class, Race and Colonialism in Malaysia: The Indian Case 
(Queensland, University of Queensland Press, 1980).
54 Rajeswary Ampalavanar, The Indian minority and political change in Malaya 1945-1957 (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981).
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fraught by divisions of class and subethnic concerns. Ramasamy55, Stenson 
and Brown observe that the Labour and Trade Union Movement was to 
flourish in the immediate post- war context having benefitted from the 
experience of being mobilised with the Indian National Army (INA) and the 
influence of the Malayan People’s Anti Japanese Army (MPAJA), which was 
essentially communist in nature in its post -war manifestations. But 
Emergency regulations enforced by the British Military Administration were 
quick to quell the fervour of Indian involvement in union activities and the 
formation of the National Union of Plantation Workers in 1954, aimed as 
being the centralised and united labour organisation, ushered in an era of 
moderate activism.
The greater force in mobilising Indian labour was Tamil nationalism. The 
predominantly South Indian Plantation Labour was deeply influenced by 
Tamil nationalism which had two strands ; Ampalavanar56 and Arasaratnam57 
note the significance of the manifestations of Dravidianism in the efforts of 
Malayan Indians to establish the Pan-Malayan Dravidian Federation (PMDF) 
in 1932 and Dravida Kalagams in Ipoh and Singapore in 1946 . Many South 
Indian labourers were influenced by the teachings of Ramasamy Naicker, 
and this was reflected in the attitudes of the labourers to affect a Tamil 
separatism of sorts by not adhering to the leadership of certain middle- class 
Indian political organisations, such as the Indian Associations and 
subsequently the MIC, which were in the initial stages dominated by the 
Ceylonese and Northern Indians. Tamil Nationalism also took a militant 
manifestation in the formation of Thondar Padai, which was a Tamil youth 
movement, inspired initially by Indian Congress nationalism but that 
gravitated increasingly towards greater emphasis on Tamil-ness and class 
unity.
55 P. Ramasamy, Socio Economic Transformation of Malaysian Indian Plantation Workers in Indian 
Communities in Southeast Asia, ed. K.S Sandhu et.al (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies Publishing, 2006).
56Rajeswary Ampalavanar, The Indian minority and political change in Malaya 1945-1957, 33.
57 Arasaratnam Sinappah, Indians in Malaysia and Singapore, 129.
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Ampalavanar highlights the second strand of Tamil Nationalism, which took 
root among the Tamil journalists, businessmen, school teachers and 
relatively high caste labourers, who had been alienated from the militant 
PMDF. Their principal organisations include the Tamil Reform Association of 
Malaya and Singapore, the Tamils Representative Council, Tamil Pannai and 
the Tamil Reform Association, but their activities were largely apolitical, 
focusing instead on social and religious reform.
While the labouring classes took to the Labour Unions, the Indian middle 
classes consisting of civil servants, lawyers, clerks and businessmen 
expressed their concerns through representation in the various Colonial 
Administrative Councils and through the formation of associations and 
political parties. Even this group, which Ampalavanar dubs the ‘ elite 
factions’58 was composed of two factions .There was the conservative 
faction, the wealthy , English- educated professionals , separated from the 
Indian masses by class , ethnic , caste and cultural distinctions . The great 
majority were Ceylon Tamils, Bengalis or Malayalees who primarily lobbied 
their own interests such as English language educational privileges for their 
children and greater representation on colonial administrative councils, and 
as a result they were alienated from the larger Indian community which was 
of the labouring class. The second elite faction was composed of radical 
nationalists. The majority were lawyers, heavily influenced by the ideology of 
the Indian National Congress. In the 1920s and the 1930s, they dominated 
Indian Associations throughout Malaya and Singapore, but it was not until 
the formation of the Central Indian Association of Malaya (CIAM) in 1936 that 
they became an effective political force.
The CIAM and arguably the Malayan (sian) Indian Congress, MIC, formed in 
1946 were largely impotent organisations, in negotiating Indian rights for two 
reasons.They did not enjoy the support of the Indian masses, largely the 
working class, who viewed them with suspicion, and they were ambivalent 
about crucial issues of citizenship and nationality from the outset of their 
creation, unsure if it was Indian or Malayan decolonization that they should
58Rajeswary Ampalavanar, The Indian minority and political change in Malaya 1945-1957, 6.
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be involved in. MIC was only able to obtain some degree of support from the 
general Indian population when firstly the party underwent a Tamilisation in
1954 with the election of V.T Sambathan as president and secondly, in April
1955 when it became a full partner of the Alliance, which became the 
government after Independence.
The story of the political mobilisation of Indians in Malaysia, as told by 
scholars stops there, told only from Independence to 1957. Ampalavanar’s 
work on The Indian minority and political change (1945- 1957), Stenson’s 
on Class, race and colonialism in West Malaysia - The Indian case and 
Ramasamy’s on Plantation Labour, Unions, Capital, and the State in 
Peninsular Malaysia are seminal works in understanding the account of 
Indian activism in Malaya(sia) during the pre-colonial era , but there is an 
absence in contextualisation of these accounts against the central debates of 
the survival of ethnic minorities in colonial and post- colonial environments . 
This context includes the forces of dominant nationalism in Malaysia and its 
impact on minorities; space(s) of representation; political, economic, judicial, 
cultural for minorities in Malaysia, national and transnational imaginings of 
the minority (immigrant) people.
Some fragmented attempts at scholarly analysis have been made to 
understand the state of political mobilization and activism amongst Indians in 
the post-colonial context. In a later work, Brown59 attempts to analyse the 
effectiveness of primarily Indian leaders of the MIC, account for the 
performance of the Indian political elite in elections up to the seventies and 
primarily cites the political system in Malaysia, communalism for the 
ineffectiveness of Indian leadership. Ramasamy60, when discussing issues 
of Indian political representation, reinforces the limitations endured by 
Indians as a result of the politics of Malay hegemony and the inabilities of the
59 Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown, "The Contemporary Indian Political Elite in Malaysia" in Indian 
Communities in Southeast Asia, ed. K.S. Sandhu et.al (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies Publishing, 2006).
60 P. Ramasamy, "Politics of Indian representation in Malaysia" in Indian
Communities in Southeast Asia, ed. K.S. Sandhu et.al (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies Publishing, 2006).
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MIC to represent the needs and causes of the Indians and places hope for 
the future of Indians in the flourishing Malaysian civil society. Anbalakan61 
tries to understand the attempts at socio economic self help by the Indians 
by analysing early failures such as the National Land Finance Cooperative 
Societies (NLFCA) established by V. T Sambathan in 1960, the creation of 
Great Alloniers Trading Corporation (GATCO) in 1967 by NUPW, Nesa, a 
multi- purpose cooperative formed by Manickavasagam in 1974 and later 
Majujaya and the Maika holdings which were created to increase Indian 
equity ownership in the corporate sector. Anbalakan cites the predominance 
of factionalism, power mongering and mismanagement as the reasons for 
the ineffectiveness of these endeavours at self help.
In reviewing the literature on Indians in Malaysia , it is obvious that no 
scholarly attempt has been made to account and analyze Indian responses 
to peak political and economically defining moments.Such as reaction to the 
events of the 1969 ethnic clashes , the formation of the National Operations 
Council (NOC) which was to initiate affirmative action in Malaysia ,such as 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971 and was continued as the National 
development Policy in 1990, the increasing practices of authoritarianism and 
patronage during the Mahathir era , the proliferation of the Malaysian Civil 
society as a result of Reformasi of the late 1990s and finally increasing 
processes of Islamisation in Malaysia . Each phase of Malaysian history, as 
mentioned here, impacted the non- Muslim /Malay minorities significantly. 
Recent, journalist’s editorials, blog spots and other media reveal a rising 
consciousness amongst the Chinese and Indians of Malaysia that they have 
conceded too much over the last 50 years, but while the Chinese persist to 
predominate in the corporate sector, with the exception of a small group of 
successful millionaires and professionals, the Indians remain the underclass 
that they were when they first arrived under the auspices of the British 
Empire.
61 K.Anbalakan, "Socio-Economic Self help among Indians in Malaysia" in Rising India and Indian
Communities in East Asia, ed. Kesavapany et al. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008).
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This thesis will analyze the continuities and disjuncture that escalated the 
marginalization of Indians to the present state, as exemplified by the Hindraf 
episode.62 It will analyze 1) how the Indians mobilized themselves during 
these significant historical phases 2) under what circumstances they could or 
could not mobilize, 3) how effective were their efforts, organizations and 
leaders. Realizing the complexities of the Indian community that consists of 
many sub-ethnicities, I will focus my attention primarily on the Tamils, who 
form 80% of the Malaysian Indian population.
Malaysia as hostland or homeland for Indians
Is there a Malayan/Malaysian consciousness and what is it? Sumit Mandal 
writes of ‘everyday teh tarik nationalism’63 and the existence of transethnic 
solidarities between Malaysians that transcend the race rhetoric of the 
Barisan Nasional government and the elite to refer to ‘a variety of efforts 
whereby the Malaysians actively participate in society without respect to 
ethnic background and by rejecting primordial notions of ethnicity’.64 These 
efforts include the social and cultural activities of arts groups, religious 
communities, civic and business groups. However, in the perspective of 
minority lobby groups like the Hindraf, social and cultural activities , while 
aesthetically pleasing and admirable in the creation of interstitial spaces 
whereby token reverence is given to blurred racial boundaries and multiracial 
harmony, do not percolate everyday realities in Malaysian life sufficiently to 
ensure equal opportunity and due respect for Hindu custom, culture and 
religion.
In examining the historical trajectory of Malayan nationalism/Malaysian 
nationalism, beginning from the creation of UMNO in response to the 
Malayan Union proposal, to the formation of Federation and the Merdeka 
Constitution, the following chapters will explain that it was a Malay
63 Teh tarik refers to sweet milky tea usually served in Malaysian coffee-shops.Here it is a metaphor 
to explain the everyday political realities and perception of the common Malaysians.
64 Sumit K.Mandai, "Transethnic solidarities, racialisation and social equality" in The state of 
Malaysia: Ethnicity, equity and reform, ed. Edmund Terence Gomez,
London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 50.
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nationalism that emerged within the Malayan context rather than a Malayan 
nationalism. The United Malay National Organization (UMNO) was not 
formed to release Malaya from the yoke of British Imperialism as much as to 
ensure and protect Malay special privileges and rights. Anthony Reid in 
expressing the dilemmas of Southeast Asian nationalisms acknowledges that 
countries in these regions attempt to foster nationalisms that are essentially 
built along a core, usually an ethnic core with a civic path encapsulated by a 
territory, as instituted by the colonial authorities.65 In the case of Malaysia, its 
core culture is a ‘Malayness’ which predominatesin the Malaysian national 
consciousness. This has two implications: 1) that Malaysian national 
consciousness is a fragmented one with Malays as the core and the other 
communities on the periphery, each beholding their own ‘nation of intent’66 
for Malaysia 2) that Malaysian national consciousness is not one which 
promises inclusivity. It has exclusive rights for the sons of the soil 
(bumiputeras) versus migrant communities (pendatang) essentially in 
reference to the Chinese and Indians, though the latter communities have 
been settled on Malaysian soil for generations and centuries. This raises the 
questions so often asked in migration literature which address issues of 
belonging, assimilation, continuities and disjuncture from the original land of 
migration. In the case of many Malaysian Indians, they no longer have family 
in India, they have no interest or stake in Indian national or Tamil Nadu 
politics except for general knowledge, and most exercise cultural affiliation 
with India through religious practice and customs as handed down from their 
ancestors . Visiting Indian nationals from the sub- continent claim that even 
they do not practice the religion or culture, or speak the language the way 
Malaysian Indians do. In short, Malaysia is the only home Malaysian Indians 
have, yet they are considered foreign and with a secondary stake in the 
national consciousness of Malaysia.
65 Anthony Reid, Imperial alchemy: nationalism and political identity in Southeast Asia (Cambridge, 
UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
66 A.B. Shamsul, "Nations-of-lntent in Malaysia" in Asian forms of Nation, ed. Stein Tonnesson et.al 
(Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1996).
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Given this context, one wonders if it is even reasonable to apply models of 
multiculturalism as espoused by Kymlicka and more recently Madood that 
are premised on liberal democractic principles.67 In examining the literature 
on Malaysian multiculturalism, Cheah Boon Kheng, Shamsul, Kahn and Loh, 
Ackerman and Lee, Lim Teck Ghee, Alberto Gomes and Azly Rahman, the 
absence of discussion on the position of Indians in multicultural Malaysia is 
conspicuous.68The dialogue that ensues is usually about the Malays and 
their primary ‘Other’, the Chinese. There could be several reasons for this: 1) 
the diversity of the Malaysian Indian community does not allow an academic 
to commit to any generalizations; 2) in comparison to the Chinese, the 
Indians are considered insignificant numerically; 3) the Indian community has 
not come out in an open confrontation with the Malay as the Chinese have 
in the magnitude as exemplified in the 1969 riots; and 4) the MIC has been 
‘enough’ political representation for the Indians and there is no other story to 
tell where the political evolution of the Malaysian Indian community is 
concerned. However, this thesis will demonstrate that there needs to be 
more academic engagement with the Malaysian Indians as a case study of 
minority rights, cultural and political acceptance and assimilation.
Chapter outline
Each chapter in this dissertation examines an agent or event in the history of 
the Malaysian Indian community that attempts to explain the Malaysian 
Indian plight and the eventual Hindraf phenomenon.
67 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights (Oxford; New York: 
Clarendon Press, 1995) and Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism: a civic idea (Cambridge; Malden,
MA : Polity, 2007).
68 Cheah Boon Kheng, The challenge of ethnicity: building a nation in Malaysia (Singapore :
Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2004); A.B. Shamsul, "Nations-of-lntent in Malaysia" in Asian forms 
of Nation, ed. Stein Tonnesson et.al (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1996); Joel S. Kahn, Francis Loh 
Kok Wah (eds), Fragmented vision : culture and politics in contemporary Malaysia, Honolulu( H i: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1992);Raymond L. M. Lee & Susan E. Ackerman, Sacred tensions: 
modernity and religious transformation in Malaysia, (Columbia : University of South Carolina Press, 
1997);Lim Teck Ghee, Alberto Gomes & Azly Rahman(eds), Multiethnic Malaysia : past, present 
and future, (Petaling Jaya, Malaysia : Strategic Information and Research Development Centre ; 
Kuala Lumpur: MIDAS, UCSI University, 2009).
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Chapter one focuses on the labouring class and plantation workers amongst 
the Malaysian Indian population. This class formed the bulk of the Indian 
population. Unlettered, poor and contracted into plantation work, they had 
very little access to upward mobility, socially and economically. Settled in 
estates that kept them insular from the rest of the Malayan population, these 
labourers had few opportunities for integration into the Malayan social, 
political and economic fabric. Nonetheless, during the post-war, Trade and 
Labour Union Movement, this class of Indians proved to be key agents for 
the community to bargain and ameliorate the position of at least those within 
the same class bracket. However, the Union movement was quickly thwarted 
by colonial Emergency policies and regulations and the potential that the 
Indian labouring population (especially Indian union leaders) could have 
actualized as power brokers was not to be.
Chapter two discusses the decolonizing moment for Malaya. This moment is 
a metaphorical reference for a span of twelve years starting from the Mac 
Michael treaties in 1945 to the transfer of power from the British in 1957. It is 
also within this time bracket that India attained its Independence from the 
British and the Indian communities living all over the Empire were put into a 
quandary over citizenship status, investment or asset placement and even 
job security. This chapter looks at how the middle class Indians attempted to 
negotiate political and minority rights on behalf of the Malayan Indian 
community during this crucial phase that was to form the basis of Malayan 
(sian) national consciousness to present times.
Chapter three looks at key agents in the Malaysian Indian community by 
examining the effectiveness of the leadership of Sambanthan and 
Manickasavagam. These two leaders were at the helm of the main political 
organization representing the Malaysian Indian community, the Malaysian 
Indian Congress (MIC). The MIC as a component party of the Alliance and 
later National Front (Barisan Nasional) attained a virtual monopoly over the 
Indian community within a political mileu that was essentially a ‘one-party 
electoral system’. This would put leaders like Sambanthan and
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Manickasavagam in a pivotal position in determining the fate of Indians in 
Malaysia.
Chapter four extends from the previous chapter in analyzing another MIC 
leader, Samy Vellu. He held leadership of the MIC for thirty years, 
determining the fate of generations of Malaysian Indians. But most 
importantly, Malaysians, Indians and non-Indians alike view him as the villain 
who has perpetrated the community’s woes. This chapter aims to analyze if 
there is truth to this sentiment.
Chapter five examines the alternatives to the MIC, alternative Indian political 
parties, Indian Opposition parliamentarians and the emergence of Indian 
Non- governmental Organization (NGOs). The chapter highlights the 
strengths and limitations of these organizations and personalities but it also 
demonstrates a build-up of political consciousness within the Indian 
community against the backdrop of Reformasi in Malaysia and rising 
Islamisation.
In Chapter six there is an in-depth discussion of the Hindraf phenomenon. 
From its inception to the current moment, the chapter examines the Hindraf 
agenda, the reaction it has received from the Malaysian state and what that 
symbolizes for the Malaysian Indians.
The Hindraf rally in November 2007 had manifold effects. It resurrected 
questions amongst reflective Malaysians as to what their national identity 
was all about. While there were instances of support for the Hindraf cause, 
mostly covert, there was disillusionment that a significant protest for minority 
rights had occurred along racial/ethnic lines or divide yet again. Within the 
Indian community, the rally was an eruption of long-simmering discontent. 
This thesis traces this discontent through five decades in post-colonial 
Malaysia. Hindraf was suppressed quickly through state measures. But its 
importance to the Malaysian Indian community and to the Malaysian multi­
cultural milieu cannot be underestimated. While it symbolized an awakening 
and mobilization on an unprecedented scale on the part of the Indians, it was
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also a reflection of the cracks and ruptures the long-standing Malaysian 
‘social contract’ can no longer withstand.
Methodology
During my fieldwork stage, I began with the Singapore National Archives and 
the Arkib Negara Kuala Lumpur to look for documents on Indians in Malaya/ 
Malaysia. The Singapore National Archives had recently restructured to 
focus solely on a Singaporean perspective and documents such as the 
Federated Malay States Annual reports had been removed from Open 
access. I found the Oral history recordings on the Indian Community 
interesting, again the focus was on Singapore but I was able to gain 
interesting perspectives on the Indian National Army and Japanese 
Occupation. The Arkib Negara was not as helpful either. There were some 
records of Colonial Office documents pertaining to the Indian plantation and 
labouring community which have been analyzed in Chapter 1. There was 
largely a dearth of a paper trail with regards to the community and I had to 
rely heavily on newspaper sources, primarily the New Straits Times Archive 
at Bungsar, Kuala Lumpur, to piece together a narrative. I also looked at 
Tamil dailies, which had been placed in the Arkib Negara and the Malaysian 
National Library, such as the Nanban, Osai and the Tamil Nesan to confirm 
the reports and editorials in the English dailies. The New Straits Times 
Archive also had records of speeches made by parliamentarians such as 
Sambanthan and Manickasavagam (See Chapter three).
After the late 1980s , the English and local dailies became a less reliable 
source of information regarding ground sentiment and an actual reporting of 
events, as the component parties of the Barsian Nasional and the MIC had 
bought into the shares of the various newspapers . To relate the events 
discussed in Chapter 5 and 6 I turned to Internet sources that had emerged 
largely out of the IT revolution and Reformasiera of the 1990s. The 
Malayasiakini, though shunned by Malaysian bureaucrats, was a rich source 
of information in attaining knowledge of ground sentiment (through its Vox 
Populi) and giving blow by blow accounts of events and controversies as
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they unfolded. The Hindraf had set up its own webpage/s and I avidly read 
the blogs of famous bloggers like Raja Petra and Anwar Ibrahim amongst 
others. I also met with heads of various Indian NGOs, visited the MIC 
headquarters, interviewed key leaders of Indian organizations and long 
serving Indian journalists to attain their perspectives and attain annual 
reports of the various organizations. The Singapore Malaysia Collection of 
the National University of Singapore Library was also helpful in acquiring 
annual reports, documents and published works of Malaysian Opposition 
Parliamentarians.
However, as I surveyed the material on the topic, I became very conscious of 
my/ the authorial voice that I would assume in this dissertation. Being a 
minority Indian of Punjabi ethnicity from Singapore, I did not consider myself 
an insider or giving an insider’s perspective on the Malaysian (South) Indian 
community. This, I hoped, would give me detachment from the issues 
concerned and to present an analytical survey of the subject matter rather 
than an emotive one. It has not been easy to achieve either. Born and bred 
in Singapore, I had grown up amidst a multicultural mix of ethnicities that was 
not unlike Malaysia’s. Tamils form the majority of the Indian population in 
Singapore as in Malaysia. I had Malay, Chinese and Tamil friends in school 
and while I took Malay as a second language, I and my family felt a greater 
closeness and association with Tamil culture due to the fact that shopping 
belts in Singapore , such as Serangoon Road, created a familiarity with Tamil 
dress, cuisine and community. Later, my only sibling was to marry a 
Ceylonese wife in typical South Indian fashion and ceremony which was to 
herald a deeper understanding and respect for Hinduism, Hindu gods and 
Tamil culture. As I spoke to Malaysian Indians, visited their temples, ate their 
food and listened to their stories and experiences, I felt more and more like 
an insider. I too believed in their gods and felt sadness at the temple 
demolitions and one does not need to be South Indian in Malaysia, just 
human, to understand marginalization, denial of opportunities and human 
rights, for all of us have encountered this at some point, just in varying 
degrees and contexts.
29
Pictures of early Indian migrants to Malaya at work on the plantations and 
their dwelling.
Source: Manickam, Janakey Raman, The Malaysian Indian dilemma: the struggles 
and Agony o f the Indian community in Malaysia, Malaysia, 2009.
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Chapter 1 -  Indian labour efforts at resistance - A subaltern 
people mobilize in Malaya
For decades throughout colonization and after independence, Indian (South 
Indian) plantation labour formed the bulk of the Malayan Indian population. 
As a people within a distinct class, made significant by the large numbers in 
their ranks, these plantation labourers had agency, if properly mobilized, to 
negotiate economic, political and social rights for the Indians in Malaya. 
However, this chapter will demonstrate that Indian plantation labourers were 
seldom rallied on ideational motives but instead on practical short-term 
needs, while the level of oppression endured over decades silenced the 
majority of this population into a certain apathy which required literate 
middlemen to instigate and garner their support. The South Indian plantation 
labour could have become a potent tool in the hands of forthcoming Malaya 
(sian) Indian leaders but the lack of planning and explored potential as well 
as state policy to suppress communism during the Malayan Emergency 
(1948-1960) cut that possibility short. Given the legacy and impact of the 
South Indian labourer on successive generations of Indians in Malaya 
/Malaysia in negotiating rights, space and identity , this chapter attempts to 
understand how the depressed labourer was able to express emancipation, 
or not, in the face of a hierarchy of power brokers above him . Was there any 
early form of articulation or demonstration at resistance, or even 
accommodation and why? What were the influences and factors that 
instigated these efforts at resistance over the decades of English Imperial 
domination and finally how did these efforts interact with the labourers’ 
binary, power elites, to establish into a fully fledged creation and participation 
in a union movement.
Indian labour in Malaya
Early references to South Indian labour in the Straits Settlements of Penang,
Singapore and Malacca show that Indians were migrating for work as far
back as 1794. Sir Francis Light, the founder of Penang, referred to them as
‘chuliahs’, people from the ports of the Coromandel Coast, who were
shopkeepers or coolies. ‘About one thousand are settled here, some with
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families. The vessels from the coast bring over annually 1500 or 2000 men , 
who by traffic and various kinds of labour obtain a few dollars with which they 
return to their homes and are succeeded by others.’1 Another reference to 
them shows that by 1867 the Straits Settlements was actually a popular 
destination for Tamil labourers:
The Straits Settlements have been the favorite resort of Kling 
immigrants from the earliest period of their establishment, Ceylon 
although close at hand being an inferior field in their estimation. They 
arrive in the Straits in August and September in native vessels , queer 
looking brigs and barks, mostly from ports of Madras ,as Cuddalore, 
Carrica , Nagore and Nagapatnam, the southwest monsoon which 
prevails at this season carrying them across in six or seven days to 
Pinang, which is always the first port of call in the Straits.2
They came to work on sugar, indigo, coffee and pepper plantations. The 
British were keen to accept them as labour as they were easily affordable 
and value for money. A British official claimed th a t, ‘ No class of men can 
here subsist on less that a Chuliah can, ...since his savings are rarely spent 
on the spo t, but sent to his family in India while the Chinese and Malays 
spend their liberally enough.’3 As British expansion into the Malayan 
hinterland continued, European planters invested in coffee and later rubber 
which required more recruitment of South Indian labour. Ampalavanar notes 
that by 1901 the Indian population in the Straits Settlements and the 
Federated Malay States was approximately 120 000 and by 1947 it was at 
600 000 4 Besides the Straits Settlements, Indian labour was concentrated 
mainly in the states of Perak and Selangor where there was excessive
1 Quoted in R.N Jackson, Immigrant labour and the development of Malaya, 1786-1920 (Kuala
Lumpur: Govt. Print., 1961), 7.
2 Ibid., 57.
The South Indian was also referred to as Kling.
3 Ibid., 17.
4 Rajeswary Ampalavanar, The Indian minority and political change in Malaya 1945-1957(Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981), 1.
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The migration of South Indian labour to Malaya was part of the wider 
voluntary or involuntary movement of Indian labour that fanned out in the 
Pacific, Asia and Africa6 under the auspices of the British Empire. After the 
abolition of slavery in 1833, Indian statutory or indentured labour was a 
desirable mode of labour recruitment as it appeared to have none of the 
negative moral connotations of the former. The arrival and settlement of 
Indian labour to Malaya has been adequately documented.7 Although earlier 
in this chapter I demonstrated that the Malayan territories were a popular 
destination for South Indian labour, historians like Sandhu and Arasaratnam 
explain that the circumstances of travel, terms and conditions of contract and 
settlement in Malaya was indeed, as Tinker termed it, a ‘ New system of 
slavery’.8 The Indian labourer who came to Malaya was mainly Tamil 
speaking but there were also Malayalees and Telegus. Sandhu described 
the South Indian labourer in Malaya, within the context of Imperial rule, as a
...peasant, particularly the untouchable and low caste Madrasi, was 
considered the most satisfactory type of labourer, especially for light, 
simple repetitive tasks. He was malleable , worked well under 
supervision and was easily manageable...he was the most amenable 
to the comparatively lowly paid and rather regimented life of estates 
and government departments ...he was already adjusted to a low
cultivation of rubber. A significant percentage of Indians also lived in Johore
and Kedah as estate labourers.5
5 Indians in the Malayan Economy (India, Office of the Economic Adviser, Delhi: Manager of 
Pubs, 1950).
5 See works of Brij V Lai, Kenneth Gillion, Marina Carter, Bill Freund and Sircar K.K
7 Kernail Singh Sandhu, Indians in Malaya: some aspects of their immigration and settlement (1786-
1957) (London: Cambridge U.P. 1969). Sinnapah Arasaratnam, Indians in Malaysia and Singapore 
(Kuala Lumpur, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). Selvakumaran Ramachandran, Indian 
plantation labour in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: S. Abdul Majeed & Co., Pub. Division,1994). Ravindra 
K. Jain, South Indians on the plantation frontier in Malaya (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1970). Paul D Wiebe and 5. Mariappen, Indian Malaysians: The View from the Plantation 
(New Delhi: Manohar publications, 1978).
8 Hugh Tinker, A new system of slavery; the export of Indian labour overseas, 1830-1920 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1974).
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standard of living, was a British subject, accustomed to British rule 
and well-behaved and docile . ...These people had neither the skill 
nor the enterprise to rise above the level of manual labour. Primitive 
and ill organized they never appear to have known the art of collective 
bargaining .They were therefore also especially desirable as the back- 
leg counterpoise to the more progressive labouring elements such as 
the Chinese . 9
Sandhu’s description reveals race prejudices and stereotyping that was 
common of the colonial era and of colonial historians who studied that era of 
race relations and Imperial policy towards the various races/communities in 
Malaya. But nonetheless the above description does depict the South Indian 
labourer on the Malayan plantation as typical of the general understanding of 
a subaltern class of people; he/she was considered ‘of inferior rank’10 in 
terms of ‘class, caste, age, gender and office’.11 Complete in their silence, 
the South Indian labouring class of Malaya has left no insight to their 
consciousness through letters or journals12, while researchers have had to 
infer through official state documentation or as ethnographers, live amidst 
them at the labour lines or settlements to understand their motivations and 
psyche.13
9 Kernail Singh Sandhu, Indians in Malaya, 56-57.
10 Ranajit Guha, "Preface" in Selected Subaltern studies, ed. Ranajit Guha et al. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988).
11 Asok Sen, "Subaltern Studies: capital, Class and community" in Subaltern Studies V; writings on 
South Asian History and Society ed. Ranajit Guha (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987).
12 Marina Carter's work on Voices from indenture: experiences of Indian migrants in the British 
empire,(London: Leicester University Press, 1996) is helpful but it focuses on the Mauritian 
experience and does not reflect the different nuances of life on the Malayan plantation.
13 Ravindra, K. Jain, South Indians on the plantation frontier in Malaya, New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. Paul D Wiebe, and S.Mariappen, Indian Malaysians: The View 
from the Plantation, New Delhi: Manohar publications, 1978.
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The commodification of the South Indian labourer
The conditions under which the South Indian labourer was recruited and 
employed on the plantations were of dire misery. In order to maximize profits, 
the British planters and the Malayan colonial authorities dehumanized the 
whole process. The Tamil labourer was very much like a commodity which 
had to be regulated according to principles of demand and supply. This was 
particularly evident in the trajectory of legislation which was employed to 
firstly, to meet the labour demand due to expanding European investments in 
cash crops in the Straits Settlements and Malaya and secondly to keep 
wages depressed.
As investments in cash crops intensified, the Indian immigration ordinance 
was passed in 1884 to repeal restrictions on the emigration of indentured 
labour.This was later extended to remove restrictions on the emigration of 
non- indentured labourers to Malaya.14 The Straits Settlements Government 
took steps to create cheaper passages to provide a stimulus to emigration 
when it granted a subsidy to the line of steamers which plied from 
Negapatnam, and to regulate recruitment and medical standards of 
labourers, it opened a depot at Negapatnam in 1890.15 As recruitment agents 
continually recruited from the same territories in South India, labour was 
difficult to attain and crimping16 was rampant by other employers in Malaya, 
thus making the high demand for South Indian labour an issue. Attempts 
were made to reduce contracts, increase wages , remove restriction from the 
import of free labour, provide free tickets of passage , and license recruiters 
but it was only in 190717 that the Indian Immigration Committee was set up to 
manage the Indian estate labour force. The Indian Immigration Committee
14 R.N Jackson, Immigrant labour and the development of Malaya, 1786-1920, 68.
15 Ibid., 100.
16 Or poaching labour from another estate
17 J Norman Parmer, Colonial labour policy and administration; a history of labour in the rubber 
plantation industry in Malaya, 1910-1941 (Locust Valley, N.Y: Published for the Association for 
Asian Studies by J.J. Augustin, 1960), 38.
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was also to manage a fund, the Indian Immigration Fund.18 Although the 
Immigration Committee and Fund were established to some extent as a 
measure against malpractices of recruitment and employment,Parmer states 
that the Superintendent of Indian immigration made it clear that the 
‘Committee’s immediate task was to devise a comprehensive scheme to 
import labour on a large scale . Concerted action by employers was 
necessary if the demand for labour was to be met. Failure to meet demand, 
would increase wages and thus “spoiling the market’” .19
In the 1900s, there were three methods of recruitment: indenture, kangany 
and free or independent labour.20 All modes of recruitment were used for 
Tamil labour in the plantations, public works and even the railways.21 The 
indentured labourer endured the worst plight. An indentured labourer was 
initially paid, for an adult male 14 cents per day during the first year, 16 cents 
per day during the second and subsequent years. A female or boy under 16 
years of age was paid 10 cents per day for the first year and 12 cents per 
day for the subsequent years.22 This was half of what a free labourer earned 
and a fraction of the pay of the Chinese or Javanese labourer. It was 
acknowledged that the indentured labourer’s wages ‘are so much below the 
market rate’23 but efforts were made that amenities and facilities such as 
housing, medical attention and rations were given just enough to keep labour 
at optimum efficiency. The exactitude with which specifications were laid
18 The Tamil Immigration Fund Enactment was passed in 1908. It was undertaken so that employers 
of Indian labour would bear the cost of importing labour instead of the offsetting costs by making 
large deductions from the labourer's wages. Amongst other things, it included the cost of the sea 
passage and allowance for recruiting expenses.
19 J Norman Parmer, Colonial labour policy and administration. 39.
20 Correspondence regarding the supply of Indian labour, the Resident -  General, FMS to the High 
Commissioner, 27th November 1906.Reference Number: 1957/0137625 (Arkib Negara Malaysia)
21 Report on the proceedings of a Commission appointed to consider the question of the 
encouragement of Indian immigration to the Federated Malay States, 1900. Reference Number: 
1957/0098620(Arkib Negara Malaysia)
22 An Enactment for the protection of Indian immigrants, 1884. State of Selangor. Reference Number: 
1957/003590 (Arkib Negara Malaysia)
23 Quoted in R.N Jackson, Immigrant labour and the development of Malaya, 1786-1920, 59.
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down in Immigration Enactments as to the kind of labourer that was required 
and how he/she was to be sustained, objectified the labourer. For instance 
the ‘Rules under the Indian Immigration Enactment of 1904’ specifies the 
type of labourer that was required;
Rules under Section 24
1) The immigrant should be free from contagious disease and in a fit 
state of health to perform six hundred days of field labour
2) The immigrant should be between the ages of 15 and 45
3) Fakirs, Brahmins and Beggars should be rejected
4) Cases of hernia , hydrocele and enlarged testicles should be rejected
5) Cases of opthlamia or of diseased eyelids , cataract, double or single 
and of spots of the cornea should be rejected
6) Short stature or slimness is not an objection if the immigrant be wiry 
and strong and able to handle agricultural implements well...24
Such documents continued to tabulate the space allotted for 
accommodation, the number of clothing items each labourer was to receive, 
even the amount of food to be rationed was specified according to diet 
scales in ounces and pounds.25 There were debates amongst British officials 
if labourers were to be given rations or cooked food since the latter would 
ensure that they were getting adequate nutrition. Decisions over providing 
mosquito nets to prevent malaria were put down to ascertaining the ‘sick rate 
...returns of the death rate ‘and working out ‘the loss resulting to Government 
owing to the sickness among its labour force’.26
24 Rules under the Indian Immigration Enactment, 1904. Federated Malay States. State of Selangor. 
Reference Number: 1957/0005346 (Arkib Negara Malaysia).
25 See Ibid.
26 Report on the proceedings of a Commission appointed to consider the question of the 
encouragement of Indian Immigration to the Federated Malay States, 1900. Reference Number: 
1957/0098620 (Arkib Negara Malaysia).
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System of subordination
The South Indian labourer was oppressed within a complex system of power 
networks that at the first instance rendered him incapable of resistance. To 
begin with, recruitment from Madras was conducted from a pool of people 
who were subordinate by caste. Rajakrishnan Ramasamy traces the descent 
of caste oppression as it was practised in Madras amongst the labouring 
classes. He notes that bonded and underemployed landless labourers in 
South India were called padiyals, pannaiyals or adimais who were usually 
relegated to the position of slaves. These labourers were mainly drawn from 
the ranks of the aboriginal and untouchable section of the population and 
their bondage was not restricted to the bonded labourer alone but was 
extended to include his family.27 It became hereditary and they were 
subjected to the attitude of the landlord called mirasdar, who was usually 
from the higher caste and compelled the labourer to bondage through the 
inevitability of borrowing money from him. The Tamil labourers who came to 
Malaya were a mix of lower castes, amongst them being Pariahs, Pallas, 
Padayachis and Goundans. Ramasamy states that the Padaiyachi and 
Goundar were people of the Vanniyar. They were full time ‘free’ wage 
labourers and small scale landowners and they were in the middle-ranking 
category in the caste hierarchy.28
Eventually Ramasamy observes that a twofold caste tier system developed 
in Malaysia, identified in Tamil terms as Tamilarand Paraiyar. Members of 
the non-Brahmin category, excepting those of the barber and washerman 
castes, are classified as uyarntajati, or higher caste and they are referred to 
as Tamilar (Tamils). Castes like Vellalar, Vanniyar, Goundar, Nadar, 
Muthurajah, Kallar and Maravar come under this classification. All lower 
castes are collectively referred to as Pariayar or talntajati (lower caste). The
27Rajakrishnan A/L Ramasamy, Caste Consciousness among the Indian Tamils in Malaysia: A case 
study of four rural and three urban settlements (MA dissertation for the degree of Masters of Arts, 
University of Malaya, 1979), 17.
28 Ibid.,38.
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category of Paraiyar, refers not only to Paraiyar but also to Pallar and 
Chakkiliyar. It is under the classification talntajati or lower caste that 
members of Pariyar or barber caste and Vannar or washerman caste are 
included.29
Caste differentiation was enacted on the plantation settlement particularly 
through separation in commensality. Lower castes could not cook food for 
occasions such as funerals and weddings. Although there might have been 
interaction at the work place or social sites, many limitations were imposed in 
the confines of the home. The most denigrating form of alienation that the 
lower castes were to endure was the stereotyping of the lower castes as 
backward, argumentative and prone to violence.30 The differentiation in caste 
created a diverse cultural background and as Lai points out in another 
context ‘hindered the development of common interests and values’31 and 
also due to their ‘lowly status in their own communities, they lacked 
leadership and organisational skills’.32 The British understood this and took 
care that the system of caste was kept intact, although they justified it under 
the concern for the labourer in preserving his culture should he return to 
India and re-assimilate to its social orientation.33
29 Ibid., 92.
30 Ibid., 115.
31 Brij V. Lai, ""Nonresistance "on Fiji Plantations: The Fiji Indian Experience, 1879-1920" in 
Plantation Workers Resistance and Accommodation, ed. Brij V. Lai et al. (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1993).
32 Ibid.
33 Report on the proceedings of a Commission appointed to consider the question of the 
encouragement of Indian immigration to the Federated Malay States, 1900. Reference Number: 
1957/0098620 ( Arkib Negara Malaysia) 'We desire to impress upon the Government our opinion 
that as a general rule caste obligations are less strictly observed in the Malay Peninsula that in 
India and Ceylon. We are inclined to believe that the value for the labourer to the country of his 
adoption is lessened by such relaxation of the standard of religion in which he has been brought 
up and we conceive it to be of importance that an effort should be made to induce the more 
influential members of the Tamil Community in the Federated Malay States to impress upon new 
comers that it is highly desirable that their entry into a foreign country should not be made 
occasion or the excuse for relaxation of that social discipline which is a necessary factor of daily life 
in their own country'
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Life on the plantation itself caused barriers to mobilisation. Munro highlights 
the'authoritarian character of the plantation as an institution, which depended 
in large part for its success on coercive ability’.34 The plantation labourers 
lived where they worked, on the plantation estate lines or in plantation 
settlements. The plantations were self- contained ‘subsystems’35 -they were 
complete with their own clinic, provision shop, liquor (toddy) shop and later 
schools. It was possible for generations of Tamil labourers to be born, marry 
and die without having left the plantation. The plantation provided security of 
employment but also created a sense of insularity in the world view of the 
labourer that would later deny him the necessary knowledge in applying for 
citizenship or lobbying for rights on a national level.36 Within this insular 
existence, the labourers were ‘taught subservience’ through a management 
style that imposed a hierarchical structure. The plantation was under the 
leadership of a manager or planter who would have been European. He was 
called the peria dorai, lord and /or master 37even to the extent of being father 
and mother.38 Below the peria dorai was the staff made up of the Krani 
(clerk), Kepala (heads of division assigned to weeding or tapping) who were 
usually Malayalees or Syrian Christians while the labourers were Tamil.39 
This organisation not only served to impose discipline and authority but also 
ensured that the heads were not of common ethnicity with the labourers to 
sufficiently organise themselves for resistance.
34 Doug Munro, "Patterns of Resistance and Accommodation" in Plantation Workers, Resistance and 
Accommodation, ed. Brij V. Lai et al. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), 10.
35 K. Ravindra, South Indians on the plantation frontier in Malaya,
36 There is a significant number of Indians who do not have a Mykad, identification papers declaring 
citizenship in Malaysia. They are effectively stateless and as a result are denied employment.
37 M.R. Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya, prelude to the communist revolt of 1948 (London: 
Oxford University press, 1970), 2.
38 Charles Gamba, The Origins of Trade Unionism in Malaya, A study in Colonial Labour Unrest, 
(Singapore, Eastern University press, 1962), 303.
39 Ibid., 252.
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Early resistance
Munro highlights that though there was an absence of outright strikes and 
organised protests , the plantation workers had other forms of resistance 
such as ‘ desertion, assault, murder, shirking , malingering , feigning 
incomprehension of orders and destruction of crops and employers’ 
property’ 40 Desertions were commonplace from the 1870s. Jackson notes 
that employers in Province Wellesley had difficulties making labourers 
complete their contracts. In 1871, there were 106 cases registered in court, 
179 in 1873, which increased fourfold by the 1880s to 586.41 The British were 
aware of these forms of disobedience and made attempts to legalise 
punishment for the different ‘offences’:
Any Statute Immigrant who shall without reasonable excuse neglect 
to labour as required by the employer, such labour being reasonable 
and proper, shall be liable to a fine not exceeding fifty cents for each 
day during which such neglect shall continue ....a Statute immigrant 
who is unlawfully absent from the estate of his employer shall be liable 
to a fine not exceeding fifty cents 42
Similarly the document tabulates fines and punishment for desertion, 
malingering including wilfully injuring oneself so as to not work, selling of 
rations.
Ramasamy notes that between 1933 to 1937, as the price of rubber 
increased, this encouraged greater assisted migration of Indian labour to 
Malaya, keeping wages depressed. This caused a number of strikes to 
occur. He cites the Labour Department Annual report of 1934 indicating that 
eight strikes occurred in the Federated Malay States and two in Johore.43 In
40 Doug Munro, Patterns of Resistance and Accommodation.
41 Quoted in R.N Jackson, Immigrant labour and the development of Malaya, 1786-1920, 66-67
42 An Enactment for the protection of Indian immigrants, 1884. State of Selangor. Reference number 
: 1957/0003590 (Arkib Negara Malaysia).
43 P. Ramasamy, Plantation labour, unions, capital, and the state in Peninsular Malaysia (Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1994), 46-47.
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1936, labourers conducted a strike when they heard one of the estate staff 
was practising witchcraft. Another strike in 1936 occurred in Nova Scotia 
Estate because of the conduct of one of the subordinate staff. A third on the 
Selamat Estate was due to a dispute between two workers and a 
subordinate staff.44
Similarly strikes in other years occurred when workers were unduly 
punished, due to caste or even personal disputes between staff and 
labourers. The strikes involved the general stoppage of work instead of 
organised resistance and protests. This pattern of desertion and strike is in 
line with the assertion of Subaltern theory that there was a lack to 1 any one 
voice consciousness’45 and that there was no structure or united purpose in 
these forms of disobedience, hence displaying an absence of class 
consciousness and identity. It is evident that the lack of educational and 
other resources hampered the labourers’ ability to challenge the state or 
become a force to lobby minority rights for the Indian community. This 
remained the case until there was a third party intervention in the form of the 
English- educated Indian elite who were inspired by Indian nationalism and 
Indian Congress ideology in particular.46 The Central Indian Association of 
Malaya (C.I.A.M) which was formed in 1936 was considered to be the ‘best 
organised and supported body of Malayan Indian business and professional 
persons to appear to that date.’47 Its formation was influenced by political 
leaders and ideas from India as demonstrated by C.I.A.M’s action in 
organising Nehru’s visit to Malaya in 1937 48 But Stenson writes that C.I.A.M
44 ibid.
45Stephen Morton, Gayathri Spivak, Ethics, Subaiternity and the Critique of postcolonial 
Reason (Cambridge: Malden, 2007) 105.
46 In the 1930s the Indian elite were influenced by the nationalistic zeal n India and were forming
Indian Associations for cultural and welfare purposes. These associations were divided into two 
camps; the English educated elite who supported the Indian Congress Party and the Tamil 
educated Indians who supported the Dravidian movement in Madras. See, P. Ramasamy 1994, 
Ampalavanar 1981, Stenson 1970, for greater detail.
47 J Norman Parmer, Colonial labour policy and administration, 65.
48 P. Ramasamy, Plantation labour, unions, capital, and the state in Peninsular Malaysia, 49.
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was largely ‘an elitist group comprising of various associations and because 
those representatives were almost all English-speaking north Indians or 
Malayalams , the CIAM had little direct influence upon the mainly Tamil 
speaking labourers'.49
C.I.A.M took specific initiatives to involve itself in the life of the plantation 
labourer. They were concerned with labour wage rates. Petitions and 
delegations to the Indian government proved successful when they were 
able to assist in the ending of assisted emigration of unskilled Indian 
labourers in June 1938.50 This endowed the unskilled labourers with ‘a more 
permanent scarcity value and thus the possibility of bargaining for their 
services’.51The activities of C.I.A.M were to have an effect in the 
development of associations run by Tamil and English-educated lower 
administrative and professional groups and significantly involved 
labourers.52These associations had an effect on kangany (labour) and estate 
school teachers who were in the 1930s associating themselves with the 
labourers due to disenchantment with the managers, having lost their 
recruiting purposes and hence their supervisory roles on the estates.
The most significant involvement the C.I.A.M had with the Indian labourers 
involved the Klang strikes of February -  May 1941. After the Depression and 
the increase in demand for rubber due to the advent of war, the Indian 
labourers felt that wages needed to be increased to keep pace with the 
higher cost of living. At the end of 1940, wages for Indian labourers were still 
at the 1928 level whilst Chinese labourers were keeping the market rate of
49 M.R. Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya, prelude to the communist revolt of 1948 (London,
Oxford University Press, 1970), 26.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 These associations focused on welfare and lifestyle such as the abolishment of toddy drinking, 
marriage reform and improvement of health but they played a major role in the actual act of 
organising and grouping labourers as part of active organisations and instituting the process of 
belonging and gaining membership to a unified grouping.
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employment at 70 cents or even a dollar53 per hour. CI.A.M’s president, 
N.Raghavan, made a representation for the increase in wages. This was met 
by the United Planting Association of Malaya (UPAM) with only a 5 cent 
increase in wages. This was dismissed by an associate body of C.I.A.M, 
Klang Indian District Union. Under the leadership of R.H Nathan, a Malayan- 
born Indian and sub-editor of the daily Tamil Nesan, there were a series of 
strikes over the three months. The strikes, were sparked by the failure of the 
Controller to offer reasonable concessions over wage increases and later 
due to the arrest of Nathan himself.54The strikes, which assumed a violent 
nature, were stopped by a battalion of Indian troops stationed in Ipoh making 
numerous baton charges and firing on labour gatherings. The labourers and 
the strike leaders displayed symbols of the Indian nationalist struggle such 
as the Congress flag, Gandhi’s portrait, Gandhi caps and Indian homespun 
cloth, but as Stenson notes there is little evidence to suggest that the 
labourers had actually infused political ideology and class consciousness or 
were even aware of the issues they were being rallied to strike for. Strikes 
were conducted in a limited area in the Klang region and were particularly 
significant when Nathan was arrested, suggesting victimisation of a 
cherished leader rather than fighting for class amelioration. Stenson 
suggests that some labourers might have participated in strikes out of fear 
due to the violence of certain parties carrying weapons.
It is interesting to note that C.I.A.M did not survive the next phase in Malayan 
history, which was a vital disruption to colonial state structures. The 
Japanese occupation was to introduce new ideas such as the ‘Greater 
Eastern Co- prosperity Sphere ‘ and leaders like Subhas Chandra Bose, 
who instilled a fresh perspective to the Asian labourers’ world view and 
esteem.
53 Ibid., 28.
54 See M.R. Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya, prelude to the communist revolt of 1948, London: 
Oxford University press, 1970. 27- 30 and P.Ramasamy, Plantation labour, unions, capital, and 
the state in Peninsular Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1994. 48 -51.
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The Japanese occupation and the Indian National Army
The Japanese Occupation was to instigate a political consciousness 
amongst the Malayan Indian population, although the political orientation 
encouraged by key protagonists during this era, such as Subhas Chandra 
Bose, was India-centric. There were some educated Indians in Malaya who 
were initially enthralled by the idea of the Japanese invading British 
territories and were inquisitive over how an Asiatic nation like Japan could 
hold sway over a British European colony.55 But many were soon 
disenchanted after witnessing the brutalities administered upon the local 
Malayan population by the initial Japanese invading Army.56 The significance 
of the Japanese Occupation, in terms of political development amongst local 
Indians, lay in the formation of the Indian National Army (INA).
The Indian National Army initially took shape when a Japanese Officer, Major 
Fujiwara, established contact with the anti-British Indian Independence 
League in Bangkok in late 1941. Together with the help of a Sikh priest, 
Pritam Singh, who had formerly conducted anti-British activities in India, the 
Japanese intention was to subvert Indian troops within the British Army 
battalions stationed in Malaya. The Japanese signed a treaty with the Indian 
Independence League (IIL) on 4th December 194157, before the outbreak of 
war in Malaya. The Japanese promised ‘ to give all possible help to the
55 A young Gujerati shop assistant, Kothari Girishchandra, who had arrived in Malaya, Ipoh in 1941
was initially excited to witness Japanese rule due to the camaraderie that he felt with the 
Japanese as Asians and was expressed in Japanese propaganda, 'Asia for the Asiatics'. Oral 
History Records, Singapore National Archives, Accession number: 000549/23/09-10 .
56 Dr Menon KR talks about the beheading and massacre of particularly the Chinese population at
the hands of the initial Japanese troops. He notes that even though the Japanese were later to 
have a conciliatory attitude towards the Malays and Indians but the initial actions of the 
Japanese invaders was cruel to all local inhabitants who did not comply with them. Oral History 
Records, Singapore National Archives, Accession number: 000025/09/05-06.
There is also the fact that the Indian labouring classes suffered the worst plight during the war 
after they were sent off to work on the Death Railway in Siam by the thousands. Dependants of 
workers who were left behind had no source of food and sustenance and were actually 
scavenging for food on rubbish dumps and jungle fringes.
57K.K. Ghosh, The Indian National Army; second front of the Indian independence movement 
(Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969), 21.
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Indian nationalists in their struggle for the independence and assured the 
latter that they had no political, economic, cultural or religious ambitions in 
India; besides they promised that the Japanese army would honour the lives, 
property and freedom of Indians in the region.’58 In return, the Indian 
Independence League agreed ‘that its members would advance with the 
Japanese Army into Southern Siam and later into Malaya, where they would 
arouse anti- British feelings through their propaganda ...they would promote 
co-operation between the Indian residents and the Japanese Army in the 
zones of military operation’.59 The INA had its official start when a Captain 
Mohan Singh ceremoniously accepted the surrender of Indian POWs at 
Farrer Park in Singapore on 17th February 1942. There were 40 000 to 50 
000 surrendered Indian troops at the Race Course who became the nucleus 
of the INA. Rash Behari Bose was appointed leader of the Indian 
Independence Movement in the Far East and of the INA.
The initial progress of the INA and the Indian Independence League was 
slow. The Indian troops assembled at Farrer Park in 1942 who had ‘gone 
wild with the idea of Indian Independence, and the National Army ....cheered 
Mohan Singh at the end of his speech most enthusiastically’60 were aware of 
the realities of being Prisoners of War under the Japanese, having to endure 
torture, hard labour and lack of food and supplies, and had enlisted in the 
INA to escape this suffering. Even the local Malayan Indian civilian 
population chose to join Indian Independence League (ML) or the INA to 
escape the humiliation inflicted on the other races such as the Chinese, who 
endured face slapping at sentry points, rape and torture. Accounts of local 
Indians reveal that ‘outwardly everybody was in favour of INA but inwardly 
they were not’.61 Many expressed doubt over the ability of Rash Behari Bose
58 T.R. Sareen, Japan and the Indian National Army (Delhi: Agam Prakashan, 1986), 22 -23.
59 Ibid.
60 T.R. Sareen, Select Documents on Indian National Army (Delhi: Agam Prakashan, 1988), 95.
61 Dr Menon KR, Oral History Records. Singapore National Archives Accession no 000025/09/05-06 .
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to lead the Indian Freedom struggle from the Far East as he was seen as too 
much of a Japanese sympathizer.62
Nonetheless, the processes were started in orienteering Indians towards 
nationalist ideologies, propaganda work and political activism. For instance, 
local Indian labourers were exposed to espionage work as they were 
organized as part of the Indian fifth columnists. South Indian rubber tappers, 
who were familiar with the local paths, assisted the invasion of the Japanese 
army on foot into Northern Malaya.63 On 24th October 1942, the Indian 
Independence League devised an outline of a propaganda scheme, making 
special references to the need for instigating anti-British feelings amongst the 
overseas Indians and mobilizing their support for the liberation of India.64 The 
object of the propaganda was ‘to prepare India to overthrow the British rule 
and to establish Swaraj or self-rule’.65 The aim of the propaganda was to 
strengthen anti-British feelings, and arouse patriotism (towards India). The 
scheme was to educate the local Indians on conducting strikes, terrorizing 
the British officials, non-cooperation with the British, and stirring up 
revolt.66The means of the propaganda was through radio, press, leaflets, 
books, pamphlets, booklets, pictures and cartoons.67 The propaganda 
scheme was even to instruct on the secrets of successful propaganda which 
entailed emphasis on repetition, focusing on personalities and facts , built 
around a slogan , specific objectives and concealment of motive.68
62 Damodaran s/o Kesavan, Oral History Records, Singapore National Archives Accession no
000127/05/03*04 & Naidu Lakshmi, Oral History Records, Singapore National Archives Accession 
no 000266/04/01-02.
63 T.R. Sareen, Select documents on Indian National Army, 99.
64 F. No 101, INA papers published in T.R. Sareen, Indian National Army; A documentary Study (in 5
volumes) Volume 1 (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2004), 191.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., 193.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., 200-201.
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The INA gained popularity and momentum especially after Subhas Chandra 
Bose took over in 1943. It was his personal dynamism, oratorical skills, and 
his record as a freedom fighter in India previously that inspired otherwise 
apathetic Indians amongst the locals to join the IIL and INA with renewed 
enthusiasm. At a huge rally held in Singapore on 4th July 1943, Subhas 
Chandra Bose, while referring to India as ‘Motherland’, announced his 
intentions and plans for Indians in East Asia, The thing the Indians at home 
and abroad have to do today is clear. They have to build a structure enabling 
them to work for an independent India under unified direction. The aim of this 
structure is to organize the Indians in a manner which will enable them to rise 
in arms against British imperialism ...I have an idea of mobilizing all our 
resources effectively, an idea which impels me to organize a provisional 
government is to direct the effort to revolutionize India and realize the ideal of 
an independent lndia’.69ln another speech also delivered in Singapore on 
21st October 1943, Bose announced the Provisional Government of Free 
India. He explained the program of Total mobilization’ of all resources of 
Indians in East Asia-resources in men, money and materials.70
He proceeded to establish departments for military bureau, recruitment, 
training supplies, finance, publicity, press, propaganda, women, education 
and culture. His work in the department of recruitment for the Azad Hind Fauj 
(INA) was particularly noticeable. It was carried out in a systematic way and 
was not aligned to British military ideology that only recruited the ‘Martial 
classes’. As a result, at least 18 000 civilians enlisted, mostly Tamils from 
South India. 71Tens of thousands of civilians participated in the local 
branches of the Indian Independence League that provided support to the 
INA. Bose was successful in raising funds and resources from the local
69T.R. Sareen, Indian National Army: A documentary Study (5 volumes) Volume II (New Delhi: Gyan 
Publishing House, 2004).
70 Sisir K Bose & Sugata Bose, eds. Chalo Delhi, Writings and Speeches 1943 -1945  (New Delhi:
Pauls Press Okhla, 2007), 109.
71 Ibid., 3.
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Indians. He appealed to the All Malai Chettiars72 to contribute while the 
common man even gave up his personal belongings and gold to the cause of 
the INA. Eventually the Azad Hind Bank was able to raise 200 million rupees 
from Malaya and Burma.73
Although the INA was to face defeat in its aims, the magnitude of 
mobilization of the local Indians and the inculcation of nationalist ideology 
ignited political consciousness amongst Malayan Indians. Ramasamy writes 
that the activities of the Indian Independence League and the Indian National 
Army gave the Indians a sense of ‘unprecedented solidarity. Never before 
had the Indian community been so united in a single movement like the 
Indian independence movement in Malaya’.74 There was a mass mobilization 
of Indians during the Occupation years involving all classes and sub- 
communal groups. Thousands of labourers were part of the Army and there 
was the formation of a volunteer corps in the estates, Thondar Padai that 
was revived after the war. 75The focus of being under one Indian nationalist 
ideology of Subhas Chandra Bose had mobilized the Indians in Malaya on an 
unprecedented scale.
Post- war Indian labour militancy
The Japanese Occupation had a significant psychological impact on the 
Indian labouring classes of Malaya. There were events which led to a 
deepening of class segregation, which was to alter the dynamics of the 
plantation hierarchy during the Occupation. As the European planters 
abandoned their positions during the war, their positions of authority were 
held by the former estate clerks (kirani) and the Kangany. Ramasamy refers 
to them as the ‘middle class intermediaries’.76 The Japanese saw the Indian
72 Ibid., 139.
73 Ibid., 9.
74 P. Ramasamy,"Indian War memory in Malaysia" in War and memory in Malaysia and Singapore,
ed. P. Lim Pui Huen et al. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), 99.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 92.
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labourers as just another economic resource to manipulate for their purposes 
of reconstruction and development. While they courted the Indian middle 
class as collaborators against the British they also used them to control and 
manage the Indian labour.
These middle class intermediaries, already separated from the labourers in 
being Malayalees or Ceylonese instead of Tamil, were accused of hate acts 
and cruelty towards the labourers during the war. Jain, Stenson and 
Ramasamy77 document that middle class management on estates conducted 
an unfair distribution of food, leading to many labourers having to starve and 
scavenge, The management also deliberately chose husbands amongst 
newlywed couples to leave for assignments of hard labour so that the 
management could exploit the women, and extended random acts of cruelty 
such as beatings, molestation of women labourers and other forms of 
violence. The defeat of the British at the hands of an Asian power had also 
demonstrated to the wider population of Malaya that the British were not 
invincible and hence the previous respect accrued to the peria dorai was not 
returned after the Occupation. After the Occupation, the Indian labourers 
rejected the returned authority of the keranis and kanganys through petitions 
requesting the transfer of Asian managerial staff, even by assaulting them or 
staging strikes in disobedience. Stenson writes that this sort of behaviour 
was significant in marking the rejection of ‘the humiliations and indignities 
which had been characteristic of the pre war- estate structure...but also 
managerial paternalism’.78 This reluctance to accept the supervisory 
authority of pre-war estate structures was an indication that the Indian 
labouring class was beginning to capitalize on a new- found sense of esteem 
in group action within its class grouping. Was this then the beginning of class 
consciousness for the Indian labourers of Malaya?
77 Jain, 1970, Stenson 1970,Ramasamy 2000
78 M.R. Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya, prelude to the communist revolt of 1948. 95.
50
Indians amongst the working class began to demonstrate a capacity to work 
in their own rational interests when there emerged a new ‘settled’ generation 
after the war. After 1938, immigration of Indian labourers had been halted 
and there was a lack of migrant mobility during the war which had bred a 
generation either born in Malaya or who had been schooled in India amidst 
the nationalist fervour of the country. The INA, which had entrusted 
leadership to junior ranks, recruited from the labourers, had provided the 
necessary boon of entrusting organizational skills and vision to mobilize in 
class interests. Some Indians who had been part of the Indian National Army 
joined the Malayan Communist Party after the war as a means of continuing 
the struggle against the British.79 This generation eschewed the passive 
attitude of subservience and addiction to toddy (alcohol) on the plantation. As 
Indian labourers began to shed the ‘Bird of passage’ mentality in saving up to 
return to India, they began to consolidate in terms of class group interests 
that manifested in the form of prominent leaders,organizations and 
resistance efforts. Examples of these would be the development of Indian 
Labour Unions, which were organized on a district basis and catered to all 
types of workers. Unions were established in the states of Perak, Johore, 
Kedah and Negri Sembilan.80 Prominent Indians emerged to lead unions 
whether they were ethnically based or not, such as S. A Ganapathy, C.V.S 
Krishnamoorthy and P Veerasenam.81
The intensity with which the Thondar Padai was revived after the war by A. M 
Samy , an ex- INA member who organized Tamil youths in several estates, 
was another example of resistance efforts that were organized by the 
labouring class . Thondar Padai made the enforcement of toddy prohibition 
its main concern.82Talks were organized amongst older members of estates
79 Ibid., 92.
80 Ibid.,100.
81 Leong Yee Fong, Labour and trade unionism in Colonial Malaya; A study of the Socio-Economic
and political bases of the Malayan Labour Movement, 1930-1957 (Pulau Pinang:Penerbit 
Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1999), 146.
82 Ibid., 150.
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to instil a sense of struggle for economic and social reform. The members of 
Thondar Padai projected a sense of militancy by wearing uniforms, 
conducting drills and carrying sticks. They enforced this sense of militancy by 
setting up informal courts to punish labourers engaging in drinking alcohol 
and picketed toddy shops. But of grave concern to the British authorities was 
their involvement with labour unrest and strikes.83
The immediate period after the war in Malaya witnessed the return of the 
British Military Administration (BMA). The purpose of the administration was 
to bring about a period of economic reconstruction and social and political 
stability. There was great expectation on the part of the local inhabitants that 
the BMA would return prosperity to the country. This was, of course, 
unfulfilled when the BMA failed even to provide adequate food necessities 
such as rice. Rationing was conducted inefficiently which caused the black 
market to flourish.84The hardships of the post-war era were further 
compounded by the onset of a communist insurgency in Malaya. These 
factors led to the proliferation of the General Labour Unions (GLUs) in the 
immediate post- war era.These GLUs were mainly affiliated with the Chinese 
dominated Malayan Communist Party.85 Gamba and Jomo & Todd state that 
the GLUs were successful in gaining worker’s benefits in terms of raised
83 Ibid., 151.
84 See Gamba 1962 and K.S Jomo & Patricia Todd, Trade unions and the State in Peninsular Malaysia
(Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1994).
85 In contrast to the Indians, the Chinese labourer was able to strike a better deal in terms of wages
and lifestyle. This had to do with the fact that they were able to organize themselves under 
trade guilds and clan associations that allowed them to negotiate for higher wages in groups or 
organizations. By the 1920s, the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern had also been successful in 
in calculating Chinese 'national' pride through establishing schools and secret Labour Unions and 
associations in Malaya. In 1928 the Nanyang Communist party, later the Malayan Communist 
Party, was established. The MCP offered military assistance to the British during the Japanese 
Occupation through the organization of the Malayan People's Anti Japanese Army (MPAJA) but 
refused to surrender arms after the war, leading them to take on British rule through combat in 
the jungles and through the establishment of trade/labour unions throughout Malaya as well as 
forming political parties such as the Malayan democratic union and the Malayan Nationalist 
party. The Chinese underclass in Malaya was self conscious of their group and ideological 
solidarities. Unlike the Indians, by the post-war era, the Chinese had refined their operations in 
negotiating for rights and wages.
52
wages and improved worker conditions. In fact ‘the GLUs became virtually 
the only means by which workers could hope to improve his or her own 
lot(sic)’.86 The GLUs in Singapore confederated under the Singapore 
General Labour Union (SGLU) while the Pan -  Malayan General labour 
Union (PMGLU) was formed to coordinate the activities of the Malay 
Peninsula.
The Indian labour demonstrated some semblance of class consciousness by 
joining or merging with the GLUs when they were courted actively by the 
otherwise Chinese- led union activists .But this did not mean that there was a 
disengagement from ethnic alliances. Indian labour remained largely 
entrenched within a strong Tamil identity and unity and in many cases they 
formed an Indian section to these GLUs. Stenson writes that ‘both Chinese 
and Indian communities were united by a sense of common suffering which 
encouraged the development of worker solidarity and perhaps in urban areas 
a genuine feeling of class consciousness. Workers did not share a common 
distinctive culture and they were in main, still employed in separate racial 
groups.’87 Indians were basically slow to catch on to communist beliefs and 
ideologies and remained largely aligned to India-centric notions of 
nationalism. The GLUs were aware of this and supported the expression of 
Indian nationalistic feelings in the Indian sector of the unions to ensure an 
Indian support base.
The Indian trade unions, with the exception of the Negri Sembilan Indian 
Labour Union88came under the direction of the PMGLU due to the 
willingness of the Indian Labour Union leaders to collaborate. Firstly, the 
PMGLU offered positions, financial assistance and physical support 89 to 
Indian labour leaders. This in turn shored up these Union leaders in the eyes 
of the Indian labouring community as power brokers since they refused the
86 K.S Jomo & Patricia Todd, Trade Unions and the State in Peninsular Malaysia, 73.
87 M.R. Stenson, Industrial Conflict in Malaya, prelude to the communist revolt of 1948. 110.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., 111.
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leadership of the English-educated Malayan Indians who had established 
themselves in the political party arena instead. This last point also 
demonstrates that the pre-war fissures amongst the Indians according to 
class and sub-ethnicity or sub-communalism, which were united under the 
INA, were returned in the post-war era. The post-war revival of the separatist 
Dravidian movement90 could also be blamed for the reassertion of sub- 
communalism.91
The post-war period till the Emergency in 1948 was marked by an era of 
militant unionism especially displayed by the Indian community.92 The 
Chinese, though staunch supporters of the Malayan Communist Party 
(MCP), were generally more prosperous and hence slower to mobilize for 
strike action. The Indians, as already discussed in this chapter, were a more 
depressed underclass. As Indian labourers mainly bore the brunt of wage 
depression and lived in squalid conditions on the labour lines, they were 
easier to rouse into action. The period from early 1946 to 1948 witnessed 
many strikes conducted by urban and plantation labourers. The Indians were 
mobilized together with the Chinese to demand better wage, work and living 
conditions, but there were some strikes that were particular to the Indian 
community, such as those involving the prohibition of the sale of toddy and 
demanding cash advances from management to celebrate religious festivals 
like Thaipusam.93 The colonial government on the advice of the planters and 
the United Planting Association of Malaya (UPAM) soon moved to curb
90 The Dravidian movement in Malaya took root when its founder in South India, E.V Ramasamy 
Naicker, visited Malaya in 1930s. The Dravidian movement eschews Aryanic interpretations of 
Hindu practices, removal of caste and focuses on the believe and dissemination of Tamil 
culture. Ramasamy Naicker's visit led to the founding of the Adi Dravida associations. The 
associations were apolitical and focused on the removal of social ills amongst Tamils such as 
alcoholism and family violence as hoped to enhance the image of the Tamil community in 
Malaya. Some researches such as Ramasamy 1994, believe that the Dravida movement could 
have also bordered on Tamil chauvinism.
91 Ibid., 123.
92 The story of S. Ganapathy, the trade unionist who was hanged in 1949 by the British, convicted 
for the possession of firearms, is emblematic of the intensity with which Indian 
labourers/working class participated in the Union movement.
93 See Ramasamy 1994, 67-81.
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strikes organized by the left- wing unions. By mid-1947, the colonial 
government had begun to initiate legislation to control the powers of the 
PMGLU. John Brazier, the Trade Union Adviser of Malaya (TUAM), 
suggested initiatives to nurture a ‘responsible’ unionism that was apolitical 
and focused on labour rights. He enforced registration of unions and initiated 
setting up alternative unions to the left that would moderate the trade union 
activity of Malaya .There was also the establishment of a Department of 
Labour that was to supervise the activities and needs of workers more 
closely. Furthermore, faced by the radical opposition from the Communists in 
urban as well as jungle settings in Malaya, the British declared a state of 
Emergency in June 1948 that was to deal a death blow to militant trade 
unionism.
For the Indian labourers, having established labour unions and attained 
leadership of these organizations as a form of class mobilization, their 
platform to power and active amelioration of their Subaltern position was 
short -lived. Emergency regulations instilled fear in the hearts of labourers 
and union leaders. Plantation labourers were suspected of Communist 
involvement due to their close proximity to Communist hideouts in the 
jungles. The estate management with the help of the police force took 
advantage of these suspicions of Communist involvement by deterring any 
hostility in the form of organized activity against management. Indian 
labourers took to disassociating with Communists and Communism as they 
equally feared the Communist terrorists who were cruel in their acts of 
extortion and coercion.94
Nonetheless, plantation labour needs necessitated the amalgamation of 
various plantation unions into the National Union of Plantation Workers 
(NUPW) in 1954. More than half of the membership of the NUPW was Indian 
and it was led by P.P. Narayanan. The NUPW remained strictly apolitical and 
focused mainly on social welfare issues. It ran a Tamil bi- weekly paper the
94 See Sinnapah Arasaratnam, Indians in Malaysia and Singapore (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University 
Press, 1979), 140.
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Sangamani, which aimed at educating labour opinion. The NUPW continued 
to exist in Malaya well after independence. It was later involved in serious 
labour plantation issues of land fragmentation and aimed to negotiate labour 
rights but researchers conclude that it was premised on ‘accommodation’95 
rather than negotiation of labour rights. There was an absence of grass root 
leadership and ‘worker emancipation through the building of worker owned 
homes and the provision of progressive education in government run schools 
were presented but never pushed.’ 96
Conclusion
The British exercised complete hegemony over the Indian labouring class. 
Their presence in Malaya, their livelihood, their world view, was at the 
complete behest of Imperial domination. The process of suppression was so 
complete that the Indian subaltern labourer seldom had the presence of mind 
to resist and when he did so it was in desperation and reaction to 
circumstances of low wages and mistreatment. Even when third parties did 
intervene, such as the educated Indian middle class, efforts to mobilize 
remained fragmented and lacked focus. The era of unionism did provide 
recourse for the Indian labouring classes but the looming spectre of 
Communism upon the Union movement caused the British to take swift 
measures to subdue and moderate trade unionism. There was no 
consideration that Indian labour would lose a hard-won platform of power 
negotiation through its suppression. This entire phenomenon proves the 
words of Guha as quoted by Lazarus that,
‘For a majority of the colonized, ...and above all for those (mostly 
peasant) members of the subaltern classes living at some remove 
from the administrative and increasingly urban centres of power, 
colonialism was experienced pre-eminently in terms of dominance, 
that is, along lines of material, physical, and economic exaction:
95 Michael Stenson, Class, Race and Colonialism in West Malaysia, The Indian case (Queensland:
University of Queensland Press, 1980). 169.
96 Ibid.
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conquest, taxation, conscription, forced labour, eviction, 
dispossession, etc. There was comparatively little attempt on the part 
of the colonial establishment to seek hegemony among these 
subaltern classes , that is to win their ideological, moral , cultural , and 
intellectual support for the colonial enterprise .’97
The latter part of the quotation suggests a marginalization of the Indian 
labour community. I would demonstrate in the next chapter that this 
marginalization of Indian labourers within the context of Malaya also 
extended to the entire Malayan Indian community. It is as though, through 
association with its labourers, the Indian middle class and educated elite 
were also not wooed in the political and ideological processes of the Malayan 
state.
97 Lazarus, Neil. Nationalism and Cultural Practice in the Postcolonial World (Australia: Cambridge 
University press, 1999), 90.
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Chapter 2 - Malayan Indians in the decolonizing moment
In 1945 when colonial rule resumed after the war, the colonial masters were 
faced with the awareness that circumstances had altered notions of location 
and belonging amongst ethnic communities-previously considered of migrant 
mentalities, inter- ethnic relations as well as notions of loyalty/acquiescence 
to colonial rule. As with other colonies, the British were returning to meet 
expectations of political reform and eventual self- government. In the case of 
Malaya, they felt obliged to acknowledge the contributions of migrant 
communities who had played a pivotal role in developing the economy of the 
country, especially the Chinese who had endured tremendous suffering 
during the Japanese occupation and had assisted war efforts through 
resistance movements such as the Malayan People’s Anti- Japanese Army 
(MPAJA). Further, there were undertones implying that the British were 
piqued about the alleged collaboration between Malay Rulers with the 
Japanese and the involvement of Malays in Fifth Column activities.
It was not a reversal of Malay privileges that the British were seeking, rather, 
they were interested in instituting a Westminster- style parliamentary system 
to foster a ‘constitutional unity’1 in Malaya which would have eventually 
required an electorate with equal rights. Aware of the separateness of the 
Malays, Chinese and Indians, and with the development of their respective 
disparate nationalisms, Admiral Lord Mountbatten wanted ‘ to break down 
racial sectionalism in every way open to us, politically, economically and 
socially and to endeavour to substitute for it the idea of Malayan citizenship... 
by getting Malays, Chinese or Indians, to combine together to deal as 
citizens ( and not as racial communities) with the local problems of Malaya in 
the same light .’2 Yet the British were also aware that this would be 
problematic as ‘endeavouring to admit non- Malay communities to a political 
equality with the Malays in the state territories. We (in reference to Colonial
1 A. J. Stockwell, ed., Malaya pt. 1. The Malayan Union experiment, 1942-1948 (London:
HMSO, 1995), CO 825/42/3, no 30. Implementation of future policy in Malaya; letter (reply) from
Mr Stanley to Admiral Mountbatten.
2 Ibid,, CO 825/42/3, no 5 Directive on policy in Malaya; letter (reply) from Admiral Mountbatten to 
Mr Stanley.
58
rule) shall make certain of estranging the Malays unless we can assure them 
of not only in the political and social field, which will prevent such “equality” 
inevitability resulting in their submergence.’3
The dilemma discussed above took up a space of negotiation that lasted 12 
years. From the McMichael treaties (October 1945), the Malayan Union , 
Federation of Malaya agreement, Member System, Elections at the Federal 
Legislative Council, the National Conference and Convention , the Reid 
Commission and the creation of the Merdeka Constitution with the transfer of 
power on August 31st 1957, is the 12 year period which I term the 
decolonising moment for Malaya. The 12 years in question are termed a 
moment in the metaphorical sense in that it was in this period that the rules 
of the game, as in the distribution of power and the mechanisms by which 
Malayan/Malaysian people and organisations would become subject to, were 
put into place and the manner in which the power brokers for the Indian 
community could/could not ‘seize’ the moment comes into question. Power 
was preserved such that Malay privileges were retained through Article 153 
in the Merdeka Constitution which allowed them to harness legitimacy and 
create unquestioned assumptions in decades to come of their centrality to 
state and governance.4 The decisions made in this epoch- making time 
generated the rules which were henceforth to become ‘the means to
3 Ibid, CO 825/42/3, no 27 Directive on policy in Malaya: letter (reply) from Mr Stanley to Admiral 
Mountbatten.
4 'Article 153 privileges: Article 153 provides a scheme of preferential treatment for Malays (and the 
Natives of Sabah and Sarawak) in a number of specified areas. The yang di-Pertuan Agong may, in 
order to promote the purposes of Article 153, reserve such proportion as he deems reasonable of-
-positions in the public service
-scholarships, educational or training privileges or special facilities
-permits or licenses for the operation of any trade or business required by federal law; and 
-places in institutions of higher learning providing education after MCE 
Malay privileges are entrenched against repeal in two ways. First, any Bill to abolish or curtail 
them may be caught by the law of sedition. Second under article 159(5), any amendment to 
Article 153 will require a special two-thirds majority of the total membership of each House of 
parliament plus the consent of the Conference of Rulers/ The above terms of Article 153 is a 
recent rendition as described in the following publication; Shad Saleem Faruqi, Document of 
destiny: The Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Star publications, 2008), 
689.
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capturing advantage’5 by equipped parties post Independence. Sharp, 
Routledge, Philo and Paddison encapsulate the significance of this moment 
for the future when stating that ‘Within such a “game” , the more powerful 
have the advantage of not only setting the rules, but also of interpreting (and 
reinterpreting) what is their meaning. The power of resistance in such cases 
becomes effectively marginalised ’.6
This chapter discusses how the Indian community navigated its rights and 
position at the negotiating table in Malaya during these twelve years. The 
Indians of Malaya, like any other Indian migrant community within the British 
Empire, experienced psychological, social, economic and political dilemma 
when they were forced to decide at the Independence of India and the 
decolonisation moment regarding issues of belonging, settlement and 
citizenship. Hence it is crucial to ask what the nationalism of the Malayan 
Indians was and what was their ‘nation of intent’7 for Malaya?
The decolonising moment
The decolonising moment exists within the umbrella era of the post- colonial, 
marking the transitory space of time when the colonial passes into the post­
colonial, bringing with it epoch- making consequences for the latter. It is 
situated within the post- colonial time and discussed within the theoretical 
category of post- colonialism. It is part of the ‘new period and a closure of a 
certain historical event or age, officially stamped with dates’8 as well as the 
dialogue of post -colonialism that deals with the impact of colonial pasts in 
representations, modes of domination and contemporary struggles. 
Catherine Hall describes the ‘post colonial moment’ on a global scale as ‘the
5 Joanne P. Sharp et al., Entanglements of Power, Geographies of Domination/Resistance (New 
York: Routledge, 2000), 6.
6 Ibid.This is witnessed at pivotal moments in Malaysian history when Malay/Muslim supremacy is re 
forged with the creation of the Bumiputera policy after 1969 and the escalation of Islamism in 
Malaysia marked in early 2000s when Mahathir openly declares Malaysia an Islamic State.
7 A.B. Shamsul, "Nations-of-lntent in Malaysia" in Asian forms of Nation, ed. Stein Tonnesson et.al 
(Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1996).
8 Ella Shohat, "Notes on the "Post- Colonial"", Social text, 31/32, (1992): 99-113.
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movements of peoples on an unprecedented scale , the break-up of Empires 
and decolonisation , the creation of a new Europe and other power blocs , 
the destruction of old nations and the reformation of new ones .’9 Stuart Hall 
localises it somewhat when reducing the ‘distinctive ‘moment ’10 to 
‘independence from direct colonial rule, the formation of new nation states , 
forms of economic development dominated by the growth of indigenous 
capital and their relations of neo- colonial dependency on the developed 
capitalist world , and the politics which arise from emergence of powerful 
local elites’.11Both perspectives converge on portraying a moment of flux of 
bodies, identities, belonging and /or versus situated- ness, of properties and 
capital. What happened, then, at the decolonising moment for migrant Indian 
communities?
Vijay Mishra discusses the type of Indian migrant communities which is of 
importance in this chapter, that of the ‘old (exclusive) Indian diaspora’12 that 
is, the diaspora which ‘began as part of British imperial movement of labour 
to the colonies’13 and which is marked by its exclusivism because they 
‘created relatively self-contained ‘little Indias’ in the colonies’.14 What 
happened to this diaspora at the point of fragmentation of the British Empire 
when considering Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin’s premise that a diaspora of, 
for example the African people, presupposes a monolithic unity? Where 
‘“diaspora” seems to refer to dispersion, diffusion and heterogeneity, 
migration movement and scattering, the very term may enhance monolithic
9 Catherine Hall,"Histories, empires and the post- colonial moment" in The Post Colonial question, 
Common skies, divided horizons, ed. Ian Chambers et.al (London, New York: Routledge, 1996), 
65.
10 Stuart Hall, "When was the 'post-colonial'? Thinking at the limit" in The Post Colonial question, 
Common skies, divided horizons, ed. Ian Chambers et.al (London, New York: Routledge, 1996), 
247.
11 Ibid.
12 Vijay Mishra, "The Diasporic Imaginary; theorizing the Indian diaspora" in The Post- Colonial 
Studies Reader, ed. Bill Ashcroft et.al (Routledge: Oxford, 2006), 447.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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notions of culture and identity’.15The old Indian diaspora is /was premised on 
the monolithic Indian identity as imagined by the British colonial authorities. 
Peoples of Gujarat, Madras, Bihar, and Punjab migrated to parts of the 
Empire such as Malaya, the Pacific and parts of Africa according to the 
economic and security needs of British colonial capitalism.
The old Indian diaspora was a phenomenon of colonialism and so was the 
identity they carried as Indians into host colonies. Sunil Khilnani suggests the 
construction of the monolithic Indian identity and what made the self­
invention of an Indian national community was the fact of alien conquest and 
colonial subjection. For example, ‘ the Greeks, who first named the land 
Indica, to travelers, traders and invaders and then most comprehensively to 
the British, who in their train spotting way darted across the subcontinent 
mapping, tabulating and classifying the territory and people that gradually 
came into their possession.’ 16 Khilnani quotes Lord Curzon as he reiterated 
this point that India had no natural frontiers and that it was the precision of 
the colonial administrative techniques that brought India forward as a unified 
and bounded space. ‘It was the British interest in determining geographical 
boundaries that by an Act of Parliament in 1899 converted ‘India’ from the 
name of a cultural region into a precise, pink territory.’17
Emmanuel S. Nelson describes the complexity of Indian identity, ‘For India, 
clearly, is not a culturally monolithic entity; it is, on the contrary, a staggering 
compendium of a multitude of ethnicities, languages, and traditions. To 
speak of an Indian diaspora, then, is to insist on a claim to an essential 
psychological and historical unity that undergrids the spectacular Indian 
mosaic’.18 The ‘psychological and historical unity’ for the old Indian diaspora 
at the point of decolonization was that of being a British subject of the Empire
15 Bill Ashcroft et.al. The Post- Colonial Studies Reader (Routledge: Oxford, 2006), 425.
16Sunil Khilnani, The idea of India (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1999), 155.
17 Quoted in Ibid.
18 Emmanuel S. Nelson, Reworlding, The literature of the Indian Diaspora (New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1992).
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versus the new (border)lndian diaspora of ‘late capital’19 which Mishra marks 
by its ‘mobility’20 but would probably hold the consciousness of being / or 
having been citizens of the Indian nation state .There was an enlarged 
political spatial belonging in the minds of the British Indian subject in that he 
could travel with just health certificates and establish businesses and 
property in any part of the Empire while professing a cultural identity from a 
place of origin on the Indian subcontinent.
This was to change on 15th August 1947 when India became independent. 
Then, Indians all over the world began the process of giving up their old 
status as British subjects and becoming new citizens of India or rather the 
country that was now to host them. Sahadevan highlights that Indians in 
other colonies attained several statuses as ‘citizens of the country of their 
adoption, holders of valid British passports but without local citizenship and 
as people of stateless category.’21 The new requirements of citizenship such 
as deciding which country to belong to, India or the colony of host; the rush 
for passports and citizenship cards; the creation of borders and trespass - 
able property; these created a chaotic post-colonial situation for the Indian 
communities in the old diaspora that was to last for decades after.
For the most part Indians became the internal problem of host countries’ 
indigenous governments that did not grant them equal rights. Burma’s and 
Indo- China’s nationalisation policies led Indian businessmen, particularly the 
Chettyar community, to lose vast amounts of property. Sri Lanka refused to 
give Tamils citizenship, arguing they were ‘birds of passage and a transient 
population’.22 Kenyan Indians faced with the process of Africanisation feared 
deportation, which became a reality for the Indians in Uganda when Idi Amin,
19 Vijay Mishra, 'The Diasporic Imaginary; theorizing the Indian diaspora' in The Post- Colonial 
Studies Reader, 447.
20 Ibid., 448.
21 P. Sahadevan, India and overseas Indians, The case of Sri Lanka (Delhi: Kalinga Publications,
1995), 59.
22 Ibid.,121.
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in 1972 ordered the expulsion of ‘aliens of Asian origin in ninety days’.23 It 
was a case of displacement of people and identities. Throughout the colonial 
migratory and settlement period, the old diaspora had demonstrated a 
‘psychological unity’ in orientation towards British India and subsequently the 
Indian independence struggle, identifying with Nehru and Gandhi. And upon 
Independence in 1947, the old Indian diaspora was told to associate with the 
host colony/country and their respective nationalisms if they did not choose 
Indian citizenship. Nehru wished that ‘we do not like any country to ill- treat 
Indian nationals. They should be given all the rights of citizenship. India’s 
connection will be cultural and not political’. But he also advised that 
‘overseas Indians should completely associate themselves with the 
indigenous people of the country ,to give primary consideration to the 
interests of the original inhabitants and not to develop vested interests, not to 
demand any special rights and privileges and to extend their undivided 
loyalty to the country of their residence’.24 Nehru’s wishes did not create ideal 
situations for the old Indian diaspora. In the case of Malaya and many other 
countries, Indians lost in the game of loyalty as they were seen as transient 
and enamoured with Congress ideology and symbolism, and they lost out 
being minorities (not always affluent), in the inability to demand for special 
rights, in not having reservations or even a voice in schools, legislatures and 
the government service of host countries, thus compromising their future 
rights.
Confusion over Citizenship.
Indians in Malaya demonstrated indecision over where they belonged in the 
decolonisation moment. Indian businessmen, after witnessing the 
nationalisation of properties and businesses in other former colonies such as 
Ceylon, Burma and Indo- China, feared the confiscation of their property and 
began to relocate their money to India. The Straits Times reported in 1951 
that ‘Indian businessmen in Malaya are selling out and transferring much of
23 Ibid., 29.
24 Ibid., 59.
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their wealth to India’.25 The rate of transfer was at $29 000 000 a year, 
amounting to a total flight of capital of $ 666 000 000.26 The Indian 
government also facilitated this movement of investments by relaxing 
taxation on remittances, and the prospects of India’s upcoming plans to 
industrialise proved attractive for overseas Indians investment. The local 
Malayan press portrayed this as a ‘Sell out’27 on the part of the Indian 
community towards Malaya. In 1953, Malay leaders expressed concern that 
thousands of Indians were coming into Malaya to beat the deadline of an 
Immigration Bill that was to restrict the inflow of immigrants. Dato Onn 
highlighted that ‘Ships were steaming to and from India non-stop in an effort 
to bring in thousands of immigrants.’28 Other Malay leaders expressed alarm 
that Malaya, which was ‘still considered a land of milk and honey’,29 would 
attract more of the working class form India and depress further already ‘low 
standards of living, wages and hours’.30 The response of the office of the 
representative of the Government of India in Malaya, M Gopala Menon, was 
to refute the allegation of an abnormal flux of Indians. He claimed that ‘the 
present heavy passenger traffic was not a one-way traffic. Ships bound for 
India were also fully loaded’. Further, that ‘A considerable proportion of the 
Indians now arriving were old residents. Many of them, who would normally 
have returned after Aug 1, hurried back because they feared that under the 
new Immigration Ordinance they might be barred’.31While the movement of 
capital and people between India and Malaya proved disconcerting to local 
Malay leaders over fears of being crowded out or a flight of capital this 
demonstrated the distress of the Indian community in first trying to make
25 The Straits Times, 19th June 1951.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 The Straits Times, 16th July 1953.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 The Straits Times, 24th July 1953.
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sense of the shifting regulations between territories and second, their need to 
safeguard property and livelihoods in the chaos of the moment.
Meanwhile, the Indian- educated elite of Malaya tried to make sense of the 
processes of the citizenship that was being offered to the Malayan Indian 
community. Due to Malay opposition to the Malayan Union proposals of 1946 
which would have nullified the sovereignty of the Sultans of the various 
Malay States, and transferred full power and jurisdiction to Britain as well as 
accruing more equitable citizenship rights to non-Malays 32( more on this 
later in the chapter), the British offered Federal Citizenship by application in 
1948 to non- Malays on terms that required them to ‘a) either be born in any 
of the territories now to be comprised in the federation and has been resident 
in any one or more of such territories for eight out of twelve years preceding 
his application or he has been resident in any one or more of such territories 
for fifteen years out of the twenty years immediately preceding his application 
...c) that he has an adequate knowledge of the Malay or English language’.33 
The Government still remained in the hands of the High Commissioner who 
was a representative of the British government. Thus while Malay nationality 
and belonging was safeguarded under the jurisdiction of the respective 
Sultans, the citizenship offered to non- Malays was restricted to political 
participation rather than nationality. This created much apprehension and 
confusion in the minds of the Indian elite in envisioning a sense of 
peoplehood for the Indian community in Malaya. In 1951, Mr R Ramani, 
President of the Federation of Indian Organisations, highlighted the Indian 
dilemma in acquiring Citizenship of the Federation of Malaya. He pointed out 
that all Indians in this country would love to regard themselves as political 
heirs to the sovereign republic of India .Further he noted, that in matters of 
political or economic importance it did not appear that the lndian( in Malaya)
32 See Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976). See 56.
33R.K. Vasil, Ethnic politics in Malaysia (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers), 1980.
Under the Federation Agreement, Malay rights were protected through ' The Conference of Rulers' 
comprising of the Sultans who assured that changes to salaries and reorganisations in the civil 
service as well changes to immigration regulations had to have the approval of this body. See 
Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics, 57.
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was required to pull his full weight.34 This demonstrates that India was still 
the primary focus for Indian identity in Malaya and the fact that since Indians 
were not being given equal privileges in Malaya there was reluctance on their 
part to acquire citizenship.
The problem was compounded for the Indians in Malaya when they were 
forced ‘to choose’ as the Government of India, in explaining the implications 
for its draft constitution for Indians overseas, discouraged dual citizenship.35 
In an article titled ‘ Indians must choose nationality’ in The Straits Times,
John Thivy , first president of the Malayan Indian Congress Party and the 
Union of India’s representative in Malaya, in August 1947 noted that it was 
left to Indians themselves to decide whether they wanted to be British or 
Indian citizens.36 He explained the changes in circumstances during travel 
between India and Malaya in that up till Independence travel between 
Malaya had been easily accomplished on the Immigration Department’s 
identification certificate but Indians now entering Singapore and Malaya 
might have to do so on the same footing as other Dominion subjects, by 
passport and visa, to demonstrate that India and Malaya had become two 
separate political entities and that Indians could only belong to either one at 
a time. The matter was discussed by the Indian High Commissioner, Mr 
Krishna Menon with the Colonial Office in London as to the status of Indian
34 The Straits Times, 2nd September 1951.
35 Indian Daily Mail, 2nd May 1948.
Article 5 of the Indian Draft Constitution.
a) Every person who or either of parents or any of whose grandparents was born in the 
territory of India as defined in this constitution and who has not made his permanent 
abode in any foreign state after the first day of April 1947.
b) Every person who or either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents was born in 
India as defined in the Government of India Act 1935 ( as originally enacted) or in Burma 
Ceylon or Malaya and who has his domicile in the territory of India a defined constitution 
shall be a citizen of India provided he has not acquired the citizenship of any foreign state 
before the date of commencement of this Constitution. -  Indian daily Mail 2nd May 1948.
36 The Straits Times, 23rd August 1947.
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nationals in Malaya.37 The Indian educated elite of Malaya such as K.P.K 
Menon, a lawyer, highlighted the reservation of this class of people when 
asking questions regarding the position of Indian professional men and 
government servants38 such as lawyers when dealing with legislation like the 
‘Singapore Advocates and Solicitors Ordinance to the effect that any 
advocate or solicitor who ceases to be a British subject after Dec 31 1935, 
may be struck off the rolls’.39 Mr Menon speculated as to what the attitude of 
the Government of Malaya would be regarding Indian lawyers in the 
country.40
Indian leaders exhorted Indians in Malaya to maintain a primary allegiance to 
Malaya and to stop giving the impression to the local Malay leaders that they 
were transients. At a ceremony at the Ramakrishna Mission orphanage,
Thivy said that Indians must stop the bird of passage attitude. Indians must 
give something to Malaya for posterity, something to remember Indians by.
‘In this country Indians must not only think of earning a living and take back 
as much as they can but contribute and give generously for the social 
service’.41 On another occasion other leaders explained the obligation and 
position of the role of local- born Indians
In that long and narrow passage in that corridor of time, Indians have had as 
conspicuous a hand in the building up of this land as had the Malays and the 
Chinese. Malaya was once a land of peace and plenty -  a prize in the orient. 
Does it surprise you therefore that nurtured with the ideal that the lot of the 
people of Malaya, be it plenty or lean , rich or poor, peace or strife , must be 
the lot of Indians born and bred in this country... its members feel they are 
Malayan first and Indians a fte r. We have always felt that we must actively 
share with the peoples in this country the task of building up this land...we
37 The Straits Times, 4th February 1948.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Indian Daily Mail, 8th September 1947.
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cannot be the proverbial bird of passage. If this country is good enough to 
live in and to make money out of, it is good enough to die by.42
Nevertheless, the Indian leaders themselves were confused in terms of 
instilling a sense of Malayan Indian community when presented with the facts 
that they had a Malayan Federal citizenship without a nationality. R Ramani 
explained the situation thus:
Citizenship is like a coat, but nationality is in our bones ...the citizenship that 
is offered to us in Malaya is something that is not coextensive with 
nationality. Citizenship is a quality that a person acquires by being in 
residence in a particular country for a particular number of years, whereas 
nationality is an attribute which is bom in him, which is part of his blood and 
bones by reason of the fact that either he is bom in the soil of his country or 
born elsewhere of parents who were born in the home country...there are no 
nationals of Malaya .One can only be the subject of the ruler of a state by 
birth or naturalisation. When you begin to discuss the question of the rights 
of a particular person in Malaya and call him in certain events a federal 
citizen it is likely to confuse constitutional pundits ...that this is a new concept 
of nationality introduced in Malaya.43
In response to the dubious situation of having a citizenship but not a 
nationality, the Constitutional Assembly drafting committee of the Nehru 
government responded to Ramani’s views by announcing that ‘ Indian 
nationals in Malaya , irrespective of whether they are enjoying Federal 
citizenship , will be entitled to an Indian citizenship which carries nationality 
with it on their making such declaration and getting themselves registered as 
Indian nationals with the representative of the Government of India’.44 Was 
this then a reversal of India’s non- acceptance of dual citizenship policy? The 
content of this declaration remained vague and as Malayan Indian leaders 
attempted to negotiate this for the common Indian in Malaya they were
42 Indian Daily Mail, 16th September 1947.
43 Indian Daily Mail, 11th August 1949.
44 Indian Daily Mail, 1st August 1949.
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viewed with suspicion by local Malays as being able to enjoy double 
privileges in having a foot in separate camps. This was exemplified by their 
response to the MIC president’s use of the ‘silk shirt and khaddar shirt’ 
analogy in 1951.
Citizenship is like wearing a silk shirt. There is no difficulty and there is 
nothing to lose. The silk shirt may be worn here. When we go back to India, 
the khaddar shirt may be worn. However, one should see that the silk shirt is 
carefully preserved against decay.45
This analogy was perceived to be in poor taste as it cheapened the feelings 
of endearment towards Malaya as home, which was understandably emotive 
for the Malays.
In terms of citizenship concerns, Indians understood that it was a tricky 
situation. They did not have equal status in Malaya and whenever they 
showed attachment with India, they were seen as being disloyal towards 
Malaya. This left them feeling resentful as expressed by Dr J. Samuel, 
President of the Federation of Indian organisations, ‘We’ve been side­
stepped’.46 He claimed that that Indian contribution to Malaya was not 
acknowledged through the Federal citizenship which allowed only thirty 
percent of Indians to be eligible for citizenship and this was to further 
compromise the political clout of the Indians when only a small proportion of 
Indians possessed the necessary citizenship documents to be eligible as an 
elector in the various elections that were held between 1948 and 1957.47 
Throughout the decolonisation moment, a representative body of Indians, the 
MIC, lobbied for a reduction of years in the residence qualifications , to be 
more lenient on the language qualifications of Malay and English ,as many
45 MIC working Committee minutes of meeting 29th April 1951, Reference number:2006/0015418 
(Arkib Negara Malaysia).
46 The Straits Times, 15th November 1952.
47 Transcript of speech made by S Govinda Raj, Meeting of Branches Malayan Indian Congress 
Selangor 4th October 1953. Reference number: 2006/0015418 (Arkib Negara Malaysia).
70
Indian labourers would have been disqualified48 ,and stand for citizenship 
with nationality -  ‘ One Nation, One Nationality and One People’.49But for a 
number of reasons, Indians were never able to form a significant voice in the 
Malayan political arena.
An uncertain sense of belonging to Malaya
Indians never felt they were stakeholders in the policy and decision- making 
arena. This had to do with the Anglo- Malay tacit understanding to preserve 
Malay rights and domination in the civil service. Indians were scarcely 
represented on the Federal and State Councils and experienced difficulties in 
entering the public service in Malaya. Stenson notes that English- educated 
Indians in Malaya were fully aware of the discrimination they encountered in 
being denied entry to the Malayan Civil Service.50During the Depression, the 
colonial government of the Malaya States shocked educated Indians when 
they took to large -scale retrenchment of Indian clerks and administrators. 
Their welfare was not taken into account when placing restrictions of already 
limited educational facilities to non- Malays. But the ‘political impotency’51 of 
the educated Indians was really demonstrated when the Chettyars, affected 
by land alienation legislation for the Malays, relied on a Chinese, Tan Cheng 
Lock, to represent their concerns.52On occasion when the Government of 
India appealed to the Government of the Federated Malay States as to why 
there was no representation of Indians in the Federal and State councils and
48 Presidential address, Sri Kundan Lai Devaser, 6th Annual session , Malayan Indian Congress , 31st 
May 1952 .Reference number: 2006/0015418 (Arkib Negara Malaysia).
49 Ibid. also The Straits Times Article 21st March 1949 -  'Give us Malayan nationality, Congress wants 
Citizenship clause changed. The Malayan Indian Congress decided today to ask federation 
Government to amend the citizenship clause of the federation Agreement and provide for 
Malayan nationality instead of citizenship...'
50 Michael Stenson, Class, Race and Colonialism in West Malaysia, The Indian case (Queensland: 
University of Queensland press, 1980), 40.
51 Ibid., 43.
52 Ibid.
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to remove the restrictions on Indians entering the public service in Malaya, 
the reply was the following:
The whole question of the constitution of the Federal Council both as 
regards representation and extension of membership is now under the 
consideration of the government, but owing partly to the extraordinary 
diversity of races, and partly to the peculiar political constitution of these 
States, it is necessary to proceed with extreme caution in introducing any 
modification of the existing order. The Indian educated community, even 
including Government officials, is very small. It comes from all parts of India, 
and is in no way representative of the agricultural labourer from the Madras 
Presidency. On all these grounds, it is felt by this government that the time 
has scarcely come for the appointment of an Indian member on the 
Council.53
The Malayan Civil Service to which this examination gives admission is a 
combined service for the Colony of the Straits Settlements, and the 
Federated and Unfederated Malay States, in which British Officers are 
assisting the Malay Sultans and Rulers in the Government of their country.
In connection with the admission of persons of other races into the higher 
ranks of the Civil Service arises the question of the legitimate aspirations of 
the Malays. It may be fairly said that the counterpart of the Indianisation of 
the services in India is the Malayanisation of the services in Malaya, and the 
gradual substitution of Malay for European officers in administrative posts is 
the declared policy of the Government both in the Federated and 
Unfederated Malay States.54
After much lobbying by the Indian government Malayan Indians were able to 
win representation for Indians on the Straits Settlements Legislative Council 
and by 1928 a representative, N. Veerasamy, was appointed to the Federal 
Legislative Council. By 1931, the State Councils of States with
53 Extract from a letter from the Chief Secretary to Government, F.M.S to the secretary to the 
Government of India, dated 28th July 1922.Reference number: Sel 516/23 (Arkib Negara 
Malaysia).
54 Extract from a letter from the Chief Secretary to Government, F.M.S to the Chief Secretary to 
Government of India, dated the 30th November 1922.Reference number: Sel 516/23 (Arkib Negara 
Malaysia).
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concentrations of the Indian population had one Indian representative.55 
Nonetheless, the colonial government in Malaya was quick to add the caveat 
that the divided nature of the Indian community according to sub­
communities did not mean that the Indian representative on the Councils 
were representative of the entire community. Arasaratnam notes that when 
the High Commissioner appointed Veerasamy, he was only representing the 
Hindu community and that he reserved the right to nominate a Ceylonese 
representative to represent Ceylonese Hindus.56 Hence the educated Indians 
felt that even though they managed to attain representation in the respective 
councils, by highlighting the issue of sub- communal tendencies amongst the 
Indians, the British were diluting their sense of power in representing the 
needs of the Indian community and this was played out when they tried to 
lobby for rights for the Indians in Malaya, such as land settlement for Indians.
The Indian elite expressed the view that it was necessary for Indians to have 
ownership of land in Malaya in order to see themselves as settlers and 
stakeholders in the economic and political future of the country. The Shastri 
report on Indian labour explained the issue from the Indian perspective thus:
It is the settlers themselves who by their own exertions open and develop 
the land, and it must be clearly understood that they have as permanent a 
stake in the welfare of the country as any mine or estate owner. Their title 
therefore must be permanent and unassailable, and in any future political 
development which may take place they must receive recognition as 
permanent independent inhabitants of Malaya. It is only if these conditions 
are fulfilled that such settlements can be expected to flourish, and these 
conditions can only be guaranteed if the land is originally allotted by 
Government.57
55 Michael Stenson, Class, Race and Colonialism in West Malaysia, The Indian case, 41.
56 Sinnapah Arasaratnam, Indians in Malaysia and Singapore (Kuala Lumpur, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1979), 86.
57 Quoted in Letter from United Planting Association of Malaya to the Federal Secretary Federated 
Malay States, Kuala Lumpur, 7th May 1937. Reference number: SeIG 712/1935 (Arkib Negara 
Malaysia).
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Later, the issue of Malayan- born Indians arose, the argument being that 
they had no political and social affinity to India and should be allotted land in 
Malaya to settle down as permanent residents of Malaya:
The facts are that previously some South Indians had come to Malaya and 
remained for irregular periods before returning home. The situation is now 
very different, the days of immigration of unskilled labour form India are over 
and many of those who came here long ago have lost the desire to go back 
to India. Their children were born here and these children feel themselves to 
be very much more the citizens of this country than the children of their 
fathers or grandfather’s village in India. Many long resident or locally born 
South Indians would far rather settle down in Malaya if they had a
c oreasonable chance to own land and become self supporting farmers.
The colonial government in Malaya maintained a steady practice until the 
Emergency in the post -war era not to allot land settlements to the Indians. 
They had several reasons for this. The colonial government only wished to 
accept Indian labour migrants as workers on plantations. They did not wish 
the Indians to eschew employment as wage earners and to go into small 
farming and compete with the Malays.59 The colonial government was also 
not prepared to carry the financial burden of acquiring land and preparing it 
for settlement. Instead they dismissed it as the responsibility of the estate 
owners.60 But it was really an editorial in The Straits Times in 1933 that 
illuminated the policy and attitude of the British Government in Malaya 
towards Indian labour migrants through the issue of land settlement:
Our correspondent is under the delusion that Indian immigrants have a 
moral right to land in Malaya, based upon the work they have done in 
developing the country and providing labour for its industries. This argument 
convinces nobody. The Indian labourer comes here as a temporary labourer
58 Indian Daily Mail, 5th November 1953.
59 Letter from Federal Secretary of State, Federated Malay States, Sd. H. Fraser to the secretary, 
United Planting Association of Malaya, 11th October 1937. Reference number: F.S. Conf 
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and not a settler. The inducements held out to him , under normal conditions 
and higher wages than are obtainable in his own country...our correspondent 
cannot or will not see the reasonableness of the strong objection felt by the 
Malay race to any policy which would result in a polyglot peasantry or in a 
countryside semi-Indian or semi Chinese in character ...The fact is that the 
only races which are welcome to the Malays in their own States , as 
permanent settlers , are those which inhabit the countries of the Malay 
Archipelago. Those races are capable of complete and harmonious 
assimilation into the peasantry of the Malay States , whereas the Tamil or 
Chinese remain distinct and inassimilable from generation to generation...the 
1931 census shows 131,500 local-born Indians ...Nearly all those “local 
Born” Indians are children of immigrant labourers , who have every intention 
of taking themselves and their families back to their own country at some 
future date ...If Immigration from India dries up , Malaya will have to look to 
China ; if the latter country fails us we shall have to look to Java ; and if Java 
fails us we shall have to make extensive use of our internal supply of 
labour...We want Chinese and Indians as labourers , not as settlers...But the 
Malay States are Malay States , and they desire to preserve the racial, 
social, religious and economic uniformity of their peasantry for exactly the 
same reasons as those which inspire nationalists of India and China to insist 
upon their own rights in their own countries.61
The tone of the above abstract indicates certain assumptions about the 
Indian labourers. First that they were in Malaya lured by the prospects of 
making money and a higher standard of living, thus negating any contribution 
they made in the economic development of the country. Second that Indians 
were thought of as transients, dismissing the fact that these labourers 
seldom had much savings to restart a life back in India. The editorial makes 
clear that preservation of Malay rights is central to the policy of the 
government and thus it was suitable to keep Indians and Chinese transient 
and not as settlers so as not to upset the socio-cultural ethos of the Malay 
States. There was also no obligation towards the Indian labourer due to the
61 The Straits Times, 2nd September 1933.
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perception of the easy ability to replace Indians as labour with other 
communities.
There were sporadic settlements or plots of garden given to the Indian 
labourers by the estates, such as the Chua Settlement, in Negri Sembilan, 
set up in 1932.62 But it was only during the Emergency, in 1953, that Sir 
Gerald Templer, High Commissioner to the Malay States, encouraged a 
scheme for the landless and offered land for purchase to the Indian 
labourers.63 The High Commissioner’s main concern was that it was 
dangerous having a floating population of Indian labourers as they could 
become easy targets for subversion by the Communists. Land was allotted to 
Indian labourers by the government, such as a sixty-acre plot in Sungei 
Buaya Estate, Kuala Langat64 and at Sungei Burong in the Tanjong Karang 
rice areas.65 It was reported that Indians could purchase land (2 acres) for 
about eighty dollars, the price of a bicycle.66The Indians who took up the 
offer purchased 2 acre plots to grow vegetables.67 But the scheme largely 
proved unpopular due to a number of reasons. In 1955, the MIC revealed 
that Indian labourers had financial problems in bearing the initial cost of 
preparing the land and subsisting till harvest times. The Indian worker had 
little or practically no money. The land offered to the Indians was also far 
from their estate lines.68 A. Balakrishnan, former president of the Penang 
Indian Congress, claimed that the government land offer to Indians was just
62 Memorandum on the question of Land Settlement for Malayan Indians , V Thaver, President, 
Malayan Indian Association , Selangor, 28th March 1949 .Reference number : Selsec 
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a ‘paper plan’.69 No concrete plans were made to make the scheme popular, 
and land was not available in places that were heavily populated with 
Indians such as in Penang, Province Wellesley and throughout the North of 
Malaya.70
The Indian Immigration Fund was frequently brought up in connection with 
the land settlement issue. Since it was felt that most Indian labourers were 
unable to finance the purchase and development of land, Indian officials 
urged the use of the Indian Immigration Fund to help settle Indian labour on 
Malayan land. Major A.S Roman, former assistant commissioner of labour, 
said that ‘It would be an act of gratitude and also be to the advantage of both 
capital and labour to settle Indian labour in or near plantations’.71lnstead, the 
colonial government announced that after the war, the Indian Immigration 
Fund was to be used to recruit indigenous labour since migration from India 
had been ceased.72 This was met with protest from the Indian community. 
The MIC took up the cause announcing that the obligations of the fund had 
not been fulfilled;
The Indian Immigration Fund according to the legal provisions governing its 
disbursement is an obligation undertaken by the government and employers 
of this country to the Indian government to recruit labour from that country. 
The Indian Immigration Fund was an assurance from this country that the 
Indian labourers will be provided with amenities as long as they are in this 
country...in spite of the great contribution the Indian labourers had made to 
the employers in way of profits the living conditions of the labourers had not 
been improved to any great extent during the past several decades.73
The Colonial government expressed different sentiments about the Indian 
Immigration Fund;
69 The Straits Times, 22nd December 1953.
70 Ibid.
71 Indian Daily Mail, 24th March 1949.
72 The Malay Mail, 23rd March 1949.
73 Indian Daily Mail, 23rd March 1949.
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No part of the Fund has been raised from labourers’ wages. It has been built 
up by assessment paid by employers of Indian labour (including the Malayan 
Governments) from their own resources. The obligation on the employer and 
the method of calculation of the assessment payable are clearly laid down in 
the Labour Code. The Fund is the property of those employers who created 
it and have since sustained it.74
As long as the Indian Government continued the labour recruitment, this 
Fund had its intrinsic value. Since the government of India discontinued 
recruitment and persistently insisted on the indefinite continuance of the ban, 
the value and the aim of the Fund automatically ceased. The labourer’s 
wages have been fixed at a standard rate by the Government and the 
planters have not even attempted to appropriate any part of the wages 
towards this fund. Thus it will be seen that neither the Government of India 
nor the Indians have any ground for grumbling if the Indian immigration Fund 
is utilised for the recruitment of any other labour force anywhere.75
The issue of the Indian Immigration Fund revealed the discrepancy between 
the Indian community’s expectations and governmental policy and practice. 
While the British thought that there were legal grounds to reassess the 
Immigration Fund and reassign it to different purposes, the Malayan Indian 
community felt that their needs were being neglected.
Even in education and language, which are vital components in nation- 
building, the Indian community felt their needs were not taken into 
consideration.76 In 1950, the Barnes report was published proposing the 
transformation of all schools into national schools in which all children will be 
taught English or Malay. The Chinese rejected this report,fearing that it 
would dilute the importance of Chinese heritage. The High Commissioner, 
Henry Gurney, appointed another committee, to consider the needs of the 
Chinese, the Fenn Wu committee. The Fenn Wu committee proposed the
74 The Sunday Mail, 20th March 1949.
75 The Malay Mail, 23rd March 1949.
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consideration of the diversity of cultures in Malaysia and to have diverse 
school systems for the different communities. Indian officials, already piqued 
that they were excluded from consultation, stated that these proposals 
promoted sectionalism.77lnstead they formed an Indian Education Committee 
under K.L Devaser and proposed an education system based in ‘Malaya as a 
culture, not Malay but Malayan, in the same sense as is envisaged for 
Malayan nationalism’.78 It advocated the learning of three languages, mother 
tongue in the first three years of education, English to be introduced in the 
fourth year and Romanised Malay in the fifth.79 The Committee also 
advocated the teaching of religious education relevant to the different 
communities and for the textbooks to be based on Malayan background. 
Despite these efforts the government still went on supporting the 
recommendations of the Barnes report with its concept of the national 
school, but provided facilities for the teaching of Chinese or Tamil where 
fifteen or more pupils requested it.80
A fractured identity
The Indian community in Malaysia could never boast a united stand on 
issues as it was wrought with sub- communal divisions, class identities and 
power struggles. Although the Chinese and Malays were also divided 
according to ideology and class, the divisions within the Indian community 
were significant in that they fragmented further the clout of a minority 
community in making a concerted representation over issues, and these 
divisions were exploited by the British to override the concerns and demand, 
of the community in Malaya.
77 Rajeswary Ampalavanar, The Indian minority and political change in Malaya 1945-1957 (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981), 131.
78 Memorandum on Indian Education in the Federation of Malaya, 31st August 1951, Indian 
education Committee. Reference Number: 2006/0014449(Arkib Negara Malaysia).
79 Ibid.
80 Rajeswary Ampalavanar, The Indian minority and political change in Malaya 1945-1957,131.
79
The fragmented Indian identity was already evident before the 1930s. The 
various sub- communal identities played out in the different Indian 
nationalisms. The Northern Indians, especially the Punjabis, were influenced 
by the Ghadr Movement (early 1900s) that led the Malayan States Guides to 
refuse service in East Africa during the First World War. The Indian Muslim 
merchant community was influenced by the Khilafat movement( 1919-1924) 
while the Tamils were divided according to caste, the Brahmin Tamils 
supporting Indian Congress ideology, while the non -  Brahmin Tamils were 
partisan towards the Dravidian movement preached by Ramasamy 
Naicker.81 .
After the war the Ceylon Tamil separatism and Tamil sub- nationalism 
became particularly obvious. The Ceylon Tamils had acquired a privileged 
position within the government service .Stenson writes that the Ceylon 
Tamils were intent on improving their qualifications, status and salaries.82 
Compared to the Tamils from India, who were mainly from the labouring 
class, the Ceylon Tamils maintained a sense of superiority due to their 
educational status. The Ceylon Tamils were also chosen by the British 
authorities between 1935 and 1938 to represent Hindu interests on State 
Councils. This created further antagonism between the Ceylon Tamils and 
the Indians. The Ceylonese established the Ceylon Federation of Malaya, on 
30th December 1945.83When the MIC attempted to integrate the Ceylonese 
in 1947, Thuraisingam, the president of the Ceylon federation of Malaya, 
made it clear that the Ceylonese had been recognised as a minority 
community with separate representation. He, therefore, told the then MIC
81 See Michael Stenson, Class, Race and Colonialism in West Malaysia, The Indian case, 40.
82 Ibid., 74.
83 S. Subramaniam, Politics of the Indians in Malaysia 1945-1955, (Dissertation for Masters of Arts,
University of Malaya, 1973), 106.
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president John Thivy ‘to leave us alone to enjoy the rights we have obtained 
through our own efforts and to look elsewhere for members’.84
Tamil sub- nationalism became more intense with the efforts of G. 
Sarangapany, editor of the Tamil Murasu. On the event of the 69th birthday of 
Ramasamy Naicker, Sarangapany made the following speech revealing 
sentiments and aspirations of the Tamil community in Malaysia. Particular 
references were made to the MIC as not being representative of the Indian 
Community, since most presidents before the election of the V.T 
Sambanthan in 1955 were Northern Indians;
We are always ousted out under the pretext of being a section although we 
form eighty to ninety percent of the Indian population in Malaya and non- 
Tamils are appointed to represent the Community. Now it is time to put an 
end to this usurpation of our rights .Any Indian organisation which is not fully 
represented by Tamils who form the bulk of the Indian population but which 
is dominated by the other sections of the Indian community is not at all 
representative body and is not entitled to speak on behalf of the Indian 
community. The Malayan Indian Congress is not adequately represented by 
the Tamils but are dominated by other sections as will be seen from the 
composition and personnel of their executive bodies where the majority of 
the primary members , namely Tamils are poorly represented .The remedy is 
in the hands of the Tamils. They must join the Congress in still larger 
numbers and demand and secure proper representation for themselves on 
various executive bodies.85
The Chettyars and the Tamil Muslims also remained aloof from the general 
Indian community. Stenson writes that the Chettyars in Malaya remained 
clannish and apolitical.86 This could have been because they were a specific 
community of money lenders who had their own customs and traditions that 
tied them to their home base in South India closely. A number of Tamil
84 Malaya tribune 25th June 1947 quoted in S. Subramaniam, Politics of the Indians in Malaya 1945-
1955,109.
85 Indian Daily Mail, 20th April 1948.
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Muslims assimilated into the Malay community. There was the precedence of 
a distinct community of the Jawi Peranakan in Malaya that was made up of 
Muslim merchants marrying into the Malay community. The portions of the 
Muslim community that remained Indian, however, felt excluded by the 
Indian community in Malaya in terms of representation in organisations and 
the Indian/Tamil press. In the 1930s they formed their own Tamil newspaper, 
Desa Nesan, which was continued into the 1950s.87
Another division that emerged after the war was that of the Malaya- born 
Indians and Indians who maintained a stronger affinity with India and were 
frequently dubbed foreigners. Sentiments ran high against foreign Indians as 
expressed by R Jumabhoy, president of the Indian Chamber of Commerce. 
Under The Straits Times report subheading of ‘Birds of passage should not 
dabble in politics’88 Jumabhoy commented that ‘the Malayan government 
was not looking after the interests of Indians and that Indians should look to 
India ...to those Indians who have come here merely to earn their living and 
can only be considered as birds of passage, I should ask them not to 
interfere with local politics’.89 The MIC was ambivalent over its policy to keep 
membership restricted to Malaya- born Indians or to Indians in general. The 
president of MIC, Budh Singh, in 1949 recommended restricting membership 
of the Congress to only Indians professing loyalty to Malaya.90 In 1951, under 
the presidency of Devaser, the MIC supported the move of the proposed 
‘Congress of Indian Organisations’ to protect the interest of all Indians not 
only the domiciled ones.91 Nonetheless, there was a section of Malayan 
Indians who were keen to secure separate representation and a pre- war 
organisation, the Malayan Indian Association (MIA), representing only 
domiciled and local-born Indians, was revived in 1947 under G.V Thaver.
87 Ibid.,75.
88 The Straits Times, 11th May 1951.
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This organisation was preoccupied with land settlement issues and took a 
very hard stand against the involvement of foreign Indians in local politics. In 
1953, P.A Das, president of the Penang and Kedah branch of the Malayan 
Indian Association, ‘warned the Government of the danger of handing over a 
large settled population to what might prove to be alien political control...A 
line must be drawn sooner or later between foreigners and others who have 
rights in Malaya. We have become increasingly aware that in Malaya there 
are many individuals who are still very conscious of their country yet remain 
active members of political parties which exert considerable pressure on the 
more settled population of this country.’ 92
MIC struggled to remain the representative body of the Indians.93 But 
besides the MIA, the Indian councillors on the various Federal and state 
councils, who were not part of the MIC, decided to form the Federation of 
Indian Organisations (FIO) as a parallel organisation to the MIC. Naturally 
the MIC opposed this. In a confidential memorandum, the MIC listed its 
objections to FIO:
a) That such an organisation would bring in conflict of interest.
b) That it would be trespass into the field of many existing organisations.
c) From the motive of the move, the MIC strongly fears that the interests of 
the labouring masses will not be safeguarded.
d) That it will be a parallel organisation to our Congress which is well 
established on a Pan-Malayan basis and is capable of voicing the entire 
masses in the country irrespective of interests, class or creed.
92 The Straits Times, 4th October 1953.
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e) This is a stunt by the convenors, most of whom are members of the State, 
Settlement or Federal Councils, to canvass support from the people for the 
forthcoming elections
f) In light of the move, the MIC is of the opinion that such a move will be 
injurious to the general interest of Indian masses.94
In light of the above comments, the formation of three organisations revealed 
fissiparous tendencies amongst the Indians. There was antagonism amongst 
the heads of the various organisations and rivalry for power. MIC remained 
the predominant organisation as the FIO and MIA remained relatively 
unpopular, due to the former not being able to rally the support of the 
labouring classes, and the latter because it had limited membership as India 
still remained appealing to Indians in Malaya.95 The lack of unity was 
realised by leaders but there were only failed attempts in 1951 at merger to 
shore up consolidated support in forthcoming elections, as MIC, due to its 
larger membership, asked for special privileges and there was indecision 
over membership and voting rights being restricted to local born or domiciled 
Indians.96
An Indian ‘nation-of-intent’ for Malaya
What were the Indian elite envisioning for themselves and the community as 
residents in Malaya at the moment of decolonisation? What was their ‘nation- 
of-intent’ for Malaya? Tonnesson and Antlov refer to ‘nation-of-intent’ as ‘ a 
vision of a territorial entity , a set of institutions , an ideal-type citizen and an 
identity profile that a group of social engineers have in mind and try to 
implement’.97 They arrive at this definition while examining the work of A.B 
Shamsul, who describes the different ‘nations-of-intent’ as imagined by
94 Malayan Indian Congress Headquarters, Federation of Indian Organisations, Confidential, 14th 
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interested parties in Malaysia.The bumiputera98-dom\r\atedl national identity 
as defined by the government" which is challenged by three groups ; the 
non-bumiputera group which according to Shamsul is led by the Chinese but 
could also include the Indians, and two other bumiputera groups .Of concern 
is the non- bumiputera, which ‘ reject the bumiputera-based and bumiputera 
-defined national identity in preference for a more pluralised national identity , 
in which the culture of each ethnic group in Malaysia is accorded a position 
equal to that of bumiputera’.™0 Shamsul arrives at this analysis in 1996 but at 
the moment of decolonisation, at least for the Indian community and their 
elite, their identity profile and the political space which they occupied was a 
confused process of negotiation and bargaining with the Malays and Colonial 
government. The Indian elite consciousness in Malaya after the war, as 
explained earlier, was tied to the psychological unity of British India and 
ridding India and the rest of the Empire of the British. This was unlike the 
Malays who understood Malaya as their watan (nation) and associated 
homeland with Malaya, Tanah Melayu (Malay land).
When the Malayan Indian Congress was formed in August 1946, its 
orientation, aims and objectives were focused on India. John Thivy , the 
founder President of the MIC, revealed that the struggle for Indian 
Independence was due to two main reasons , the freedom of the mother 
country and to ‘ rid ourselves of the wrong of having permitted India to be the 
base from which Imperialism spread to other countries in East Asia.’101 
Resolutions adopted at the inaugural meeting of the formation of the MIC 
revealed a propensity to concentrate on India and overseas Indians rather 
than remained focused on Indians in Malaya. Subramaniam writes that at 
best, resolutions adopted at the inaugural meeting of the Malayan Indian
98 Meaning sons of the soil in reference to the Malay community.
99 A.B. Shamsul, 'Nations-of-lntent in Malaysia' in Asian forms of Nation, 323.
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Congress manifested a dualism. 102The Draft Constitution of the MIC in 1946 
demonstrated that India drew greater attention from the Indians- out of 
twelve resolutions passed , only three resolutions were relevant to Malaya , 
that is ‘communal co-operation and endeavour for the independence of 
Malaya , the adoption of a progressive policy to secure for the Indian workers 
a reasonable share of the wealth and prosperity of this country and to fight 
for the language and cooperative associations of Indians -  all Indians 
whether citizens or not’.103
On 10th October 1945 , the British introduced the Malayan Union Scheme 
which, among other things, promised citizenship on the basis of jus soli .that 
it could be claimed by all those born in Malaya or Singapore whether Malay , 
Chinese or Indian. The Malays took exception to this as it aimed to negate 
their special rights. Like the Chinese, the Indians were slow to respond to the 
Malayan Union scheme, but when the MIC did give a belated response 
through John Thivy, despite all past and future claims that were made by 
Indians with regards to their contribution to the development and prosperity 
to Malaya, Thivy conceded that the Malays had first right to Malaya. Thivy, in 
an address to the Pan-Malayan Conference in February 1947, declared that 
Indians were ‘solidly behind the Malays when the latter opposed the Union 
proposals’.104 Although the main issue was the deprivation of the Sultans of 
their sovereignty, and the further consolidation of Imperial powers , this act of 
concession and lack of realisation of the benefits of the Malayan Union 
scheme to non- Malays, set the tone for Indians to be secondary players at 
the table of negotiations for rights and belonging to Malaya. It was only when 
the British realised that the Malayan Union Scheme had generated an 
unprecedented level of political consciousness amongst the Malays and 
decided to enter into negotiations in a Working Committee in July 1946 
comprising only of representatives of the Government, the Malay Sultans
102 S. Subramaniam, Politics of the Indians in Malaya 1945-1955, 46.
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and representatives of the Malay Party UMNO, excluding non- Malays, that 
MIC cried foul that the British were beginning to resort to divide and rule 
policies.105 The significance of the Working Committee was not to be 
underestimated as recommendations from this committee led to the 
Federation of Malaya Agreement on 1st February 1948.
Subramaniam writes that ‘ It is necessary and interesting to observe that 
when the other communities of Malaya , especially the Malays , were 
concerned with their privileged status and interests in the constitutional 
discussion , the MIC appeared to be overly concerned about principles of 
democracy and independence for the country.,106The MIC displayed a 
naivety about the political milieu at the moment of decolonisation which was 
communal. When they did realise the whole process was about communality 
they expressed dismay at the realisation that their voice would go unheeded 
as a minority. The Malays were united about the privileged position of the 
Malays and the Malay language whether it was a leftist, Islamic or British- 
educated elitist perspective of Malay Identity. The seminal work of Anthony 
Milner107 highlights that the concept of Malays as a race had begun with the 
works of Munshi Abdullah from the 19th century. This was further crystallised 
though the efforts of Eunos Abdullah through the Malay newspaper, the 
Utusan Melayu , introducing a specific political vocabulary that revolved 
around , bangsa ( community / race), watan , (nation) and ideas of affinity to 
soil and land ( Tanah Melayu ) . At the time of decolonisation, the Malayan 
Union proposals aroused in the Malays quick political mobilisation which led 
to the creation of the political party, United Malay National Organisation 
(UMNO) in March 1946. Their swift action manifested first in the creation of 
communal boundaries. UMNO was keen to define who belonged to the
105 S. Subramaniam, Politics of the Indians in Malaya 1945-1955, 146.
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nation.108The Malays had derived ancestry from Thai, Burmese, Bugis and 
other Indonesian sub- cultures as well as Chinese and Indians. The issue of 
who was Malay was defined. ‘A Malay was a Muslim who habitually followed 
Malay customs and habits and spoke the Malay language.’109 Malays also 
needed to be subjects of a state ruler since ‘the state monarchical culture 
was an integral part of Malay culture’.110Second, with the establishment of 
boundaries manifested the process of ‘other-ing’, of primarily the Chinese 
and the Indian communities in whom Malays ‘had little faith of these 
communities intentions and loyalty towards Malaya’.111Mauzy writes that ‘A 
key feature of Malay nationalism was its highly developed sense of “us 
versus them” and its keen purpose in defending everything considered 
Malay. The creation of a defined Malay identity allowed Malays 
subsequently to monopolise debates and negotiations in the years running 
up to Independence. The debates focused on Malay special rights and status 
while the non-Malays were excluded from political discussion and had to 
content with guarantees in terms of economic opportunity and rights of 
citizenship’.112
The Chinese were also influenced by China in their homeland nationalisms. 
They had the alignment towards the Kuomintang Party and the creation of 
Kuomintang Malaya as well as the establishment of the Nanyang Communist 
Party, later renamed the Malayan Communist party.113But in the inter-war 
years there were already Chinese who wanted to focus on a Malayan-
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centred political identity. The Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA) was 
one such organisation. It fostered individuals like Tan Cheng Lock, who were 
to become key protagonists during the decolonisation moment and who 
proved that the Chinese were more formidable negotiators with the Malays 
and the British than the Indians during this era. There were reasons for this. 
The Chinese were numerically close in terms of population numbers to the 
Malays.114 They dominated the urban areas of Malaya and were further in 
control of private enterprise than any other community in Malaya. 
Furthermore, against the background of the Emergency, the Chinese 
enjoyed the political patronage of the British, who were keen to offset the 
Chinese communist elements with the more moderate conservative elements 
of the Chinese community. The Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), which 
was formed on 27th February 1949, had the backing of the British High 
Commissioner, Henry Gurney, who was keen to install a conservative 
Chinese leadership within the community as a bulwark against the Chinese 
communists. This Chinese party was included in committees and high- level 
negotiations because the colonial administration needed the MCA to help 
initiate its Emergency initiatives such as the New Villages programme. Heng 
Pek Hoon writes that The Emergency brought Chinese politics in Malaysia to 
centre stage and set the conditions for the growth of the MCA as an 
indigenized party’.115 MCA representatives were invited to sit on the Federal 
War Council and all the Advisory Committees.116 Heng admits that ‘the 
inclusion of MCA office holders on these various committees built an 
effective linkage and communication system between the Association and 
Government from the grass-roots to the national level’.117The MCA also built 
up its grassroots support when the government encouraged the MCA to form 
branches in all squatter areas where communist activity was obvious. In
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contrast to the British government’s patronage of the MCA was the attitude of 
the British to the Indian political elite, as explained earlier in the colonial 
government’s policy to deny Indians representation in the various Straits 
Settlements and Federation councils, who, the elite, by Tinker’s assertions 
were considered as ‘middlemen and interlopers’ and to be ‘disarmed 
whenever they got politically strong’.118
During the decolonisation moment, the MIC made certain ineffective turns 
and unhelpful alliances to gain representation. In certain instances, it did not 
help that the government did not see their representation as necessary. In 
registering their opposition against the Working Committee of July 1946, MIC 
joined the AMCJA coalition. The AMCJA coalition was a mixture of Chinese, 
Malay left and Indian organisations. In joining the AMCJA, the MIC was 
making a claim for non-Malay rights and single citizenship. When the 
Federation draft Constitution was announced, giving citizenship without 
nationality, a nominated legislature and Singapore as a separate political 
entity, the AMCJA staged a boycott and announced an alternative 
Constitution called the People’s Constitutional proposals. Of the various 
features of the AMCJA constitution, it hoped to initiate a ‘citizenship to be 
termed Malayan to be given automatically for all born in this country with 
equal political rights for all citizens’.119 Ampalavanar notes that even the 
AMCJA coalition had problems with the MIC because Indians were insistent 
that John Thivy should be president of the AMCJA, the MIC refused to 
accept the oath of exclusive allegiance to Malaya, and that they championed 
Indian National Congress and Nehru as anti-imperial leaders and symbols for 
a new ideology.120
The MIC staged a constitutional boycott in March 1948 to oppose the 
Federation Agreement of February 1948 which ensured that Malays qualified
n8See Hugh Tinker, Separate and unequal: India and the Indians in the British Commonwealth, 1920- 
1950, (London, 1976).
119 S. Subramaniam, Politics of the Indians in Malaya 1945-1955,164.
120 Rajeswary Ampalavanar, The Indian minority and political change in Malaya 1945-1957 ( Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1981), 87.
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for citizenship based on birth while non-Malays had to qualify based on a 
period of residency and language proficiency in English or Malay. This 
constitutional boycott alienated the Indian Councillors in the government and 
the Indian mercantile community, who found the MIC to be extremist in their 
attitude.121This weakened the power base of the party. Also, the AMCJA, due 
to its leftist orientation, could not survive new Emergency regulations and 
came to an end in 1948. As the MIC came to the end of its era of boycott and 
chose to prepare for elections in the early 1950s, it aligned itself with a new 
political force, the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP), led by Dato Onn.
The IMP was appealing to the MIC because it took a non- communal 
position. But once again the MIC realised that it was an unhelpful move as 
the IMP was trounced at the polls in comparison to the communal alliance of 
the UMNO-MCA coalition which was favoured by the Malayan electorate.122
Meanwhile, Indians felt that they were snubbed by the government in two 
instances. First was when the government formed the Communities Liaison 
Committee in January 1949. It began as the Sino Malay Good Will 
Committee and then was later expanded to include Thuraisingam, a 
Ceylonese.123 In 1953, the government introduced the Member system in 
preparation for self -government. There was Malay and Chinese 
representation but Indians were excluded. This was because the Indian who 
was offered the position, Ramani, declined and a Ceylonese was selected 
instead. In protest all five Indian Councillors on the Federal Legislative 
Council resigned. By the announcement of the Federal Elections Committee 
Report in February 1954, the MIC feared political oblivion. Due to the 
introduction of new regulations the significance of Indians in the electorate 
had diminished. The MIC realised that against the communal political milieu, 
they were going to be outperformed and decided to ask for 10 percent of 
seats to be reserved in the Legislative Council for Indians. The MIC had
121 Ibid.
122 This is in reference to the Municipal elections of 1952 and 1953 whereby IMP stood against the 
UMNO-MCA merger making up the Alliance.
123 Ibid., 109.
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finally broken from its non- communal stance. To appeal their position the 
MIC played the minority card:
We are accused in certain quarters that by asking for representation in 
the Member System we are communal. Yet these very quarters have 
accepted their appointments in the Member System and have publicly 
accepted their appointments in the Member System and have publicly 
declared that these appointments are a recognition of their communal 
organisations.124
We are a minority in the country at the moment. Time must come and 
will come when we will talk of Malayans rather than Indians, Chinese, 
Malays and others. But at no time interests of the minority must be 
ignored .The majority communities must be generous and helpful to 
the minorities who in turn must be co-operated in the interests of the 
country as a whole.125
The MIC was practically clutching at straws with futile strategy and ideology 
by 1954 until they joined the Alliance and won a landslide victory in the 1955 
elections on the Alliance ticket. The Alliance had campaigned successfully in 
1955, promising a final run up to Independence. Thereafter there was a 
general mode of acquiescence by Indian leaders to Malay demands and 
communal bargains. It is significant that even within the Alliance, MIC had to 
accept the heavy end of the bargain by only being allotted two seats on the 
Alliance ticket (despite forming 11% of the Malayan population) at elections 
in comparison to MCA’s fifteen tickets and UMNO’s thirty five.126 The Alliance 
memorandum that was submitted to the Reid Constitutional Commission for 
consideration was also a contentious issue. The Alliance memorandum 
highlighted Malay special privileges and Malay to be recognised as the
124 Speech made by S Govinda Raj at MIC Selangor Meeting, 4th October 1953. Reference number: 
2006/0015418 (Arkib Negara Malaysia).
125 Speech made by S. Govinda Raj, Malayan Indian Congress Selangor 4th April 1954. Reference 
number:2006/0015418 ( Arkib Negara Malaysia).
126 Rajeswary Ampalavanar, The Indian minority and political change in Malaya 1945-1957,193.
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national language. MIC party members called for a restriction for Malay 
privileges which was not brought up by the MIC president V. T Sambanthan 
at the Alliance National Council. This inconsistency was highlighted by 
Devaser, another Indian member of the council, which led to his 
suspension.127 Although Sambanthan of the MIC was not the exception, 
UMNO and MCA leaders also generally sidestepped those elements within 
their communities which they termed ‘radical’ to arrive at a consensus over 
what the Malaya’s Independence (Merdeka) Constitution was to be like.
Conclusion
The Merdeka Constitution which includes Article 153, stipulating Malay 
special privileges, set the stage for ethnic relations in post- colonial Malaysia, 
with Malay identity forming the primary nucleus for Malayan/ Malaysian 
national identity while recognising the cultural symbols of other ethnic groups 
peripherally.128 Out of the decolonising moment for Malaya emerged an 
‘Asian form of Nation’,129 which was based on a hierarchy, with the Malay 
ethnic group situated in privileges and rights above the Chinese and Indians. 
The Indian nation-of-intent for Malaya was in the end a compromise of rights 
that were given away due to a fragmented sense of the individual with 
multiple loyalties and community, a period of flux and confusion, being 
excluded from colonial governmental policy, and internal divisions and power 
mongering from within the Indians themselves. Indians had a secondary 
position at the negotiating table during this decolonising moment. It was a 
post- colonial situation of displacement, a common story of a migrant 
community that could not understand that they were in pivotal moments 
throughout the Empire as in Malaya.
127 Tamil Nesan, 6th September 1956.
128 A.B. Shamsul, 'Nations-of-lntent in Malaysia' in Asian forms of Nation, 323.
129 Tonnesson et.al Asian forms of Nation, 25.
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Chapter 3 -  Sambanthan and Manickavasagam within a 
tradition of elite accommodation (1959-1973)
The Malayan Indian Congress joined the Alliance in April 1955, thus 
completing the Alliance as the representative body of the major ethnicities in 
Malaya. The tapestry of events leading up to Independence in 1957 and 
beyond have led academics in Malaysian studies to postulate ‘an elite 
accommodation’1 model or a ‘consociational democracy’2, which was 
accounted by ‘elite coalescence’3 ,to describe the Malayan/Malaysian 
political milieu. It was through negotiation of the elites from the component 
parties of the Alliance representing the Malays, Chinese and Indians that ‘the 
Bargain’4 was struck, the Bargain being the concession to Malay political 
hegemony in return for unhindered economic activity (for particularly the 
Chinese) and revisions to the citizenship regulations granting jus soli to non- 
Malays after 1957. ‘The Bargain’ was institutionalised in the Alliance 
memorandum to the Constitutional Commission of 1957 and subsequently 
incorporated into the Merdeka Constitution.
‘The Bargain’ was modified with the advent of Malay ‘ultras’ in the rank of the 
UMNO and in the wake of the 1969 ethnic riots . The Malay elite innovated 
and executed policy that further entrenched the supremacy of Malay rights 
through affirmative action proposed in the New Economic Policy(NEP) and 
the creation of a national identity (The Rukunegara) that presented the 
symbols and culture of the Malays as being paramount. In short, the already 
narrow civic space in which non-Malay/Muslim minority rights could 
manoeuvre in Malaysia was diminished further after 1969. Two Indian
1 Gordon Means, Malaysian politics: the second generation (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 
1991), 2.
2 Arend Lijpart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A comparative Exploration (New Haven: Vale 
University Press, 1977).
3 William Case, Elites and Regimes in Malaysia: Revisiting a Consociational Democracy ('Clayton: 
Monash Asia Institute, 1996), 35.
4 Diana K. Mauzy Barisan National; Coalition government in Malaysia (Petaling Jaya, Malaysia: 
Maricans Academic Press, 1983). 20.
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leaders, presidents of the MIC, were to dominate the stage during this period 
of Malaysian history, V.T Sambanthan and after him, V. Manickavasagam. 
They were the key elites who sat at the negotiating table and decided as 
representatives of the MIC within the Alliance to coalesce with the Malay 
majority.
Gordon Means offers a five point model in signalling an ideal type of elite 
accommodation out of which three are highlighted here to understand the 
role of the ethnic elite representative: ‘1) that ethnic community is unified 
under a leadership which can authoritatively bargain for the interests of that 
community 2) that the leaders of each community have the capacity to 
secure compliance and ‘legitimacy’ for the bargains that are reached by elite 
negotiations 3) that there is sufficient trust and empathy among elites to be 
sensitive to the most vital concerns of other ethnic communities.’ 5 Indians 
were rarely unified in their political views due to the diversified cultural make 
up of the community. As to securing compliance for bargains reached, 
events explained in the previous chapter have already demonstrated the 
knee- jerk decisions arrived at by the Indian elite. With regards to being 
‘sensitive to the most vital concerns of the other ethnic communities’, the 
Indian elite demonstrated this aptly when conceding from the outset the 
primacy of Malay hegemony , much to the chagrin of their Indian followers. 
Sambanthan and Manickavasagam, in representing a minority community, 
rife with internal sectional rivalry, were bound by circumstances that gave 
them very little space to make effective decisions and execute empowering 
initiatives for the Indian community.This chapter explains the crises endured 
during the time of Sambanthan and Manickavasagam and the dilemmas that 
enmeshed them. Sambanthan and Manickasavagam together with Samy 
Vellu (discussed in the next chapter), as presidents of the MIC, were key 
agents in formulating the direction and fate of the Malaysian Indian 
community over decades. Hence, it is crucial to assess their aims, successes 
and failures that inevitably impacted the community.
5 Gordon Means, Malaysian politics: the second generation, 2.
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Compromised beginnings
Chandra Muzaffar offers the following analysis to account for the political 
marginalisation of Indians in Malaysia from the outset:
The fact of the matter was that MIC did not really count. The Alliance could 
have won the 1955 election easily, without MIC support. Indeed, MIC 
candidates were returned from Malay majority constituencies with active 
help from the UMNO. In the formulation of proposals connected with the 
drafting of the 1957 Merdeka Constitution and in the actual negotiations for 
independence the MIC had hardly any significant role. When it came to 
controversial issues like jus soli, the special position of the Malays and the 
national language, the MIC merely echoed positions held by the MCA and 
other non- Malaya groups outside Alliance.6
The situation that Muzaffar describes hinges on the fact that Indians were a 
small percentage of the electorate. They formed 11.26% of the population in 
1957.7 In 1954 the Malay Mail reported that MIC might not perform well in 
the 1955 elections due to the fact that ‘the Indians were not registering for 
citizenship to the extent as was expected’.8 This had to do with the great 
degree of insularity experienced by Indians on the plantation. They were 
poorly educated and had little access to upward social mobility. Few Indians 
on the plantations, besides the plantation school teachers and managers, 
could read the papers and understand the political shifts and developments 
that were occurring in Malaya. An article in the Tamil Nesan in 1950 reported 
a story, ‘No blessing from God to apply for an Identity card(IC)’ that gives an 
insight into the mind and motivations of the Indian plantation population , 
suffused with parochial particularities , with regards to applying for the 
necessary documentation for citizenship. The article describes the plight of 
an Indian lady, Suppamal, who failed to apply for an identity card because
6 Chandra Muzaffar, "Political Marginalisation in Malaysia" in Indian communities in Southeast
Asia, ed. K.S. Sandhu et al. (Singapore: ISEAS and Times Academic Press, 1993), 220.
7 DOS Census Reports 1970,1980,1991,2000 &2004 and Ninth Malaysia Plan quoted in Malaysian 
Indians: Looking Forward Jayanth Appudurai & G.A David Dass,(Selangor, Malaysia, Strategic 
Information and research Development Centre(SIRD)), 2008.
8 The Malay Mail, 2nd March 1954.
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her God (Saamy) said: The time is not good, do not apply for an 1C now.’ 
She later added that ‘last week Saamy came again to me and told me that 
the time is good now and that I should apply for an 1C’.9
The Indian literati, as explained in the previous chapter, were split into 
different factions and organisations such as the MIA, FIO and MIC. While 
MIC was able to dominate the political arena, it was hardly representative of 
the general Indian population comprised overwhelmingly of the labouring 
class. Muzaffar’s analysis highlights the dispensability of the MIC to the 
Alliance. From the onset of negotiations in MIC to join the Alliance, MIC was 
placed in a compromised position. Ampalavanar writes that in 1954, Tunku 
Abdul Rahman was only keen to admit MIC to the Alliance if they were 
capable of attracting support at the municipal elections.10 Subsequently in 
the 1955 elections, MIC had disputes with the Alliance over seat allocation. 
This remained a problem in the state elections of Perak in November 1955 
when MIC requested two seats and were allocated only one by the 
Alliance.11
But it was the Bungsar seat fiasco in October 1957 which was to 
demonstrate aptly that MIC was not an equal partner in the Alliance .MIC 
was very much subject to the authority of UMNO and the MCA. The Bungsar 
fiasco began in October 1957, when the Alliance and MIC headquarters 
nominated Gurdial Singh, a North Indian, as the Alliance candidate for the 
Bungsar ward in the municipal elections. This disappointed the Tamils in the 
constituency who were supporting another Tamil, K. Gurupatham, to run for 
elections instead. As a measure of protest, the Bungsar MIC branch 
campaigned and voted for the Labour Party candidate V.David12, who was a 
Tamil. V.David won and UMNO and MCA took disciplinary action by 
demanding the removal of the Selangor branch from MIC and Alliance. The
9 Author's translation from Tamil to English from the article in Tamil Nesan 16th March 1950.
10 Rajeswary Ampalavanar, The Indian minority and political change in Malaya 1945-1957,192.
11 Ibid. 194.
12 Ibid.
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Malay press editorials even went as far as campaigning for the expulsion of 
the MIC from the Alliance. Sambanthan had become president of the MIC by 
then and his adversary within the MIC, Devaser, blamed Sambanthan. In an 
editorial in The Malay M ail, ‘MIC president wavered at critical time’ , Devaser 
wrote ‘ that the headquarters had interfered with the selection of the 
Congress candidate in the Bungsar ward and that the president had wavered 
when during the election campaign it had been obvious that that things were 
not going right’.13
The Bungsar fiasco demonstrated the constant dilemma of the MIC 
president, who on one hand, was subject to the undemocratic process within 
the Alliance selection of the Bungsar candidate, since the Bungsar Branch 
was not given a say in the selection of the candidate, and on the other, not 
being able to sustain the support of his subordinates within the party and the 
larger Indian community. The MIC leadership appears to have acted in 
isolation from the wider Indian political community in merging with the 
Alliance. There were internal divisions as reported in 1954 when delegates at 
the All-Malayan Indian Congress, which approved the merger with Alliance, 
declared the move unconstitutional. The Straits Times reported a delegate 
saying, ‘ The decision did not represent the wishes of the majority of the 
Indians in the Federation and at best was a decision of the MIC’s Kuala 
Lumpur branches only...Many branches were not told in advance of the 
proposal to join up with the Alliance . Several delegates did not have the 
mandate from their branches to vote.’14Other Indian elite in the MIA and FIO 
deplored the merger with Alliance as a sell out in that they expressed doubt 
over Indian minority status being incompatible with communal politics. Tamil 
Murasu expressed that MIC was ‘picking crumbs from the table’.15 The Tamil 
editor, R. Venkatarajulu, of the Tamil Nesan predicted an eventual split 
between MIC and the Alliance when the Alliance ‘will find out that Congress
13 The Malay Mail, 26th December 1957.
14 The Straits Times, 19th October 1954.
15 Quoted in Rajeswary Ampalavanar The Indian minority and political change in Malaya 1945-
1957, 192.
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does not represent the majority of the Indians in this country... When it (MIC) 
joined the winning side (Alliance) I detested the organisation’.16 He further 
stressed that ‘Malaya should be given self government only when the people 
speak and live as Malayan and not as communal bodies’.
The primary dilemma for the Indian elite of the MIC at Independence was 
that they held a weak position as part of the Alliance coalition , being 
representatives of only a minority community, and they were not able to rally 
sufficient support from the Indian community for initiatives and policy that 
they were compelled to acquiesce on. Hence, when Sambanthan took over 
as president of MIC, his leadership was dubbed ‘lacklustre’ because he did 
not have the personality to outwit the challenges presented by communal 
bargaining as would be seen in years to come.17
Sambanthan portrayed the expendable position of Indian minority 
representation in the run up to Independence when he decided not to join the 
London Conference held from 18th January to 8th February 1956 to discuss 
constitutional reforms, transfer of power and an independent constitutional 
commission.18 The Alliance Party delegation was made up of the Chief 
Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, Dato’ Abdul Razak, H.S Lee and Dr Ismail A 
Rahman.19 The Tamil Nesan announced in its headlines, much to the shock 
of the Indian community, that ‘Sambanthan refuses to go on the London 
delegation’.20 The article reported that the MIC personnel including the 
former MIC president, Devaser, expressed ‘shock’ over his decision to not 
join the delegation. Selangor State Branch Secretary, A Tharmalingam, 
commented, ‘As the history of Malaya is being written, it must not be said
16 The Malay Mail, 13th December 1954.
17 Rajeswary Brown Ampalavanar, "The contemporary Indian political Elite in Malaysia" in Indian 
Communities in Southeast Asia, ed. K.S Sandhu et.al (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies Publishing, 2006).
18 Joseph M. Fernando, The Alliance Road to Independence (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya 
Press, 2009), 118.
19 Ibid., 121.
20 Tamil Nesan, 2nd November 1955.
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that Indians did not play their role in getting Independence for Malaya . 
Sambanthan himself has articulated this on several occasions and now we 
must remind him of his own words’.21
Sambanthan’s reply was that first, delegates had already been selected and 
by insisting on joining the team he might create unwanted problems,22 and 
second, the issue of race was not being discussed, only the constitution, so 
he did not have to be present.23 The Tunku voiced his admiration for 
Sambanthan by saying that Sambanthan had done his duty towards the 
Indians but ‘the trip to London was to discuss the constitution and that we 
only needed individuals with expert knowledge of the constitution’.24 These 
comments revealed two things: first, that Indians were only relevant in 
matters of communal representation. In the moment of the creation of 
Malayan national consciousness, reflected in constitution building, Indians 
were not on equal footing; there was no Malayan identity for Indians, they 
were just a community in Malaya. Second, Sambanthan did not have the 
political acumen to negotiate a position at the London talks. His 
acquiescence, maybe unknowingly, reflected that Indians were ignorant of 
Malayan life and could not comment effectively on the Constitution and 
hence they were denied representation at the crucial London talks.
Sambanthan's silence on most issues affecting the nation and local politics 
after the MIC merger with the Alliance did not go unnoticed. In 1956,
Devaser voiced in a report ‘Why MIC was keeping quiet when the future of 
Malaya was being determined’.25 He highlighted that the MIC was created 
even before the UMNO and had been vociferous in speaking up on issues of 
citizenship and a united national consciousness. The Indians in Malaya were 
aware of party perspectives and stands on national issues. But that had
21 Ibid. in author's translation of Tamil press.
22 Ibid.
23 Tamil Nesan, 3rd November 1955.
24 Ibid.
25 Tamil Nesan, 20th April 1956.
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changed under Sambanthan. As the country was discussing citizenship 
rights, national culture and language, and the formation of Malaysia, MIC had 
been resolutely silent.26 Devaser’s comments could be seen in the light of 
political competition between adversaries but Sambanthan’s silence over 
three main points- Malay special privileges, religion and citizenship 
qualification in the Alliance memorandum to the Reid Commission, 
threatened a split within the MIC party itself and piqued the Tamil ultras 
within the party.
MIC delegates to the Alliance National Council urged Sambanthan to 
mention to the Alliance that there should be no special privileges for the 
Malays in filling appointments in the public service and on land 
reservations.27 This point was important as it would affect educated Indians 
forming a majority in the public service, unlike the Chinese who were 
primarily in the private sector.28 Sambanthan failed to stress these points to 
the Alliance giving the impression that MIC supported the Alliance 
memorandum fully. Devaser, who was also part of the Alliance National 
Council, highlighted at meetings that Malays should only be awarded special 
privileges in trade and industry29 and had argued with Sambanthan at the 
National Council’s meetings to represent these issues. The Tamil Nesan 
reported that, ‘Sambanthan ignored Party’s orders’.30 In reaction to 
Sambanthan’s reluctance to act, there were rumours that Devaser intended 
to resign from the party.31 Instead, Tunku Abdul Rahman criticised Devaser 
for revealing details of confidential proceedings of the council32 and the
26 Ibid.
27 The Straits Times, 22nd September 1956.
28 Rajeswary Ampalavanar, The Indian minority and political change in Malaya 1945-1957, 196.
29 Tamil Nesan, 6th September 1956.
30 Tamil Nesan, 6th September 1956.
31 Ibid.
32 Rajeswary Ampalavanar, The Indian minority and political change in Malaya 1945-1957, 196.
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policy making committee of the MIC endorsed the suspension of Devaser by 
Sambanthan.33
Sambanthan’s reluctance to act and his suspension of Devaser undermined 
confidence in Sambanthan within the party. Tamil ultras were disappointed 
that Sambanthan had supported the memorandum’s stand on Malay as a 
national language. Their opinions were voiced in an editorial:
It is MIC’s duty to represent Indian rights in Malaya. UMNO and MCA are 
working diligently to protect their community’s rights.The Chinese have 
formed committees comprising academics to study the education committee 
report. They have constructed many plans to protect their language. But it is 
a mystery as to why the MIC is silent.34
The MIC Selangor branch decided to launch boycotts of MIC meetings, ‘It is 
better for us not to attend the All Malaya Indian Congress Committee 
Meeting which is going to be conducted under a leader we have no 
confidence in ...rights for Indians were let down for the sake of pleasing the 
Malays.’35 It is inevitable, given this trajectory of non-involvement on the part 
of Sambanthan and MIC during a pivotal moment in Malayan nation building, 
to question what Sambanthan’s role was after all. Cafi he be taken as a 
Malayan/Malaysian pioneer determining national consciousness or were he 
and MIC only part of a token representation, possibly to please the Colonial 
Government that was handing over power? I find Sambanthan’s silence 
since the MIC merger with the Alliance chilling, and a sombre revelation of 
the politics within the Alliance. The issue goes beyond accepting the 
explanation that Sambanthan maintained a silence over citizenship rights, 
national culture and language because he had a mild political personality. 
Rather, it also revealed the internal dynamics amongst the parties within the 
Alliance and the hierarchy of importance each communal party was assigned 
in relevance to state policy. Reflecting on Tunku’s words, Sambanthan need
33 The Straits Times, 23rd September 1956.
34 Tamil Nesan, 17th August 1956.
35 Tamil Nesan, 21st September 1956.
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not have been an expert on constitutional matter to be present at the London 
Conference in February 1956. Sambanthan was an Indian and a leader of 
the Indian communal party but a Malayan Indian nonetheless. From the 
onset it is clear that the Malayan national identity that was coming to be was 
not an inclusive one.
Sambanthan as leader
In an article, ‘My dhoti and I’36, Sambanthan explained why he always wore 
a simple white dhoti and shirt, even during his visits to Europe and Britain: ‘I 
wear these clothes because it makes me feel closer to the people. As the 
leader of the Malayan Indian community I want to feel close to them.’ But 
besides feeling closer to Malayan Indians, it also reflected the depth to which 
he was steeped in his Tamil cultural heritage. In fact, after the first eight 
years of MIC leaders being North Indians or Malyalee, Veerasamy 
Thirunyana Sambanthan, was elected president of the MIC because he was 
well- versed in the Tamil language and culture.He ushered in the 
Tamilisation of the party. Born to parents who were shopkeepers in Sungai 
Siput and land owners in the Perak area, Sambanthan attained his tertiary 
education at the Annamalai University in South India where he came in 
contact with the ideas of Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru and Subhas Chandra 
Bose.
When he returned to Malaya after his degree, he took an active interest in 
the plight of Indian plantation workers by ironically driving around his father’s 
estate in the family Mercedes Benz.37 He understood the problems of the 
estate labourers to be the lack of funds for future investment and poor 
standards of education for the Tamil estate workers and their children. He 
sought to improve the life of plantation workers on his father’s estate by 
collecting statistics regarding the estate workers from the Labour Office, 
visiting schools that had insufficient amenities and initiating English classes
36 The Straits Times, 28 November 1957.
37 Ummadevi A/P Suppiah , Tun V.TSambanthan : Peranan Dalam Politik dan kemajuan orang India 
di Malaysia (Jabatan Sejarah , Fakulti Sastera dan Sains Sosial Universiti Malaya , 2003).
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for certain schools.38Soon he was recognised as the head of the Indian 
Society of Sungai Siput and took bolder measures at social service through 
building the Mahatma Gandhi Tamil School in Sungai Siput in 1952.39 He 
started English education in this school and also a crèche and kindergarten. 
While seeing to the management of this school he had close interaction with 
the Subramaniam Temple in Sungai Siput, revealing a propensity to network 
effectively across the social and religious networks of the Indian community. 
This got him noticed by K. Saranggabani who promoted his candidature as 
president of MIC in 1955, through articles in the Tamil Murasu.40Once 
elected, he used the Tamil language effectively to attract Tamils, who formed 
the bulk of the Indian population to the party and unite the party under new 
initiatives involving Tamil culture and language usage.41
Sambanthan enjoyed a successful national profile as part of the Alliance 
cabinet ministers. He was appointed Minister of Labour (1955-57), Health 
(1957- 59), Works, Posts and Telecommunications (1959-71) and National 
Unity (1972-74).42But in 1958, MIC members began to voice apprehensions 
if Sambanthan would be able to perform the role of president of MIC and 
Minister simultaneously. In 1958, an emergency meeting of the MIC branch 
in South Province Wellesley passed a resolution calling for Sambanthan’s 
resignation in connection with disciplinary action taken against Province 
South. MIC spokesmen claimed that ‘Had Mr Sambanthan concentrated his 
entire time on the MIC; it is probable that the organisation would have been 
more effective...’43
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Such as the organisation of Tamils Day held at Sungai Tinggi Estate, Tamil Nesan, 26th February 
1959, as well as Ponggal and other Tamil festivals organised and funded by MIC.
42 The Star, 3rd September 2001.
43 The Straits Times, 20th January 1958.
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Sambanthan enjoyed a strong mandate when it came to annual party 
presidential elections. In the fourth term, he won by a majority of 14 000 
votes. His close rival, Devaser, polled 1540 votes.44 In the fifth term, he 
defeated another rival, E.J Johnson, by a majority of 11 092 votes.45ln 1968, 
signalling his fourteenth successive term, Sambanthan polled 29 136 votes 
against his nearest rival, M Kandasamy, a businessman.46 But these 
victories did not exclude the excessive politicking and power struggles 
Sambanthan had to encounter personally or mediate between branch 
members throughout Malaya. In the beginning Sambanthan’s most zealous 
rival was K.L Devaser, former president of the MIC. On account of his 
suspension from the party, Devaser had the support of the youth groups of 
the MIC. Rebel groups in the MIC, in support of Devaser, moved to oust 
Sambanthan in 1958, which necessitated talks between the factions to find 
common ground.47 Sambanthan was also frequently enmeshed in legal 
proceedings against him. In September 1959, his opponent in the MIC 
presidential elections, E.J Johnson, took court action against Sambanthan, 
claiming that he was not eligible to contest elections as the Ipoh branch he 
represented had ceased to exist due to failure on the part of the branch 
members to pay membership dues.48 In 1960, A. Tharmalingam, an Alliance 
municipal councillor and former secretary of the MIC Selangor branch, 
brought legal action against Sambanthan because he wished to contest the 
letter of suspension he received in 1959, two days before the annual 
delegates’ conference. Tharmalingam felt that he had been suspended for no 
other reason but, ‘...had I been elected president of the Selangor branch, the
44 The Malay Mail, 26th May 1958.
45 The Sunday Times, 4th October 1959.
46 The Straits Times, 24th December 1968.
47 The Straits Times, 26th March 1958.
48 The Straits Times, 3oth September 1959.
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defendant (Dato Sambanthan) would have found me a dangerous 
opponent.’49
Local branches engaged in infighting that put the MIC leadership in poor light 
within the Alliance. In 1958, two rival presidents of the Penang and Province 
Wellesley branch placed the Alliance in a quandary about who would be 
represented in the Penang state Alliance.50 In 1964, Sambanthan had to 
warn the Negri Sembilan branch against breaching orders in holding its 
annual delegates conference.51 Consensus building was difficult amongst the 
MIC members as demonstrated in the 1958 delegates’ conference to amend 
the MIC constitution to bar non- citizens from holding authoritative posts in 
the party. The Straits Times reported the heated exchange between four 
hundred or more delegates from one hundred and six branches during this 
controversial meeting.52 At times MIC meetings were became violent and the 
Federal Reserve Unit (FRU) had to be called in to quell the situation.53
In response, Sambanthan often made melodramatic speeches that further 
exposed the power struggles within the party that were already getting 
attention in the local media: ‘It is no use having anyone who is not resolute in 
his loyalty to the party. It is no use having as members anyone who has no 
sense of loyalty and who harbours treachery.’54 These power struggles 
diverted Sambanthan’s time from effective management of the party. Having 
to deal with the incessant power struggles in a personal and party capacity, 
Sambanthan’s incompetence in party management became obvious. In 
1964 three hundred members of the Kelantan branch protested to
49 The Straits Times, 1st March 1960.
50 The Straits Times, 22nd May 1958.
51 The Straits Times, 24th January 1964.
52 The Straits Times, 15th February 1958.
53 Basheer Hassan bin Abdul Kader, Intra Party Conflict,The Malaysian Indian Congress, A case
Study, A graduation Exercise presented to the Faculty of Economics and Administration in partial 
fulfilment of Degree of Bachelor of Economics with Honours, University of Malaya , 1975/1976.
54 The Straits Times, 11th September 1960.
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Sambanthan over the ‘unconstitutional and undemocratic procedures’55 of 
the branch leaders. It seemed that no general meeting had been held at the 
branch for two years , members were unaware of who the elected present 
secretary and committee members were and no subscriptions had been 
collected for the last five years.56There was failure to execute membership 
renewal at branch level, party branches were becoming defunct due to lack 
of direction from headquarters and party leadership was losing touch with the 
grassroots.57 Things were to reach such a level of disarray that the MIC 
Annual General Assembly was not held for six years, between the 20th 
Annual General Assembly on July 1967 and the 21st Annual General 
Assembly in August 1973.58
Due to his experience on his father’s estate, Sambanthan was accurate in 
his diagnosis of the problems of the Indian community. His primary concern 
was with the life of Indians on the plantation. In an editorial entitled, ‘A place 
of respect for the Indians’59, Sambanthan highlighted his analysis of the 
situation and his concerns;
The future cannot be divorced completely from the past. Most Indians are 
workers and the majority live in plantations. Hitherto, the future of their 
children has not been thought of. Like their parents, the child faced the 
future as a tapper or weeder. Educational and social opportunities open to 
children in estates in the past have been such that escape from the 
environment was impossible...The Indian peasant who became the Indian 
worker in Malaya did not come here in quest of adventure. He was brought 
here by the breakdown of his village economy and the famine conditions in 
his native land. But his arrival in this country, no attempt was ever made to 
help him sink his roots here. His mind of the peasant was confused. He had 
come in expectation of quick gain and early returns. In this he was
55 The Straits Times, 22nd January 1964.
56 Ibid.
57 Basheer Hassan bin Abdul Kader, Intra Party Conflict,
58 Ibid.
59 The Straits Times, 1st September 1957.
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disappointed. Frustration and malaria goaded each other, and the peasant 
broken by poverty became the docile estate worker. The Government 
evinced no interest in his future. No encouraged to have a stake in the 
country, the Indian estate worker, ruled by different degrades o supervisors 
according to personal whims, was unable to rise above his environment. ...A 
vast section of Indian children are still subject to the indifferent education 
that one obtains in single teacher, multi-standard schools all over the 
country.
The main problem affecting Indians on the plantation during Sambanthan’s 
time was land fragmentation. Smaller investors were buying up pieces of 
land within larger territories that formerly belonged to European companies. 
Sambanthan spoke out against this land fragmentation, describing the 
purchases as the ‘butchering of estates’.160At an MIC delegates’ conference, 
he said that more than 500 families would be thrown out of employment as a 
result of recent take-overs of long- standing rubber companies. From 1956 to 
1961, several families had been uprooted from estates sold or bought from 
fragmentation. Sambanthan expressed concern over the displacement of the 
Indians on the plantations who had lived there for generations. His early 
initiatives entailed encouraging tappers to organise cooperatives. He claimed 
that the Indian plantation worker was not poor if $14,000,000 was spent 
collectively on an annual basis on the purchase of toddy and another six 
million on beer and samsu.61He claimed that if only half of that was saved at 
least 10 000 acres of land could be purchased. He hoped to incorporate men 
from the National Union of Plantation Workers and executives of the Bank 
Negara to help in this scheme.62
In May 1960, Sambanthan formed the National Land Finance Co-Operative 
Society (NLFCS). The NLFCS was formed with initial capital amounting to
60 The Straits Times, 26th November 1961.
61 The Sunday Times, 15th November 1959.
62 Ibid.
109
M$10 million.63 In 1965 Sambanthan announced that from $10 monthly 
instalments from workers, NLFCS had bought M$12 000,000 worth of 
estates that safeguarded the future of thousands.64 The plan was to 
purchase land in other districts as well such as that of Phin Soon Estate, 
after which there was the intention to undertake large-scale cropping with 
commercial crops. The NLFCS was seen as Sambanthan’s main 
achievement but very quickly he was to run into opposition with the unions 
over the Co-operative. Ampalavanar cites three reasons for the opposition 
from the National Union of Plantation Workers (NUPW): that the trade unions 
would not be able to act competently if workers on an NLFCS plantation 
were to strike, NUPW did not have strong representation on the NLFCS 
board and that through the NLFCS, a political party, MIC was trying to take 
over the role of the Union.65 The matter involved personal differences 
between Sambanthan and the secretary general of the NUPW, P.P 
Narayanan. P.P Narayanan alleged that the NLFCS had coerced workers to 
give up their jewellery and post office savings to contribute towards the 
NLFCS.66 Furthermore, it was disconcerting to Union officials that MIC and 
particularly Sambanthan, a political figure, were involved in the running of the 
Society. Sambanthan’s reply to these charges was that NLFCS had its own 
constitution and was governed by rules and regulations covered by the Co- 
Operative Ordinance. If Union officials felt embarrassed by Sambanthan’s 
association with the Cooperative, he was ‘ready to quit’.67 Also by 1973, 
NLFCS had incurred huge debts of $224 million.68 This was due to poor
63 Rajeswary Brown Ampalavanar, "The contemporary Indian political Elite in Malaysia" in Indian 
Communities in Southeast Asia, 240.
64 Speech by Dato V.T Sambanthan at Annual Conference of Perak MIC, 2nd May 1965. (New Straits
Times archive).
65 Rajeswary Brown Ampalavanar, The contemporary Indian political Elite in Malaysia in Indian 
Communities in Southeast Asia, 240.
66 The Straits Times, 6th December 1962.
67 Ibid.
68 Ummadevi A/P Suppiah , Tun V.T Sambanthan: Peranan Dalam Politik dan kemajuan orang India 
di Malaysia Jabatan Sejarah, (Fakulti Sastera dan Sains Sosial Universiti Malaya, 2003).
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planning and management with regards to issues of loans and financing. It 
was only able to reduce this debt to $55 million by 1976.
When Sambanthan was elected for his fourth term, one of his objectives in a 
three -point plan was to step up the citizenship drive amongst Indians on the 
plantation.69 His initial efforts met with little success. In 1957 when MIC 
volunteers approached Indians to register for citizenship, they were denied 
entry into estates by estate managers.70 However, events in 1969 were to 
demonstrate the uneven efforts of the MIC and even the NUPW had not paid 
off. When work permit regulations were enforced and thousands of Indian 
plantation workers’ work permit expired, since they did not have adequate 
citizenship papers, they were forced to return to India. On 6th December 
1969, The Straits Times reported that ‘10 000 families book one-way trips to 
India’71.In 1970 the plight of several unregistered Indians came to light. Many 
had not been registered at birth, they had no documentation to register for 
citizenship and as a result were not even issued marriage certificates. The 
problems were particularly acute for those born during the Japanese 
Occupation who failed to get birth certificates and lost all documentation in 
that period. As a result many faced unemployment and drifted from one odd 
job to another.72
Sambanthan was adept at making sense of the political environment and 
explaining crises in a manner that provided meaning for his followers and 
generated trust in his initiatives and that of the Alliance party. Instead of 
focusing on just communal issues, Sambanthan encouraged national 
consciousness and patriotism. He was frequently quoted espousing slogans 
such as ‘Build a united Malaya’,73 ‘Sacrifice your all to defend Malaysia*74
69 The Malay Mail, 26th May 1958.
70 The Malay Mail, 6th December 1951.
71 New Straits Times, 6th December 1969.
72 New Straits Times, 5th February 1970.
73 The Straits Times, 8th July 1958.
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and warning against ‘other jealous countries’ who ‘ are watching us ready to 
pounce’.75 During addresses to the MIC he tried to generate trust for the 
Alliance party and the Malays;
I would like you to remember that, at the elections in 1955, only 4% of the 
electorate was Indian, 8% was Chinese and 88% were Malay voters. It 
would be true to say that political power was completely in the hands of the 
Malay community. They could have, at that time, followed the pattern of 
Ceylon and refused to make it easy for the achievement of citizenship by the 
other races, and there was nothing we could have done, but instead, broad 
minded vision, understanding and goodwill of Tunku, Tun Razak, Dato Ismail 
and the leadership resulted in a liberal and broad minded attitude on the 
whole question of citizenship.76
At other times he highlighted that the UMNO was a better, moderate, 
alternative for Indians to support in comparison to the Pan-Malayan Islamic 
Party (PMIP);
Now in our country, for instance you have the Alliance. Ten years ago we 
formed the Alliance and went to election. Well we got freedom. The question 
now is why don’t you stop having the MCA, UMNO and MIC. Granted .OK. 
But are the people ready for it yet? On the Malay side, for instance you have 
the Pan -Malayan Islamic Party all the time breathing down our neck that 
Islam is in danger. Now if you wind up the UMNO, what would be the first 
reaction. You hand over a section of the Malay public right into the lap of the 
PMIP. ...It is far more important to keep the public together on a progressive 
policy of political realisation than to throw them to the wolves.77
This sort of political discourse reinforced the close relations Sambanthan had 
already nurtured with the Alliance, particularly with Tunku Abdul Rahman.
74 The Straits Times, 1st December 1963.
75 New Straits Times, 18th October 1968.
76 Speech by Dato V.T Sambanthan at Annual Conference of Perak MIC on 2nd May 1965. (New
Straits Times archive).
77 Text of TV interview by A.Kajapathy with Dato Sambanthan, President of the Malayan Indian 
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Whether real benefits were accrued to the common Indian labourer on the 
plantation or in urban areas, Malay officials, on occasion did espouse 
goodwill towards the Indians publicly, ‘As long as I (Tunku Abdul Rahman) 
am Prime Minister of this country I shall fulfil my duty and responsibility to the 
people and I can assure them and future generations to come a place in the 
sun.’78
Changing political milieu, the May 13th riots and the NEP
The goodwill that Tunku attempted to generate, however, did not meet with 
the outcomes he desired of a united Malaysia. Although both the MIC and 
MCA were to accept the Education Ordinance of 1957, whereby the primary 
position of Malay was recognised as the national language, the Chinese 
community was to later express fears over the erosion of their language and 
cultural values. In 1961, the Education Act confirmed the fears of the 
Chinese when implementing the recommendations of the Rahman Talib 
report that Chinese medium secondary education in National type schools 
was to be abolished.79Further reinforcement of these policies led the non- 
Malays, particularly the Chinese, to feel that attempts were being made to 
secure Malay privileges and special rights at the expense of Chinese 
language and heritage. In the 1969 elections, the Chinese showed their 
discontent by abandoning MCA at the polls. The Alliance maintained a 
significantly reduced majority in the Dewan Rakyat. Instead, parties like the 
Gerakan Chinese and the Democratic Action Party (DAP) came to power. On 
May 12th DAP and Gerakan supporters took celebrations to the streets, 
‘taunting Malays and predicting future Chinese success’.80 In retaliation 
UMNO supporters held a counter rally that quickly deteriorated into the 
infamous May 13 riots of Malaysia.
78 Tunku's speech at a Deepavali gathering, New Straits Times, 10th November 1969.
79 Barbara Watson Andaya & Leonard Y. Watson. A history of Malaysia (Second edition, China:
Palgrave, 2001), 290.
80 Ibid., 298.
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The impact of these 1969 elections and subsequent riots was to be 
longstanding in affecting the non- Malay position within the politics of 
belonging and civil rights in Malaysia. A new Malay elite with local Malaysian 
education had emerged since Independence and could not identify with the 
anglophile executive approach of Malay ministers like Tunku Abdul Rahman. 
The new generation of Malays felt that the Tunku was pandering too much to 
Chinese interests and that economic measures to bolster the Malay position 
had proven ineffective in comparison to Chinese prosperity. Tunku retired in 
September 197081 and Tun Razak took over. The Razak administration was 
marked by an infusion of new blood into the party, individuals such as 
Hussein Onn, Mahathir Mohammad and Musa Hitam, who together with 
Razak’s leadership were solicitous of Malay interests.82
Under the auspices of the National Operations Council, since both the 
Constitution and parliament were suspended after the riots, Razak’s 
administration took new initiatives in the communal bargain. First, the 
Rukunegara, national Ideology, was institutionalised with emphasis on Islam 
being the official religion of the Federation and an expected loyalty and 
acceptance of the position of the Malay rulers and special position of the 
Malays.83 Second, an emergency decree was issued amending the Sedition 
Ordinance limiting freedom of press and speech, making it an offence to 
question rights of citizenship, Malay special rights, the status and powers of 
the Malay rulers, the status of Islam and Malay as a national language.84 
Third , Razak transformed the structure of the Alliance into the National Front 
( Barisan Nasional), co- opting parties such as the Gerakan and the People’s 
Progressive Party (PPP), and strengthening support from non- Malays as 
well as the Parti Islam , so as to avoiding splitting the Malay vote . The
81 Gordon Means Malaysian politics: the second generation, 19.
82 Ibid., 20.
83 Ibid., 13.
84 Ibid., 14.
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adoption of this new coalition was to eliminate opposition to the bargaining 
and negotiation processes in parliament.
In light of the riots, the economic position of the Malays was reviewed. In
1970 the income of 49.3 percent of all households in peninsula Malaysia was 
below the poverty line, out of which 75 % were Malays. Measures had been 
taken under the Tunku's administration to support Malay economic progress. 
In 1965, a Bumiputera economic Congress was held to promote Malay 
capitalism. In 1965, a Malay commercial bank, Bank Bumiputera, was 
created to ease credit facilities for Malays. In the First Malaysia Plan (1966- 
1970), special allocations had been made to promote Malay economic 
development.85 The New Economic Policy (NEP) set out in the Second 
Malaysia Plan in 1971, while designed to eradicate poverty and restructure 
the Malaysian society, was aimed primarily to ameliorate the economic 
position of the Malays. Under the NEP, the government formulated five year 
plans to bolster the Malay economic growth. This included setting up 
government-formed public corporations to increase Malay ownership of the 
economy, quotas in the Malayan Civil Service partial to Malays and initiatives 
in education to boost Malay performance.86
Though Malays had been awarded special privileges at Independence, these 
were to be reviewed by the Legislative Council 15 years after 1957. The play 
of events between the Chinese and the Malays in 1969, the emergence of 
Malay ultras in power and the emergency regulations imposed from 1969 
and 1971 facilitated the protection of Malay rights indefinitely. The civic 
space of non- Malays was limited further. It was a crucial time for minority 
action and negotiation, the next section will demonstrate, which MIC leaders 
did not seize adequately while being mired in internal party politicking and 
strife.
85Barbara Watson Andaya & Leonard Y. Watson. A history of Malaysia, 302.
86 Gordon Means, Malaysian politics: the second generation.
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Leadership crisis within the MIC (1971- 1973)
Since 1967, the MIC under Sambanthan had not held an annual general 
assembly.87 Party machinery was static and this inertia was brought up by 
the English- educated elite within the MIC as well as leaders of other parties 
in the Alliance. Manickasavagam commented that in view of the national 
developments of the late 1960s and the 1970s, ‘it is not enough for the MIC 
to exist in the form of a few leaders and occasionally meetings at which 
speeches are made and more leaders are elected’.88The perspective of the 
government towards the significance of the MIC was expressed through Tun 
Ismail, Deputy Prime Minister, when he said that after the 1969 riot, the MCA 
and the MIC were ‘more dead than alive’.89Led by Selangor branch chairman 
and Senator, Athi Nahappan, the English- educated faction in MIC organised 
to oppose Sambanthan, who had remained unchallenged as MIC president 
for 15 years. The faction called upon MIC vice president Manickavasagam to 
challenge Sambanthan. Manickavasagam had already begun to build 
consensus about his leadership capabilities in taking initiatives within the 
party to respond to the NEP. In April 1971 he set up five bureaus, run by full­
time staff, within the MIC party structure. The bureaus were concerned with 
organisation, education and culture, land settlement, economics and 
citizenship.90 Manickavasagam called for a review of party progress under 
Sambanthan’s leadership. Athi Nahappan made speeches declaring that ‘the 
MIC had never measured up to challenges but remained content to remain 
passive’.91 Manickavasagam claimed that this passivity was to be challenged 
to ‘ take advantage of the widespread opportunities that are being created 
under the Second Malaysia Plan and if we do not understand the framework
87 New Straits Times, 24th August 1973.
88 New Straits Times, 1st August 1971.
89 Rajeswary Brown Ampalavanar, The contemporary Indian political Elite in Malaysia, 243.
90 New Straits Times, 17th April 1971.
91 New Straits Times, 13th July 1971.
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and concepts within which we can do this , we will forfeit our own well being 
and the well being of our children in Malaysian society’.92
In June 1971, the four contestants challenging Sambanthan at the MIC 
presidential elections were announced. They were Manickasavagam, Athi 
Nahappan and two other branch members, S Thangasamy and M 
Kandasamy.93 An editorial by Unny Krishnan in The Straits Times predicted 
that the MIC was to play a more active role in Malaysian politics after the
1971 presidential elections. The editorial revealed that the rank and file of the 
MIC were demanding changes both in leadership and the image of the party. 
They were no longer content with the estate pattern of life and were keen to 
participate in the Malaysian mainstream. The desperation for change was 
indicated by the participation of senior executives such as Manickasavagam 
and Athi Nahappan to challenge Sambanthan.94
Sambanthan took the challenge in the presidential elections personally. ‘I will 
continue to do what I have been doing all along, but if you feel that my 
services to the party have not been good then throw me out’.95 Party 
executives gave Sambanthan the face-saving option ‘to withdraw 
gracefully’.96 Athi Nahappan claimed that ‘the writing was on the wall and he 
would be committing the gravest political misjudgement’97 of his career if he 
did not take this soft option of leaving the presidential elections. The party 
executives promised to treat him with ‘the due honour and respect similar to 
what UMNO has given to the former Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul 
Rahman’.98 In retaliation, Sambanthan remained adamant in staying on to
92 New Straits Times, 1st August 1971.
93 New Straits Times, 1st June 1971.
94 New Straits Times, 13th July 1971.
95 New Straits Times, 5th July 1971.
96 New Straits Times, 28th July 1971.
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fight and announced that he would let the people decide who should lead 
them, then withdraw." Instead, supporters of Sambanthan from the Kedah 
State MIC committee asked Manickasavagam to step down. This revealed 
party disunity and the emergence of factions behind the various contenders. 
All over the country, party branches and their members took sides. The Ipoh 
branch under the chairmanship of N.P Theviah said that his members were 
‘fully behind Sambanthan’.100 In Taiping, S Chellasamy, chairman of the 
Larut Selatan branch announced that his branch was ‘110 percent behind 
Manickasavagam’.101 In Kuantan more than two- thirds of the MIC members 
were expected to vote for Manickasavagam while in Telok Anson, the MIC’s 
21 branches were divided.102
Anxious about party disunity at a crucial juncture of Malaysia’s political and 
economic development, party executives , R Satchianathan , chairman of 
the Sepang branch, N. Velu , the branch’s youth leader and T.S Maniam , its 
cultural leader staged a hunger strike typical of Gandhian style politics.103 
The hunger strike was not to be called off until either Sambanthan or 
Manickasavagam withdrew from the fight. They felt that ‘the unity of the party 
was at stake and for this reason we do not want the fight to go on.’104 Despite 
such protests and strikes both leaders remained rooted to their decision to 
contest the elections and a stalemate was reached in the struggle. A 
decision was taken by the Central Working Committee of the MIC to 
postpone the elections to March 1972, allowing emotions to cool off.105 In 
October 1971, both Sambanthan and Manickasavagam approached Tengku
99 New Straits Times, 4th August 1971.
100 New Straits Times, 12th August 1971.
101 Ibid.
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Abdul Rahman to mediate the crisis. The suggestion to approach Tengku 
was put up by Sambanthan’s supporters .The Tengku offered a peace 
formula whose details were not made public but the peace formula did not 
appeal to Sambanthan, as the Tengku later reported that Sambanthan had 
failed to respond to his suggestions.106
Meanwhile the Malaysian state and the Registrar of Societies took 
Sambanthan to task on several grounds. A letter was sent to the MIC Central 
Working Committee from the Registrar of Societies that there were grounds 
for the deregistration of the party since the party had violated the 1965 
Societies Act and the MIC constitution by not conducting annual meetings. 
Also the annual returns, giving a statement of accounts and the list of office 
bearers had not been submitted for three years.107 In January 1972, 
Sambanthan also had to face court proceedings as he had , as head of the 
MIC building committee , failed to show party members the accounts of two 
land transactions . The land transactions were to acquire a piece of land to 
build party headquarters .However the two pieces of land were sold and it 
was not until Manickasavagam took over the building committee that a third 
piece of land was finally acquired.108 The political crisis which was being 
discussed in the public domain openly was damaging MIC's image as a 
component party of the Alliance. Issues of poor management and ineffective 
leadership were particularly embarrassing and on March 15th 1972, Tun 
Razak, as head of the Alliance Party, met members of the MIC Central 
Working Committee to resolve the stalemate.109 The compromise arrived at 
was that Sambanthan was to remain party president for another year and
106 New Straits Times, 23rd July 1972.
107 New Straits Times, 14th October 1971.
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then retire in June 1973, while Manickasavagam was to withdraw from the 
presidential contest.110
Though the compromise had been reached, the next year was to be one of 
bitter rivalry, mudslinging, witnessing breaches of party discipline and intense 
politicking. Manickasavagam had accepted to withdraw from the contest on 
certain conditions. These were not openly debated and created dilemmas in 
party leadership, such as choosing the secretary general for the party, which 
Manickavasagam felt was his responsibility.111 In March 1972, when Tun 
Razak stepped in to negotiate, the support in the Central Working Committee 
was marginally in favour of Manickasavagam.112 In the one year that 
Sambanthan was to remain in power, he took initiatives to remove his 
detractors from power. Sambanthan took to suspending his critics, six 
officials who controlled the Negri Sembilan State Congresses, two of whom 
were in the Central Working Committee members and supporters of 
Manickasavagam.113 When Manickasavagam protested against the sacking 
of Govinda Raju, a central working committee member and chairman of the 
Brickfields -Bungsar branch, he was told by Sambanthan to ‘behave 
himself.114 Manickasavagam and Sambanthan openly blamed each other for 
the poor party discipline and for inciting ‘rebel’ groups within the party 
structure.115 In response, Sambanthan formed a National Organisation 
Committee to put an end to the lack of discipline within MIC and appointed 
Manickasavagam as head. Tun Sambanthan stated that, ‘to show my 
sincerity in solving party crisis. I have appointed Tan Sri Manickasavagam as 
chairman of the committee. He will be in charge of cutting down all the
110 New Straits Times, 16th March 1972.
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animosity arising from the party leadership.’116 Manickasavagam, on 
occasion did threaten to review the truce pact that had been agreed upon 
with Sambanthan with Tun Razak’s help. Manickasavagam claimed that Tun 
Sambanthan has shown by his actions and deeds that he is breaking the 
party. I kept to the agreement that we should allow him to continue but not to 
utter words of ill-will to party members.’117Amidst this chaos, the MIC Central 
Working Committee reinforced the atmosphere that demanded 
Sambanthan’s departure from the post of party president, The MIC will gain 
the respect and admiration of its Alliance partners as well as the people in 
the country if Tun Sambanthan took the initiative to install Tan Sri 
Manickasavagam as his successor. The Indian community is poised for a 
change and there is a need to inject new blood into the party to make it more 
efficient to play its role in nation building and to realise the fruits of the New 
Economic policy of the Government.’118ln June 1973, Sambanthan did 
relinquish his post, albeit on a sour note: ‘It is obvious that there is neither 
harmony nor brotherhood in the MIC at the moment and for that reason I 
have decided to relinquish the presidentship on June 30’.119
Manickasavagam as president of MIC
Vengadasalem Manickasavagam was the son of a labour overseer on a 
rubber plantation who was a radical thinker and staunch supporter of the 
Indian National Congress.120 As a young boy, Manickasavagam was 
interested in the welfare of the estate workers and led agitations for better 
amenities on the estates. During the Japanese Occupation he was a youth 
secretary of the Indian Independence League. In 1946, he joined John Thivy
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as one of the founding members of the MIC.121 Manickasavagam was 
professionally known to be a businessman and land proprietor but he spent 
most of his time in politics and welfare work. At 20 years of age he was 
secretary of the Klang branch and was active in travelling across Malaya to 
establish branches and know the grassroots .In 1947 he was part of a 
Malayan delegation to the First Asian Leaders Conference in New Delhi. He 
claimed to be inspired by his meetings with prominent Indian political figures 
like Nehru and Gandhi and said that although ‘I was extremely fortunate to 
have had this experience at so early an age. But I felt no nostalgia for India. 
My roots were in this country. I regarded myself only as a Malayan’.122 In 
1955, Manickasavagam was returned unopposed to the Selangor State 
Council in the Klang South Constituency.123 In 1958 he was elected vice 
president of the MIC.124ln 1964 he was returned to the Klang constituency 
and was appointed Minister of Labour.125ln 1969 he was appointed minister 
of Labour and acting Minister of Transport and finally in 1973 he was made 
MIC party president.126
Manickasavagam’s priority as president was to get the MIC house in order.
In his inaugural speeches he mentioned that the leadership crisis over the 
last few years had placed MIC in ‘a position of ridicule, disrepute and relative 
neglect’.127He appealed to party members to heal the wounds of factionalism 
as a result of the leadership crisis and to ‘close ranks in the interest of the 
party and nation’.128 He promised to revamp the party so that it could play a 
more meaningful role in the developments that were taking place in
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Malaysia.129 Manickasavagam diagnosed the static condition of the MIC 
party thus;
We need to activate the party at all levels. In the economic sphere too .It is 
activity at these levels that is likely to have the greatest impact-in terms of 
gaining employment, participation, in land development, gaining greater 
opportunities in commerce and industry. MIC had 60 000 members and 350 
branches, But a number of these branches existed merely for the sake of 
electing office bearers once a year. Except for the occasional brawl at some 
meeting or the other, neither the members nor the public hear anything of 
these branches. There appears to be little done in the way of concrete 
programmes of action and service.130
At the twenty-second General Assembly of the MIC on 6th July 1974, 
Manickasavagam revealed the initiatives that had been taken since he 
became party president to restore the part structure and prestige. He claimed 
that every State Congress was functioning and that there were 410 Branch 
Congresses. There was an increase in membership to 10 000, indicating an 
unprecedented level of grass roots activity and support. Meetings were 
beginning to be conducted in an orderly and purposeful manner and records 
of meetings and events were being kept in the State Congress. The Party 
Headquarters was strengthened through the recruitment of additional staff 
and there was a new orientation towards organising programmes and 
activities. The organisational and logistical structure of the party was 
strengthened. On 24th August 1973, the nine- storey MIC building was 
officially declared open by the then Prime Minister, Tun Razak.131 A Northern 
Regional office was established in Ipoh, covering Perak, Kedah and
129 New Straits Times, 1st July 1973.
130 New Straits Times, 25th August 1973.
131 MIC Secretary General's report for the period 1 July 1973 to 30 June 1974 in MIC annual report 
1973/74 (NUS Singapore /Malaysia Collection ).
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Penang.132 Assistance was provided by the Headquarters for an office 
building in Selangor.
An MIC youth section was inaugurated. The objective was to create avenues 
for youth activities, participation and to infuse creativity. S. Samy Vellu was 
appointed as the National Youth leader and the structure of the National 
Youth Section was laid out, consisting of the National Council of MIC youths, 
State Councils of MIC Youths and Branch Youth Committees.133 Several sub 
-committees were created to infuse ‘new blood and fresh 
approaches’.134There were sub-committees for education, the economic, the 
land, employment and welfare and citizenship.
By 1975, a Southern Regional office was established in Malacca to serve 
Malacca, Negri Sembilan and Johore.135 Membership increased to 120 000. 
Re-registration of members was conducted and a master register was 
started.136 In 1975, the MIC National Women’s Council was announced by 
the MIC president.137 By 1976 , the MIC not only had various sub-committees 
, youth and women’s sections established but a sophisticated array of 
leadership training courses , celebrations , awards in excellence and 
seminars were organised to enhance the party machinery and efficiency.138 
In 1977, journalist V.K Chin reported a ‘Change for the better at the MIC’,139 
Chin’s article highlighted that Manickasavagam had encouraged better
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 Presidential address by Y.B Tan Sri Dato V. Manickasavagam at the twenty -  second General 
Assembly of the MIC, 6th July 1974. ( New Straits Times Archive).
135 Secretary -  general's report for the period 1 July 1974 to 30 June 1975 in MIC Annual report 
1974/75. (NUS Singapore- Malaysia Collection).
136 . ,Ibid.
137 Secretary -general's report for the period 1 July 1975 to 30 June 1976 in MIC Annual report 
1975/76 (NUS Singapore- Malaysia Collection).
138 Ibid.
139 New Straits Times, 31st March 1977.
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educated Indians to join the party, imposed a more orderly conduct of party 
business, maintained party paperwork and administration with efficiency, 
simplified internal election procedures and ‘a new spirit’ emerged with 
greater contact with the grassroots .Even Manickasavagam openly stated 
that the ‘Era of mudslinging is over’.140 However some problems remained 
endemic to party culture. Despite Manickasavagam’s best efforts, 
factionalism re-emerged towards 1979 as S. Subramaniam and S. Samy 
Vellu vied for the deputy president position of the party.141ln June 1979, 
journalist N. Kunasekaran asked Manickasavagam probing questions 
regarding MIC party culture which revealed that elections of junior party 
posts often resulted in violence at meetings, the rivalry between 
Subramaniam and Samy Vellu was creating fissures, mastering the art of 
consensus was problematic for MIC members and despite 
Manickasavagam’s best efforts, educated Indians were still staying away 
from the party.142ln his defence Manickasavagam could only reply that there 
was a lack of awareness at the level of the rank and file of party members 
regarding the shame factionalism and violence brought to party image and 
to counter the abovementioned problems strong leadership was required at 
all levels of management.143
Manickasavagam engaged the government on the NEP and matters 
concerning the Indian community. An MIC Blueprint was formulated as an 
outcome out of an MIC National Seminar, The New Economic policy, the 
Second Malaysia Plan and the Mid Term Review, and the role of the MIC’ 
held on May 11th and 12th 1974. The Blueprint was presented to the Prime 
Minister in a special sitting of the Assembly representing a formal request for 
commitment from the Government to the ideals and objectives incorporated
140 New Straits Times, 2nd August 1976.
141 New Straits Times, 5th February 1979.
142New Straits Times, 17th June 1979.
143 Ibid.
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in the Blueprint.144 Manickasavagam intended the Blueprint to indicate a 
‘partnership between the Party, the people and the Government’.145 The MIC 
defined the NEP as being relevant to all Malaysians including Indians to 
‘eradicate poverty by raising income levels and increasing opportunities for 
all Malaysians, irrespective of race’146 and to ‘restructure Malaysian society 
to correct economic imbalances so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the 
identification of race with economic function’.147But they were not oblivious to 
the fact that strategies of the economic policies to be implemented were to 
benefit largely the Malays:
The first prong of the New Economic Policy, which aims at raising income 
levels of the poor group in rural areas (through agricultural development) 
and in urban areas (mainly through a fast pace of employment growth) is , 
therefore sharply directed at eradicating the sources of poverty in Malaysian 
society . With Malays constituting 85% of households in the lowest income 
group earning less than $100 per month, it is inevitable that the attack on 
poverty, even though directed in a manner regardless of race, will largely 
benefit Malays.148
The MIC Blueprint highlighted the economic position of the Indians in a 
systematic manner. In 1970, Indians were mainly in the agriculture and 
services sectors. Nearly 80% of employed Indians were found in manual 
jobs, mostly in unskilled or semi-skilled labour. Only 6% of Indians were in 
the administrative, managerial and professional categories. Indians were 
also suffering the highest unemployment rate at 11% compared to 8 % for 
Malays and 7.4 % for the Chinese. The Blueprint noted that Indian ownership 
of wealth or productive assets in the country was ‘ the worst position among
144 Presidential address by Y.B Tan Sri Dato V. Manickasavagam at the twenty -  second General 
Assembly of the MIC, 6th July 1974. ( New Straits Times office).
145 Ibid.
146 The New Economic Policy and Malaysian Indians: MIC blueprint. (NUS Singapore- Malaysia 
Collection).
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
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the various races’.149 Indians owned only 1% of the total share capital of 
Limited companies in Malaysia, while the Malays had 1.9% and the Chinese 
at 22.5%. The MIC warned that ‘ failure to grasp the situation and 
accumulate savings and pool efforts required to improve the ownership 
position of Indians can only lead to an even worse off stake for Indians 
generally in the dynamic growth and progress of the nation’.150 The Indian 
position in education was also unsatisfactory. Enrolment rates were low and 
there was a high dropout rate. Reasons stipulated for poor educational 
performance were poverty, poor facilities and standards of teaching in Tamil 
Schools.
The Blueprint gave extensive recommendations for the problem areas 
identified. This included , setting targets; recommending government 
initiatives such as accelerating new land development; supplying credit; 
building low cost housing; extending health and medical facilities; employing 
a racial balance in all sectors of employment;urgently granting citizenship to 
qualified Indians; providing vocational guidance; allotting Indians 10% of all 
settler opportunities in new land schemes; reserving 10% of places in 
residential science schools for Indian students; and other such schemes. The 
Blueprint was not the only document of recommendations given to the 
Government. A ‘Memorandum on pressing issues facing Malaysian Indians 
in the field of education was submitted to the Minister for Education’151 by 
Manickasavagam on 24th September 1973. On 14th June 1974 a 
‘Memorandum on Enrolments in The University of Malaya and other 
Institutions of higher learning’152 was submitted to the Minister of Education 
by MIC Secretary General. On 17th March 1974 a ‘Memorandum on
149 ibid.
150 The New Economic Policy and Malaysian Indians: MIC blueprint. (NUS Singapore- Malaysia 
Collection).
151 MIC Secretary General's report for the period 1 July 1973 to 30 June 1974 in MIC annual report 
1973/74. (NUS Singapore /Malaysia Collection).
152 Ibid.
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Citizenship Issues’153 was submitted to the Minister of Home Affairs by MIC 
Headquarters. Between July 1974 and June 1975, the MIC made a 
submission to the cabinet committee on education to highlight the problems 
of Indians.154
Party initiatives in solving some of these problems internally included the 
establishing of the cooperative, Syarikat Kerjasama Nesa Pelbagai Bhd 
(Nesa), in January 1974. Nesa started with a membership of 1200 and a total 
subscribed share capital of $400 000. Nesa applied to State governments for 
the alienation of about 50 000 acres of land for agricultural and other 
purposes. Loans were approved for various business ventures involving 
Indians. MIC processed applications for loans of deserving applicants from 
various banks. Unit Trusts were also set up. Education scholarship funds 
were raised by the Indian community and Indian participation in government 
land development schemes such as FELDA and FELCRA were 
encouraged.155
Throughout his term, Manickasavagam kept up the pressure in stressing on 
Indian problems. Local tabloids consistently reported his efforts in making 
appeals on the citizenship question for Indians,156 the plight of Tamil 
schools,157 asking for aid for estate pupils,158 openly identifying the problems 
of Indians,159 helping Indians in employment issues160 and improving the
153 Ibid.
154 MIC Secretary General's report for the period 1 July 1974 to 30 June 1975 in MIC Annual report 
1974/75. (NUS Singapore- Malaysia Collection).
155 Secretary General's Report for the period 1 July 1973 to 30 June 1974 in in MIC annual report 
1973/74 . (NUS Singapore /Malaysia Collection).
156 New Straits Times, 11th September 1978.
157 New Straits Times, 24th July 1973.
158 New Straits Times, 6th December 1974.
159 The Star, 26th July 1976 and Sunday Times 6th July 1975.
160 New Straits Times ,19th December 1973,13th May 1974, 4th November 1974, 15th November 1976, 
23rd May 1977, 18th June 1979.
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economic position of the Indians.161 Manickasavagam also negotiated for 
greater political representation with the National Front. In 1977, the MIC was 
reported to have urged the Government to give the party more state and 
parliamentary seats in the next general elections.162 But these issues were 
highlighted to the government and the UMNO whilst working within a 
cooperative framework with the Alliance and the National Front. On several 
occasions Manickasavagam reiterated that only MIC within the National 
Front had the capacity to do more for the Indians.163 He claimed in 1978, ‘ 
that the people must realise and bear in mind that only the National front 
government can do more for the people. Others can only talk and say 
whatever they want to say. But they will never be in the position to do 
anything for the people.’164MIC’s top executives like Athi Nahappan echoed 
this sentiment when he stated, The MIC definitely, clearly and unequivocally 
believes that the future of Malaysian Indians lie in the politics of cooperation 
developed and practised by the National Front’.165 MIC support and loyalty 
was voiced repeatedly when it supported the second nd and third rd Malaysia 
Plans166 and the Green Book schemes167 that focused on land development 
and allotment. When Datuk Hussein Onn was made Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, the MIC openly ‘pledged loyalty’ to him and the policies of the 
Front.
The response to Manickasavagam’s and MIC’s proposals and initiatives to 
gain governmental support for the unsatisfactory socio-economic position of 
the Indians was diplomatic denial. Whilst accepting the MIC blueprint, Prime
161 New Straits Times, 4th August 1975.
162 New Straits Times, 2nd July 1977.
163 New Straits Times, 3rd July 1978.
164 . . . .Ibid.
165 New Straits Times, 22nd March 1976.
166 New Straits Times, 28th June 1976.
167 The Malay Mail 17th February 1975.
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Minister Tun Razak made explicit to the Malaysian Indian community that 
while he ‘understood the problems of the Indian community, we should not 
lose sight of the heart of the matter which is the prevailing economic 
imbalance we inherited from the colonial era’.168 With this he was referring to 
the poor economic position of the Malays (Bumiputera) vis- a- vis the non- 
Malays, primarily the Chinese. It was unfortunate for the Indians that they 
were lumped together with the Chinese as non- Bumiputera, since that 
clouded the actual economic reality and aid required by the Indian 
community.169 An editorial by K.Das in the Far Eastern Economic Review 
revealed further insight into the matter when it quoted Manickasavagam’s 
opening proverb at the MIC 23rd Party General Assembly on July 6th 1975, 
The very gods may concede but the priest would demur’. To this, according 
to Das, Manickasavagam meant that ‘while the Prime Minister proposes, 
the lower echelons of his government dispose the largesse with calculated 
abandon , with an eye more on politics than on people’. That is, the politics of 
Malay supremacy. Concerns were constantly raised about the 10% quotas 
raised for Indians in education, public employment and housing schemes 
and other grants. The question asked was ‘Do we get 10% of the lot, or the 
10% of the left overs after the Bumiputera preference shares are cut?’ Within 
Manickasavagam’s time, pro-Bumiputera policy had become the political 
and cultural milieu of Malaysia and negotiating Indian rights was obviously a 
challenge. Manickasavagam’s time in power was cut short by his untimely 
death in October 1979.He was eulogised in The Straits Times as being 
‘modern, forward looking, down to earth, hard driving, unpretentious and 
approachable’.170
168 New Straits Times, 8th July 1974.
169 K. Anbalakan. The New Economic Policy and further marginalization of the Indians in "The 
Bumiputera Policy, Dynamics and Dilemmas", Kajian Malaysia , Journal of Malaysian Studies ,ed, 
Richard Mason et.al Vol XXI, Nos 1 & 2 , July /December 2004, Pulau Pinang, Penerbit Universiti 
Sains Malaysia.
170 New Sunday Times, 14th October 1979.
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Conclusion
The primary issue that hampered Sambanthan and Manickasavagam from 
attaining rights and a proportionate share of social, economic and political 
benefits for the Indians was that the Indian community itself was considered 
an insignificant minority by the UMNO- led government in terms of numbers 
and economic clout. The MIC was in a weak bargaining position as it brought 
‘negligible’ returns to the Alliance and later the National front. Witnessing the 
removal of Sambanthan by MIC party elites to be replaced by the ‘more 
forward looking’ Manickasavagam ameliorated the image of the party, but it 
did not solve problems that were endemic within the party such as 
factionalism and disunity. Leadership styles, whether they were in 
acquiescence to Malay leadership, as in Sambanthan’s case, or with 
Manickasavagam engaging governmental initiatives to bargain rights for 
Indians, mattered little in the face of a political milieu that had already pre­
determined Malay hegemony.
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Malaysian Federal Reserve Unit breaking up the violence that was common at MIC 
meetings and elections. (Source: Nanban)
Allegedly Samy Vellu’s supporters controlling the crowd and making decisions as to 
who should be allowed into the polling stations during MIC elections. (Source: 
Nanban)
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Chapter 4 -  S. Samy Vellu, a Malaysian politician
Sangalimuthu Samy Vellu became president of the Malaysian Indian 
Congress, in 1979. In 1977, he won the deputy presidency by 25 votes, 
defeating S. Subramaniam, the choice of Tan Sri Manickasavagam as 
successor, and this paved the way for him to take over as party chief in 1979 
when Manickasavagam died that year.1Samy Vellu was an architect by 
training but maintained a greater interest in politics, participating in and 
taking up positions in the MIC since he first joined MIC’s Batu Caves branch 
as an ordinary member in 1961}  In this period Samy Vellu attained 
institutional memory and witnessed the severity of factional rivalries within 
MIC that led to Sambanthan’s removal as party president. He was also in a 
position to understand the narrow political and civic space in which Indians 
were navigating citizenry rights as demonstrated by Tun Razak’s apathy to 
Manickasavagam’s Blue Print and repeated requests for equal opportunities. 
In 1979, the Barisan Nasional and MIC, as a component party, had firm 
control over political power in Malaysia.Unlike the Chinese who had the 
opposition parties such as the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the 
Gerakan as counter pressure for the Malaysian Chinese Association, (MCA) 
the MIC was the main representative of the Indians politically. This placed 
Samy Vellu as a key protagonist in the trajectory of the Malaysian Indian 
community’s political, social and economic development. Samy Vellu’s 
policies, executive decisions and vision were pivotal for the Indian 
community.
Early in his political career, the local newspaper, The Star, proclaimed 
Samy Vellu the undisputed leader of the Indian community who got ‘the job 
done’ claiming that he had been able to gain control through two means: ‘ his 
ability to manipulate the masses through his speeches and his
1 The Star, 24th May 1984.
2 Bernice Narayanan, A life A legend A legacy, Dato'Seri Samy Vellu, (Kuala Lumpur: BN 
Communications Sdn Bhd, 2010.) 44.
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unchallengeable achievements’.3 But thirty years on, Malaysiakini reported 
several instances when Sarny Vellu was booed or jeered at by Malaysian 
Indians while making public appearances.4 Malaysian Indian Business 
Association (Miba) president P Sivakumar asserted that thirty years later the 
Malaysian Indian condition had not improved much: ‘For decades they have 
been talking about the same issues like estates, Tamil schools and temples. 
No doubt these are important but the problem is now greater. What is 
confronting the community today are issues of national identity and equal 
opportunities in the public and private sector as well as education’.5This is an 
explicit criticism of Samy Vellu’s record as leader. Thirty years on, as 
circumstances have only worsened since Independence for the Indian 
community, Samy Vellu is often considered the prime villain by Indians and 
non-Indians in Malaysia to explain away the challenges the community is 
facing. This chapter examines that assumption by analysing Samy Vellu as a 
leader of the Indian community, examining his party policies, actions and 
strategies as well as the shifting circumstances in which he had to execute 
his obligations as MIC president and cabinet minister of the UMNO- led 
government.
Factions and foes
Samy Vellu’s political strategy towards internal party politics in MIC was one 
of ‘no more compromise’.6 This was mainly directed towards his adversaries 
in party elections, particularly after he took majority votes during the several
3 Ibid.
4 Malaysiakini, 26th December 2007. 'Writing on the wall for MIC supremo'. The internet news set 
reported the following ' The jeering and booing of Works Minister S Samy Vellu at the Penang 
International Sports Arena (Pisa) last Sunday shows the naked truth that a growing number of 
Indian Malaysians are against h im '. On 19th February 2008, Malaysiakini reported that 'angry 
Indian Malaysians demand answers for the community's woes ....Two events in Pajam and Kapar 
were disrupted last Sunday, a day after S. Samy Vellu had to be rescued by police. It was the 
second incident involving him in recent weeks. In all four cases, the crowd claiming to represent 
the community has surrounded and heckled MIC leaders wanting them to explain why they had 
been left behind in terms of development'.
5 Malaysiakini, 21st December 2007. 'Indian woes: Look at the Big picture'.
6 The Star, 5th August 1980.
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presidential elections he contested while leading the MIC. On 21st March 
1981, newspaper headlines read out Sarny Vellu’s main statement after 
winning his first MIC presidential elections, echoing his leadership strategy 
for decades to come , Toe my line or get out’.7 Samy Vellu told reporters that 
there would be ‘no independence in thinking among members. All members 
had to follow party decisions without question. A common thinking was 
necessary if the people whom MIC represented were to benefit...he would 
take action without mercy in a few weeks against a few people who had 
planned to disrupt branch elections’.8 Throughout the three decades he was 
in power, he was consistent in removing from power or taking steps to 
weaken the power base of his opponents or anyone else who had even a 
semblance of popularity within the party that could threaten his position.
From the outset his main opponent was S. Subramaniam. Rivalry with 
Subramaniam had its roots during Manickasavagam’s time. In the 1974 
elections, Manickasavagam picked three representatives, apart from himself, 
to contest the different constituencies. Subramaniam was placed in 
Damansara, Samy Vellu in Sungai Siputand K. Pathmanaban in Teluk 
Kemang along with Manickasavagam in Klang. MIC won all four seats.9 This 
initiated competition between Subramaniam, Samy Vellu and Pathmanaban 
to start building their power base to compete for the senior- most positions in 
the party hierarchy. During the 1975 party elections, Samy Vellu secured the 
highest votes amongst ten candidates in the fight for the three vice 
presidents’ posts. Subramaniam polled the most votes in the contest for 
three elective central committee seats and was reappointed Secretary 
General.10 In May 1977, Samy Vellu won the Selangor MIC election for State 
party chairman defeating V.L Kandan, Manickasavagam’s brother.
7 New Straits Times, 23rd March 1981.
8 Ibid.
9 New Straits Times, 24th Jan 1981.
10 Ibid.
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Subramaniam meanwhile became a Parliamentary Secretary.11 In May 1976, 
the deputy president, Nahappan, passed away. As a result in July 1977 there 
was a bitter run up campaign between Samy Vellu and Subramaniam, who 
was Manickasavagam’s preferred candidate, for the position of deputy 
president. Samy Vellu defeated Subramaniam by a mere 25 votes.12ln 1979 
when Manickasavagam died suddenly, Samy Vellu took over as acting 
president and prepared to fight the next presidential elections with the words 
that ‘problems and the troubles in the party can only be resolved once the 
presidential elections are held’.13 This indicated that he was going to 
maximise his position after securing power to enforce his decisions and 
initiatives.
Samy Vellu used his position as Acting President from 1979 to 1981 to 
eliminate potential competitors for the MIC presidency. He refused to appoint 
a deputy president when he was acting president.14 Instead he appointed a 
Council of Administrators to run the party while he was abroad for a month. 
The Council comprised of the party’s three vice presidents, the secretary 
general and the treasurer.15 He refused to appoint a deputy even though he 
came under tremendous pressure from party members to appoint his rival 
Subramaniam, a party vice president ,as the deputy president.16 His next 
manoeuvre was to conduct a purge of party members on disciplinary charges 
but the local dailies asserted that the suspended party leaders were 
specifically ‘supporters of his rival Senator S. Subramaniam’.17 Those 
suspended were Kedah state secretary V.N Nadarajah, Nibong Tebal
11 Ibid. Based on the Westminster model, a parliamentary secretary is a member of parliament who 
assists a cabinet minister in his duties.
12 Ibid.
13 New Straits Times, 5th August 1980.
14 The Star, 14th January 1980.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17New Straits Times, 13th January 1980.
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chairman Mohana Dass Kumar, Muar branch chairman R Subbiah, former 
Parit Bakar chairman A Kanniah and the branch’s secretary J 
Kulandaipaiyan.18 Subramaniam protested the suspension of his branch 
secretary, Nadarajah, as unfair and called Samy Vellu a ‘dictator’.19 Samy 
Vellu further clamped down on the suspended members by instructing all 
branches of the party that no suspended member was to be given the 
opportunity to speak at any party function, thus limiting their influence 
further.20 A nationwide signature campaign was started to protest the 
suspension of the MIC leaders. MIC members admitted that ‘ the 
suspensions have been against people who are likely to be a threat to Samy 
Vellu and his supporters in the party’s elections...This is a pre-emptive strike 
to consolidate his position and ensure that he will not have to face a strong 
challenge for the party’s top position in future’.21
Samy Vellu then led a move by party headquarters to query the citizenship 
status of members of some 15 Federal territory branches of the party.
Branch members feared that failure to comply with the short notice might 
have prevented them from holding elections to nominate delegates to the 
Federal territories party meeting.22 Early in 1981, newspapers reported that 
Samy Vellu personally went through registers of branches in the presence of 
other MIC officials and uncovered a series of alleged malpractices such as 
fictitious members who existed in name only in registers , duplication of 
membership registrations, use of electoral rolls to pick Indian names with 
Identification Cards (IC) numbers and addresses to boost numbers , insertion 
of false citizenship numbers and some members not having the citizenship
18 New Straits Times, 13th April 1980.
19 Ibid.
20 New Straits Times, 8th April 1980.
21 Ibid.
22 New Sunday Times, 28 December 1980.
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numbers of more than half the members.23 A query was also started to 
question the establishment of new branches which did not represent 
‘identifiable areas’ of having at least 100 Indian residents.24 Federal territory 
MIC members questioned Samy Vellu if the query was a nationwide 
verification exercise and if the Federal territory branches were being singled 
out from the 600 branches in the country. MIC members asserted that of the 
18 branches which had been directed to verify their membership, 15 were in 
the city,and were under the chairmanship of Samy Vellu’s chief adversary, 
Subramaniam. The absence of Federal territory delegates could undermine 
Subramaniam’s re-election.25Eventually in February 1981, as a result of the 
query, MIC withheld the issue of B forms-the go ahead for branch- meetings, 
to 25 branches, 7 of which were from the Federal Territory.26
In the run- up to Samy Vellu’s first presidential elections , he was keen to 
remove another adversary from power, MIC youth leader, Vice Chairman 
and Selangor State Executive Councillor, V.L Kandan , brother of the former 
president of MIC Manickasavagam. Samy Vellu wrote to the Mentri Besar, 
Datuk Hormat Rafei, asking that Kandan be replaced by Samy Vellu’s known 
supporter, party’s state Assemblyman for Assam Jawa, Datuk N.S Maniam.27 
MIC sources expressed surprise that Samy Vellu had taken such steps 
against Kandan but also revealed that since Samy Vellu’s appointment as 
acting president, many of Samy Vellu’s arch rivals, including K. 
Pathmanathan, were removed from sub-committees they were heading.28 
Sources also revealed that Kandan and Samy Vellu fell out when Kandan
23 The Malay Mall, 1st January 1981.
24 The Malay Mail, 7th January 1981.
25 New Straits Times, 8th January 1981.
26 B forms are governmental approval forms for organizations and companies to exist.
27 The Star, 1st May 1980.
28 Ibid.
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started backing Sarny Vellu’s chief rival S. Subramaniam.29 In July 1980, 
Sarny Vellu, chairing a four- hour meeting at the Selangor MIC branch, 
witnessed the branch voting to demand the removal of their vice president, 
V.L Kandan, from the Executive Council.30
The factional rivalry that developed in MIC from 1979 was unfortunate for the 
party’s social and organisational structure. Newspapers reported that the 
power struggle between the Samy Vellu camp and the Subramaniam 
(popularly known as Subra), camp had led to the rules and procedures ‘to be 
thrown to the wind’31 and unconstitutional means being used to achieve an 
edge. Violence was reported at several branches due to factional fighting: ‘in 
fact branches were openly being threatened at public meetings that the only 
way they could survive was for them to throw in their lot with either camp’.32 
The candidate with the most branches behind him would emerge the winner 
and to this end many ‘unconstitutional’ branches were being set up. Where it 
was known that a new branch was to favour one candidate, it was simply not 
approved while branches known to support the approved candidate were 
allowed to get away with fictitious membership rolls.33 Questionable tactics 
were also being used to influence the election of new office bearers in old 
branches. Then party officials claimed in reference to Samy Vellu’s 
strategies: ‘One camp will put up a slate of candidates for the elections. If 
they win, well and good. But if they lose out, thugs are sometimes used to 
create trouble’.34
Samy Vellu’s strategies proved successful when Subra pulled out of the 
race. On 22nd February 1981, Subra announced that he would not run for the
29 Ibid.
30 The Star, 13th July 1980.
31 The Star, 17th March 1981.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
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party’s presidential elections and instead had decided to focus on winning 
the deputy president’s post at the party’s general assembly in July. This 
cleared the way for Sarny Vellu’s landslide victory in March 1981 where he 
was elected as MIC’s president with 93.9 per cent of the votes.35 Naturally 
Sarny Vellu then proceeded to fill the rank and file of the party with his 
supporters. K. Pathmanathan, deputy Labour and Manpower Minister, who 
was in Subra’s camp, was to be challenged by Sarny Vellu’s supporters for 
the vice president’s post. Sarny Vellu favoured S. Mahalingam and V. 
Govindaraj to stand for the three vice -president’s posts.36 Post- presidential 
elections analysts were claiming that, ‘Senator Subramaniam’s camp which 
was already fighting an uphill battle is going to find it even more difficult to 
get a foot into the party’s corridors of power’.37 Samy Vellu was quoted as 
saying that ‘I am going to clean up the party. It is time to get rid of the 
troublemakers in the party’38. Samy Vellu had five supporters whom he was 
keen to promote in the posts of deputy president and vice-presidents, 
Senator M. Mahalingam, lawyer D.P Vijendran, Datuk G. Pasamanickam, 
Senator Muthupalaniappan and V. Govindaraj.39 However in May 1981, 
Samy Vellu and Subramaniam had a ‘heart to heart’ talk of about twenty 
minutes after a three-hour Central Working Committee meeting that had met 
to discuss possible disciplinary action against Subramaniam. After this talk, 
Samy Vellu claimed that he had decided to close ranks with Subra and to 
work ‘hand in hand’ for MIC and the Indian community.40 Subra then went on 
to win the Federal Territory party elections and subsequently became the 
deputy president of MIC. But the factional rivalry between Samy Vellu and 
Subramaniam was to colour MIC party politics for the next thirty years.
35 New Straits Times, 23rd March 1981.
36 New Sunday Times, 22nd February 1981.
37 New Straits Times, 23 March 1981.
38 Ibid.
39 The Malay Mail, 23rd March 1981.
40 The Star, 27th May 1981.
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In June1987 there was a hint of change in Subra’s favour when Selangor 
and Federal Territory Youth elections witnessed candidates backed by 
Subra’s camp come into power.41This was followed by the elections of the 
vice presidents and deputy president later in the year. It was felt that the 
contest was seen as a proxy fight between Sarny Vellu and his deputy 
Subramaniam.42 Samy Vellu was said to be supporting Johore MIC chairman 
Datuk G Pasamanickam, Negri Sembilan MIC chairman Datuk M. 
Muthupalaniappan and Selangor MIC chief and former Secretary-general 
Datuk Mahalingam. Subramaniam was backing Datuk K Pathmanathan and 
M.G Pandithan for the positions of Vice President and Subra’s camp was 
victorious at the September 1987 elections.43The failure of Samy Vellu’s 
supporters to win the vice-presidencies was not taken as a reflection of 
Samy Vellu’s waning influence in the party but it did give Subramaniam the 
courage to fight the presidential elections in 1989 challenging Samy Vellu.
The 1989 presidential elections were just as scandalously conducted as the 
1981 elections. MIC sources revealed that the conflict between Samy Vellu 
and Subramaniam worsened with Samy Vellu taking steps one year in 
advance of the elections to start closing down some 250 branches.^He also 
expelled 20 MIC leaders such as Dr N.G Baskaran and R. Masilamani.45 
Subramaniam went public, expressing his shock over these decisions, ‘All 
those expelled are my strong supporters....’46 Samy Vellu’s supporters 
claimed that these decisions were taken with the approval of the MIC Central 
Working Committee, to which Subramaniam’s supporters replied that 
‘Endorsement by the CWC does not make an action democratic. Most of the
41 The Malay Mail, 30th June 1987.
42 New Sunday Times, 20th September 1987.
43 Ibid.
44 The Star, 9th April 1989.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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members are the president’s men’.47Samy Vellu also accused Subramaniam 
of not handing $250 000 in lottery proceeds to the Maju Institute of 
Educational Development (MIED), the education arm of the party. To which 
Subra replied that the amount had already been credited to the MIED but 
could not be cashed due to Nesa’s assets being frozen by the Bank Negara. 
Subra also asked why he was being singled out when there were many 
others owing money to the MIED.48
The Tamil dailies were more vivid in their accounts of the 1989 presidential 
elections. There were reports of Subramamam’s supporters being attacked 
as they were about to place their nominations in support of Subramaniam. 
This was reported about Kampung Tunku MIC leader M.Devaraj, it was 
claimed that as he entered the MIC headquarters to submit his nomination, 
his path was blocked by gangsters 49 Police were reported taking orders from 
an individual, Parat Maniam, during nomination day as to who to allow into 
MIC Headquarters to file nominations. Parat Maniam’s and his men’s actions 
were taken as gangsterism in the Tamil press.50Subramaniam received 
threats via phone calls to withdraw from the presidential elections.51 
Members of the public wrote in to demand that the local Tamil news on 
Malaysian television should not be dominated by coverage of just Samy 
Vellu and his speeches, especially during the elections when other 
candidates should also be given air time.52 And finally there were queries 
over Samy Vellu receiving 825 nominations, together with Subramaniam’s 
139 nominations that would make for a total of 964 nominations when there
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Tamil Osai, 2nd October 1989.
50 Tamil Osai, 4th October 1989.
51 Tamil Osai, 5th October 1989.
52 Tamil Osai, 3rd October 1989.
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were only 947 branches registered under MlC.530n October 15th 1989, Sarny 
Vellu won the presidential elections for a fourth term by 62 percent of the 
votes cast. But post- elections Sarny Vellu curbed his deputy Subramaniam 
further by not fielding him as an MIC candidate in the 1990 general 
elections.54 It was only after reconciliation with Sarny Vellu that Subra was 
allowed to win the Deputy President’s post unopposed.55
Samy Vellu remained party president of the MIC even past the Hindraf saga 
and his loss of the Sungei Siput seat in the March 2008 elections. The 1992 
presidential elections were particularly indicative of the success of Samy 
Vellu’s strategies in securing himself as MIC president since he was being 
investigated by the Anti Corruption Agency over the Maika scandal, to be 
explained later. Despite the scandal, Samy Vellu received a ‘mandate like no 
other’ when he defeated two relatively unknowns for the post of party 
president, securing 34 102 votes out of the 35 899 votes cast. Again the 
lopsided victory was not free of controversies. For example, a local charge of 
cheating came from Negri Sembilan MIC chief Datuk M Muthupalaniappn, 
who alleged that a branch in Kuala Pilah with only 13 votes recorded 22 
votes instead.56 Some political observers noted the establishment of more 
than 1000 new branches nationwide, all said to be favourably disposed to the 
president, as the reason for Samy Vellu’s success.57 They also commented 
on the closure of some 400 branches aligned to deputy president 
Subramaniam that broke up the opposition to Samy Vellu.58
By the 1994, there was a newly elected vice-president on the scene, G. 
Palanivel. At 45, he was the youngest vice- president to be elected. But it
53 Tamil Osai, 4th October 1989.
54 Malaysiakini, 1st September 2005. 'Samy: Don't ask MIC candidates to withdraw'.
55 Ibid.
56 G Vijaya Bharathi/ A mandate like no other,' Malaysian Business, 1-15 November 1992, 20.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
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was noted that his meteoric rise was achieved with the aid of Sarny Vellu.59 
In 2005, a year in advance of the MIC party elections, Sarny Vellu had 
already begun to announce that he ‘wanted a new deputy who could work 
with him to implement party policies and programmes’.60 Samy Vellu also 
began to talk openly against his deputy in public. He claimed that 
Subramaniam was conducting a ‘proxy war’ through the Malaysia Nanban 
newspaper.61 In January 2006, familiar tactics were employed in the run- up 
to the elections in not issuing B forms to a significant number of branches .62 
As a result, some 50 000 to 100 000 MIC supporters who were considered to 
be ‘outside’ the party due to the dissolving of branches and terminations, 
formed a splinter party, ‘MIC baru’ (New MIC). However, MIC baru claimed 
not to have links with Subramaniam.63
By March 2006, Samy Vellu had begun to endorse Palanivel as his 
candidate for the number two spot.64 Samy Vellu began to launch verbal 
tirades against Subramaniam publicly: ‘I firmly believe he (Subramaniam) 
had a hand in everything. So it is time to see either it is you (Subramaniam) 
or me. You want to take the MIC through the back door, I will not allow it 
...you want to contest against me I will allow you to challenge me ...They 
tried to prove I am a man not worth to be president, you (Subramaniam) had 
your game , now I will play mine.’65 Palanivel claimed that Subramaniam had 
become ineffective as someone who had been in power for too long and had 
become unproductive for the job and party. Instead Palanivel said that Samy 
Vellu had now named his successor in Palanivel and it was now up to the
59 The Star, 4th December 1994.
60 Malaysiakini, 1st September 2005. 'Samy: Don't ask MIC candidates to withdraw.'
61 Malaysiakini, 8th September 2005. 'Subra waging 'proxy-war', says Samy.'
62 Malaysiakini, 28th January 2006. 'MIC sec-gen: Only 10 branches barred from holding meetings.'
63 Malaysiakini, 28th January 2006. 'Make way MIC 'lama', here comes MIC baru.'
64 Malaysiakini, 1st March 2006. 'Palanivel endorsed as No 2, Subra undeterred.'
65 Malaysiakini, 20th May 2006.' Game over: Samy flays Subra.'
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delegates to cast their votes.66 On June 24th 2006, Subramaniam polled 495 
votes compared to Palanivel’s 935 votes.67Subramaniam’s defeat, at already 
61 years of age, signalled an end of his long political career that began in 
1973 when he was made executive secretary of the MIC.68
Apart from fighting Subramaniam, Samy Vellu had also fallen out with some 
other prominent MIC leaders and these became headline news for the Indian 
community. V. Govindaraj was Samy Vellu’s man. He was nominated by 
Samy Vellu to be National Front’s man for the Port Klang by-election69, made 
to compete against Subramaniam for the deputy’s post70 and as Selangor 
MIC chairman was handpicked by Samy Vellu to compete against V.L 
Kandan in the run up for Selangor leadership.71However, since February 
1983, Govindaraj faced disciplinary action from MIC under the suspicion of 
having ‘political interests in the Malaysian Indian Muslim Congress (KIMMA) 
or any other opposition parties’.72 In March 1983, Govindaraj was suspended 
for 12 months amidst protests from Govindaraj that he and Samy Vellu ‘ate, 
cycled together...’73 and had actually been bosom buddies. Samy Vellu, 
however, claimed that ‘he had given Govindaraj many opportunities to reform 
but he did not and instead he assumed I was weak’.74 Samy Vellu cited the 
reasons for his suspension that as a state party chief he had fallen short in 
several financial responsibilities, he had acted contrary to the directives of 
the Central Working Committee, he had lied to the party’s disciplinary
66 Malaysiakini, 2nd June 2006. 'Palanivel: the hour of change has come.'
67 Malaysiakini, 24th June 2006.' Palanivel is new no 2 , Samy team in.'
68 Ibid.
69 The Malay Mail, 9th November 1979.
70 The Star, 13th September 1981.
71 The Malay Mail, 10th February 1981.
72 The Star, 22nd February 1983.
73 Sunday Mail, 27th March 1983.
74 The Star, 27th March 1983.
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committee and headquarters on a matter relating to a political party acting 
against MIC, and he had generally shirked his responsibilities as Selangor 
MIC leader,75 but the main reason was due to an initiative Govindaraj had 
taken to clear his name. When Mahalingam announced to Govindaraj that he 
had been instructed by the party president to tell him that the Prime Minister 
had agreed to drop Govindaraj as Barisan Nasional MP for Port Klang and 
that he was now instructed to resign from the MIC, Govindaraj wrote a long 
letter to the Prime Minister to clear his name.76 Samy Vellu felt that this letter 
had damaged the image of MIC.77 Govindaraj went on to form his own party , 
the Democratic Malaysian Indian Party (DMIP)78 but it was an unsuccessful 
political endeavour and Govindaraj was seen by Samy Vellu’s side again in 
the 1989 elections as a friend .mediating between Samy Vellu and 
Subramaniam.79
Another widely publicised falling out was when M.G Pandithan was sacked 
by MIC in 1988. Pandithan was popular with the Malaysian Indians because 
he came from a humble background, with his father being a City Hall 
sweeper and his mother a washerwoman, and he came from a lower caste. 
He was able to draw the crowds with his oratorical skills and enjoyed support 
mainly from Indians of the same caste as himself.80 In 1977 he won a 
Central Working Committee seat and in 1981 he became vice- president, 
was re-elected for a third term in 1987 and elected Tapah MP and 
Parliamentary Secretary in the then Trade and Industry ministry.81 However 
Pandithan stood in Subra’s camp. In May 1981 it was reported that
75 Ibid.
76 The Star, 27th March 1983.
77 The Star, 31st March 1983.
78 New Straits Times, 17th February 1986.
79 The Malay Mail, 3rd October 1989.
80 The Star, 26th February 1995.
81 Ibid.
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Pandithan would go all out to ensure that Senator S. Subramaniam was 
elected as the party’s deputy president in its forthcoming elections’.82 In the 
run-up to the 1989 presidential elections, Pandithan was a victim to Sarny 
Vellu’s familiar tactics in eliminating the power base of his opponent Subra, 
that of suspending Subra’s supporters. Pandithan was issued with a show 
cause letter asking him to explain the alleged use of caste issues and other 
sensitive issues to garner support.83Pandithan responded with a protest 
‘death fast’ lasting 48 hours during which a coffin( allegedly a symbolic 
gesture to note Samy Vellu’s political death) was brought to the MIC 
headquarters.84 Eleven of Pandithan’s supporters were also arrested as the 
crowd gathered at the MIC headquarters, awaiting the CWC’s decision to 
uphold the decision to suspend Pandithan. They smashed glass doors, 
burned the MIC flag and tore down a portrait of Samy Vellu.85 The Pandithan 
affair was criticised by MIC leaders such as Pathmanathan who claimed that 
the vote to expel Pandithan was through a show of hands at a meeting 
presided over by Samy Vellu. Critics charged that this was to intimidate CWC 
members who might have been sympathetic towards Pandithan.86Pandithan 
was later to form another political party called the All Malaysian Indian 
Progressive Front (IPF).87
Samy Vellu’s political style in managing the party was Machiavellian and 
geared towards the objective of retaining power for over three decades. But 
in the process of eliminating competition he stifled the possibility of 
alternative party leadership that could have provided a check and balance to 
his power and questioned his initiatives and their execution. The closing 
down and establishment of new branches consisting of his supporters and
82 Echo, 28th May 1981.
83 The Star, 9th April 1989.
84 Ibid.
ssThe Star, 2nd December 1988.
86 New Sunday Times, 4th December 1988.
87 The Star, 30th January 1990.
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suspensions of potential threats not only weakened the party structure but 
also gave rise to cronyism and nepotism under his reign as party president. 
Sarny Vellu consistently reiterated that he had established party unity 
through his ‘ disciplinary measures’ but that had also led to him being 
surrounded by ‘ yes’ men .
Samy Vellu’s initiatives for the Indian Community
Samy Vellu had an action plan in waiting even before he won his first MIC 
presidential elections. On winning the presidential elections in 1981, the 
New Straits Times reported how ‘he promised to show everyone how his pet 
projects could succeed despite criticisms against them. These projects 
include the Jelapang Industrial Training Institute, the second MIC unit trust 
fund , the Vanto Academy takeover and the formation of a central Holding 
Company’ ,88 In 1983 The Star reported that ‘Datuk Samy Vellu has shown 
that he has a good grasp of the problems facing the Indian community since 
he took over as MIC president in 1979.’89 Samy Vellu identified ‘education, 
economic well being and employment as the three main problem areas faced 
by the Malaysian Indians’. 90
In the same article, Samy Vellu laid out a detailed plan about how he was 
going to deal with these problem areas. He intended to make MIC the 
umbrella body for all other Indian- based organisations in the country so that 
the party could exert enough political pressure to carry out its plans.91 Tamil 
schools had poor facilities and a low standard of teaching. Samy Vellu 
wanted to group Tamil schools that were relatively close to each other to 
form a larger school so as to offer better facilities and teaching standards. He 
wanted Tamil schools to be changed to be fully government schools. In 
1983, Samy Vellu intended to gradually increase the intake of Indian
88 New Straits Times, 23rd March 1981.
89 The Star, 22 May 1983.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
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students in local institutions of higher learning to ten percent. In the 
economic sphere Sarny Vellu pointed out that the Indian share of the 
corporate wealth had stagnated at one percent for more than ten years.92 He 
wanted the government to provide soft loans to Indian businessmen, 
opportunities to enable Indians to buy shares in restructured companies and 
licences for insurance companies, finance and leasing companies, mining 
leases and transport companies. 93These issue and strategies were 
reiterated throughout his three- decade reign .
In the early 1980s, the Indian community were impressed with Samy Vellu’s 
management and leadership style. ‘Samy stamps his mark on the MIC’94, 
‘Discipline makes its mark in the MIC’95, ‘Samy Vellu: down to business’.96 
Press comments lauded him : ‘ While in the past, MIC meetings were often 
the brunt of jokes and ridicule for their unruliness, this weekend’s gathering 
of 823 delegates of the Barisan Nasional’s third largest component was 
noted for its high standard of discipline -  thanks to the firm hand with which 
party boss Datuk S. Samy Vellu conducted the proceedings.’ 97The Far 
Eastern Economic Review stated that Samy Vellu’s popularity was very high 
and that MIC’s traditional electoral bases , rural plantation workers and up- 
country labourers, had shown a willingness to support his economic 
initiatives even though MIC’s previous cooperative ventures had slid into 
mediocre performances.98 It was also emphasized that the then Prime
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 The Star, 24th May 1984.
95 New Straits Times, 23rd July 1984.
96 James Clad, 'The other Malaysians,'For Eastern Economic Review, 26th July 1984.22-23.
97 New Straits Times, 23rd July 1984.
98 James Clad, 'The other Malaysians,'Far Eastern Economic Review, 26th July 1984.22-23.
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Minister, Mahathir Mohamad and Sarny Vellu ‘enjoy a relationship that goes 
back a long way’. 99
Samy Vellu portrayed a sense of mission and determination in the early 
stages of his career and this had something to do with his own personality 
and life trajectory. A recent biography100 revealed that Samy Vellu started his 
working life at the age of fourteen at an ice cream stall. By 1951, he was 
employed by J.R Venthavanam as an office boy but he was also taught how 
to draw the basics of architectural plans. Keen for a better life for himself, 
Samy Vellu got employed at a reputedable architectural firm managed by 
G.M Davidson. In July 1972 he graduated as a Chartered Architect. As the 
eldest child of Sangilimuthu, a rubber tapper of Rengomalay Estate in 
Kluang, Samy Vellu had to support his siblings and step-siblings. He was 
never content with his earlier designations as a cook in a provision shop or 
as an office boy, he kept aspiring for more. This sense of ambition and drive 
was evident in his initiatives and party resolutions to be carried out for the 
Indian community.
Samy Vellu had been vocal to the Malaysian government regarding the 
needs of the Indian community. In 1980, as acting president of MIC, he 
brought up an issue that was to be a recurrent theme for the Indians for the 
next thirty years that ten percent of all jobs, university places, ownership of 
business concerns and scholarships should be given to the Indians.101 Samy 
Vellu highlighted this target at the Second Indian economic seminar. MIC 
officials stated that the issue surrounded ‘different groups competing with 
each other to secure a share of the cake’.102 Instead, Malay Finance Minister 
Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah pointed out that ‘while economic seminars of this 
nature were welcome as they provided valuable feedback to the government, 
there were also very often sensitive and provocative racial issues that were
99 The Star, 24th May 1984.
100 See Narayanan, A life A legend A legacy
101 The Star, 20th July 1980.
102 Ibid.
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raised.’103 Tengku Razaleigh emphasized the ‘need of keeping things low 
key and making demands that did not rattle any one group’. This was to 
inform Samy Vellu’s style of negotiation with the government even though 
there were instances when he was to be aggressive in making demands. At 
the same seminar Samy Vellu stated that ‘the realities say that we will not 
get anywhere by demanding for things. It is better to ask for things in a low 
key manner and in stages.’104
The ten percent equity for the Indians was raised several times for different 
sectors. For example, MIC requested ten percent seats for Indians in 
universities.105 In 1982, Samy Vellu pointed out that the Malaysian Indian 
share in the corporate sector was stagnant at one percent when it should be 
about seven percent by 1990.106 He hoped that the government would 
provide a holding company which MIC was setting up to take up shares on 
behalf of Malaysian Indians in both government companies as well as private 
institutions.107 But as early as 1984, he was reported to be losing heart in his 
goals. He claimed that in 1980 the Indian community managed to achieve 
only 0.9 percent equity percentage. In 1984, the figure had reached only 1.3 
per cent. Samy Vellu stated,’ It is only another six years to 1990 and I don’t 
think the target of seven percent equity participation can be reached ...We 
will be quite satisfied if the Indians reach the figure of five percent equity 
participation of $4 billion worth of investment instead of the targeted $6 
billion’.108
A major reason identified for Indians not receiving a more equitable share of 
the economic pie was that Indians had been classified as non- bumiputera ,
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 New Straits Times, 26th April 1983.
106 New Straits Times, 5th July 1982.
107 The Star, 5th July 1982.
108 New Straits Times, 20th January 1984.
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lumped together with the more economically advanced Chinese 
community.109 Speaking at the laying of a foundation stone of the Sri 
Muneeswara Temple at Kampong Pandan in early 1984, Samy Vellu 
reiterated that this matter had been brought up several times when reviewing 
past Malaysia Plans and the decision to classify the Indians separately had 
been agreed to by the then Prime Minster Dr Mahathir Mohamad. Samy 
Vellu enjoyed a minor victory when Indians were classified as a separate and 
distinct group under the Fifth Malaysia Plan.110
There were other areas touching on the economic development of Indians 
that were a major concern for Samy Vellu. In 1981, MIC noted that Felda , a 
government agency started in 1956 that ensures the resettlement of the rural 
poor by offering small land holding for the purpose of growing cash crops , 
had a suspect perspective and orientation towards the New Economic Policy. 
MIC lamented that ‘the absorption of Malaysian Indians into Felda schemes 
had been small and 2186 successful applicants had been waiting seven 
years for settlement’. 111ln 1983, Samy Vellu sought the assistance of several 
Mentri Besar and Chief Ministers of the various States to allot land in 
industrial estates for MIC sponsored companies.112 In 1984 Samy Vellu 
alleged that banks were slamming their doors on Indian businessmen loans. 
MIC wrote to the Labour Minister and the Governor of Bank Negara stating 
that the Indian community was being discriminated against by 133 financial 
institutions in the country and that this was particularly serious for the Indian 
community as most Indian businessmen were small traders running retail 
shops and service industries.113
109 . . . .Ibid.
110 New Straits Times, 16th January 1984.
111 New Straits Times, 3rd October 1981.
112 New Straits Times, 27th June 1983.
113 New Straits Times, 24th September 1984.
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In 1994, Samy Vellu argued that economic success based on rapid 
industrialisation and dynamic national leadership had put Malaysia on the 
map. However, the majority of Indians trapped in the traditional estate 
sectors faced great difficulties to ride the economic success wave. The 
Indians needed governmental help, and a business and commercial vehicle 
to transform the Indian community into a prosperous segment of society.114 
In 1996, MIC gave the Prime Minister an action- oriented proposal for the 
development of the Indian community under the Seventh Malaysia Plan. The 
proposal addressed issues of poverty eradication, better housing, better 
education and economic opportunities.115lndian estate workers were not 
neglected. MIC announced that steps would be taken to ensure that Indian 
estate workers would reap the benefits of national development. He said that 
a task force formed under the Tun Abdul Razak to look into provisions of 
proper amenities for estate workers had not taken off as expected. Samy 
Vellu then claimed that a team would be put together under Vice President 
MIC, K. Pathmanathan, to submit a report on the latest developments on the 
matter of estate workers and then presented to the government.116 MIC 
encouraged the government to provide low cost housing for Indians.117 MIC 
also urged the government to take over estate schools118 and to improve 
conditions of Tamil schools in the country.119
However it was in the mid -1980s that Samy Vellu was vociferous about the 
marginalisation of Indians, particularly in the civil service. He was reported as 
having said that, ‘non- Malays are being denied places and promotional
114 The Star, 11th December 1994.
115 The Star, 29th January 1996.
116 New Straits Times, 20 July 1981.
117 Malay Mail, 12th February 1981.
118 New Straits Times, 9th February 1981.
119 New Straits Times, 3rd June 1985.
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opportunities in the civil service’.120 He said the civil service was dominated 
by one community and recruitment was based on race. Samy Vellu was also 
quoted as saying that, ‘...extremists were being placed in key positions in the 
civil service and non- Malays, especially Indians holding sensitive posts, 
were being removed and placed in non- sensitive positions’.121 For this 
assertion, Samy Vellu was cautioned by UMNO Youth executive council 
member Tamrin Ghaffar. Tamrin Ghaffar asked Samy Vellu to step down as 
he had not acted responsibly as a cabinet minister. Tamrin stated that Samy 
Vellu’s role as MIC president was interfering with his ministerial role and he 
was inciting communal politics.122 Samy Vellu retorted with statements in the 
press such as ‘I won’t shut up’123 and ‘I’ll tell all at assembly’.124 But it was 
ironic that within weeks of the issue of discrimination against Indians in the 
civil service being raised, Samy Vellu was reported to have been quelled by 
discussions held with Minister Khalil Yaakob and that Samy Vellu was 
‘satisfied’ with the position of Indian officers in professional postings in the 
civil service .125 No explanations, details or statistics were brought forward or 
highlighted as to why Samy Vellu was ‘satisfied’.126
Surveying MIC annual reports during Samy Vellu’s reign reveals an 
extensive list of activities and resolutions addressing issues in education, 
welfare and economic development. There were grants to temples and Tamil 
Schools.127 An MIC Land Committee was in operation which sent out survey 
forms to investigate the Malaysian Indian status in land ownership and the
120 The Star, 18th July 1985.
121 Ibid.
122 New Sunday Times, 23rd June 1985.
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problems faced by Indians in having land and titles.128 There were visits to 
estates, accompanied by officials of the Ministry of Human Resources, to 
inspect living conditions of estates throughout the country. The outcome of 
these visits was a five-year development plan that entailed 27 700 units of 
substandard houses in 800 estates being rebuilt, improvement in child care 
facilities, building of community halls, the improvement of the quantity and 
quality of water supply in estates and an improvement in electrical and 
medical facilities.129 An Estate Workers Home Ownership Scheme was 
debated within the party to build 4384 units of houses.130 There was much 
focus on development of Tamil schooling and education with workshops for 
teachers and students, plans for the improvement of facilities of Tamil 
schools and scholarships and grants to students. There was also the 
Educational Recovery Programme (EDUREC) to upgrade the level of 
educational achievement of Indian students in primary and secondary 
schools as well as the Smart Schools project in an effort to upgrade Tamil 
education in line with the country’s educational standards of the Indians in 
Malaysia.131
Significant initiatives in education included the buying of Vanto Academy 
from owners Thomas and Anthony Verghese in 1980.132 In 1985 it was 
documented that Vanto Academy had a student enrolment of 1221. The 
courses offered were Sijil Rendah Pelajaran (SRP), Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia, 
SPM, GCE O’ Levels and GCE A Levels. There was also a VANTO 
Professional Centre which offered courses in School of Management 
Studies, School of Engineering Technology, School of Adult Education,
128 MIC Annual report 1988/1989. NUS Singapore/Malaysia collection.
129 MIC Annual report 1991/1992. NUS Singapore /Malaysia collection.
130 MIC Annual report 1992/1993. NUS Singapore /Malaysia collection.
131 MIC Annual report 1996/1997. NUS Singapore /Malaysia collection.
132 New Straits Times, 14th October 1980. NUS Singapore /Malaysia collection.
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L.L.B, Pre Law, Legal Secretarial work and in computers.133 In 1984, Maju 
Institute of Educational Development (MIED) was established by Sarny Vellu 
to improve opportunities for Indian in institutions of higher learning by 
providing loans and scholarships to meet their educational needs.134 In 
1988, Kolej TAFE was set up in Seremban and it offered certificate and 
diploma courses in engineering, computing and business. There were also 
diploma courses in subjects such as aircraft maintenance technology, 
automotive engineering, civil engineering and electrical and electronics 
engineering. TAFE College was built at a cost of 30 million ringgit to MIED. In 
1997, the enrolment stood at 3100. It is important to note that TAFE also 
admitted 40% non-Indian students in the college.135 In 2001, AIMST 
University began operations .It was funded and established by MIED. AIMST 
boasts a campus with modern facilities and the degree programmes 
curriculum are drawn from the University of Bristol in the U.K. Courses 
offered range across medicine, dentistry, engineering, computer technology 
and even business administration.136
In attempting to achieve economic equity, Samy Vellu’s main drive was 
setting up Maika Holdings BhD. In August 1983, MIC announced that Maika 
Holdings would need $75 million for the projects it wished to participate in. 
Samy Vellu declared that Maika’s projects would cover four areas: insurance 
business, in the restructuring activities carried out by companies, privatising 
Government agencies and in the first private television network, generally 
known as the Third Channel, which went on air by January 1985.137 In the 
action plan for raising funds Samy Vellu revealed the ‘System 50’, which was 
expected to raise at least $35 million by November 1983. Under this plan 
each of the 720 MIC branches would identify 50 investors who would
133 MIC Annual report 1985/1986. NUS Singapore /Malaysia collection.
134 MIC Annual report 1996/1997. NUS Singapore /Malaysia collection.
135 MIC Annual report 1997/1998. NUS Singapore /Malaysia collection.
136 MIC Annual report 2000/2001. NUS Singapore /Malaysia collection.
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undertake to invest $1000 each. In addition MIC had identified 3000 
Malaysian Indian professionals, including those of Pakistani and Bangladesh 
and Sri Lankan origins, from whom they hoped to raise $15 million. MIC also 
planned to raise funds from India institutions.138 Early in 1984 Samy Vellu 
was reported urging Indians, ‘It’s now or never’ to participate in even more 
ambitious fund collecting for Maika Holdings.139 He claimed that it was still 
another two years to the introduction of the next five year plan and he was 
keen that Maika Holdings would increase Malaysian Indian equity 
participation in the corporate sector from the present 1.3 percent to at least 2 
percent, with the MIC target being 2.5 percent. He was also hoping to 
collect about $1000 each on the average from the 500,000 working Indians 
to realise some $500 million.140
In April 1984 it was reported that Maika Holdings Bhd ‘s restricted public 
issue of 50 million ordinary shares of $1 each at par had drawn keen interest 
from members of the MIC.141 In 1985 , Maika Holdings was poised to move 
into finance , banking , trading manufacturing, agricultural development, 
plantation , transport, marketing and viable joint ventures.142 Maika was 
modelled on the aggressive investment holding company , Multi-Purpose 
Holdings (MPHB) that was a cooperative with strong links to the Malaysian 
Chinese Association(MCA).143 Maika’s success in raising $106 000 000 with 
66 649 share holders made it largest shareholding company in Malaysia in 
the eighties.144
138 . . . .Ibid.
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141 Business Times, 11th April 1984.
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Despite these initiatives , in 2001 , twenty years after coming to power and 
implementing the above mentioned initiatives , Samy Vellu was still asking 
the government for ten percent quota in university for Indian students , 
calling for the establishment of a national unit trust fund to help achieve the 
official goal of doubling Indians' corporate stake to three percent in the next 
10 years, urging the government to provide opportunities for Indians in small 
and medium-size businesses and advising the government to promote 
Indians in the police and armed forces, saying some have held the same 
rank for more than 10 years.145 Opposition leaders such as Democratic 
Action Party (DAP) leader, Lit Kit Siang, began to ask, Two decades on, 
what has Samy done?’146 Kit Siang’s line of questioning was that the Indians 
were not considered such an ‘underclass’ as much as they are considered 
after 24 years of the political supremacy of Samy Vellu. He said that the 
Indians had come to be considered the new ‘criminal class’ of Malaysia.147 
Kit Siang pointed to the revelation by parliamentary secretary to the Prime 
Minister's Department, Kamsiyah Yeop, that the Indian ratio in the public 
service had plunged from 9.8 percent in 1980 to 5.2 percent currently.148 
There was also no answer as to why there were no Indian Malaysians at the 
higher levels of the civil service.149
In 2004, the non-government Group of Concerned Citizens (GCC) launched 
a booklet that drew attention to the woes of the Indian Malaysian community 
and called for the resignation of Samy Vellu. Among the issues raised were 
the increasing numbers of Indian youths dying in police custody and the 
worsening economic disparity in the community compared to other races. As 
well as the government’s alleged ineffectiveness in addressing the social ills
145 Malaysiakini, 20th May 2001. 'Ensure 10 percent university quota for Indians urged MIC.'
146 Malaysiakini, 20th October 2003.' Kit Siang: Two decades on, what has Samy done?'
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plaguing the Indian community, the poor monetary allocation for Tamil 
schools and the under-enrolment of Indian students in public universities.150 
Finally in 2005, Samy Vellu himself began accusing the government of failing 
to help the Indian minority group improve its wealth.151 Samy Vellu 
threatened to withdraw his party's support from the government unless the 
target, outlined in an economic report, was achieved. He was quoted as 
saying that ‘If the target was not achieved, there is no point in talking after 
that. We will not talk about equity or anything. We will close shop.’ 152He also 
said that the government had not put any specific mechanisms in place for 
Indians to achieve the target. The community on its own could not raise the 
equity share to three percent. That is why MIC had repeatedly asked the 
government to help.153 The withdrawal of course did not happen and MIC 
remained a component party of the BN. Obviously Samy had not lived up to 
the community’s expectations. This chapter goes on to show that part of the 
problem lay within MIC and partly it was systemic as a reflection of the 
Malaysian political system.
Mismanagement and Scandals
By the mid- 1980s, editorials criticising MIC and Samy Vellu began 
appearing in the press:
MIC general assemblies come and go. Resolutions are passed. Songs are 
sung. Threats and counter threats of resignation by party leaders are made. 
Challenges are thrown. Tempers are exchanged. But in the end, party 
leaders emerge victorious. The climate is set for the next general assembly.
In the excitement and euphoria, the Indian community and its problems are 
forgotten. ...The community is being led to believe that the MIC is effective in 
handling Indian grievances. The truth is far from this. All that needs to be 
done is to study the resolutions of the party over the last 10 years, the
150 Malaysiakini, 11th March 2004. 'Citizens group blames Samy Vellu for community's woes.'
151 Malaysiakini, 10th October 2005.' Samy accuses government of failing Indian Malaysians.'
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blueprints, the committee reports, the recommendations of expert panels, 
the plans and the numerous seminars on education, culture and economics. 
It is amazing to see how much is promised and how little is achieved. It is 
interesting to note how delegates keep passing resolutions without asking 
what had become of earlier resolutions, accept new promises from the 
leadership when the old ones have not been kept, plan new strategies when 
the previous ones are gathering dust on the shelves . The problems that 
were identified 10 years ago as critical for the community remain critical 
today...154
Ramasamy cites reasons for the relative political impotency of the MIC as 
described above. First, he focuses on the politics of Malay hegemony.155 
Ramasamy argues that MIC does not operate in a vacuum, MIC represents 
Indians by being a component of the coalition BN. Since the May 1969 riots 
in Malaysia, the relationship between UMNO and the non- Malay component 
parties was to alter and become ‘an unequal relationship’156 with ‘the 
mandate to rectify Malay injustices’.157Ramasamy notes that Malay 
hegemony ‘essentially entailed UMNO giving priority to the political, 
economic and cultural interests of Malays. While the practice of Malay 
hegemony did not include the participation of non- Malays, their interests and 
concerns were clearly subordinated to the interest of the Malays.’158 
Ramasamy’s analysis lends credence to the earlier quoted editorial which 
goes on to state the following,
The plight of the Indian community can only improve in a political system 
which recognises that all communities have legitimate rights and 
responsibilities ...the party’s so called self help measures are nothing but a 
camouflage for its inability to secure the legitimate rights of the community.
154 The Star, 15th November 1986.
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So it sets up its own schools ( Vanto academy and others) with funds 
collected from the community, it mobilises Indian capital through 
cooperatives to build its own houses , it established Maika Holdings with 
capital collected from across the community , and it is going on a campaign 
to raise $10 million for a scholarship fund . All these in addition to the 
numerous other collections from the community extracted by various Indian 
religious and cultural bodies. The Indian community can be said to be 
subject to double taxation -  one to the government and the other to MIC and 
other Indian organisations. Why should this be? The community is entitled to 
its share of public funds...’159
The second reason that Ramasamy brought up was the flawed decision 
making and power structure within the MIC. He noted that the decision 
making body in MIC was not the annual assembly but the Central Working 
Committee, which is responsible for holding activities and debating issues 
affecting Indians, but which comes under heavy criticism for mechanically 
toeing the line of the president’.160 Ramasamy also goes on to suggest that 
the ‘elitist nature of the party structures, the overwhelming power of the party 
president, the nature of decision making in the party, the lack of viable 
opposition, the party has not been responsive to the ideas and suggestion 
emanating from the grassroots’,161 making MIC a symbolic party that is giving 
the impression that it is helping the Indian community.162 Ramasamy is 
particularly critical of the fact that Samy Vellu had spoken on several 
instances of his personal relationship with Mahathir in getting things done for 
the Indian community.163 He writes that the dependence of MIC leaders on 
UMNO leaders ‘makes a mockery of the practice of democracy, consultation 
and accountability on the part of the government as well as its Indian
159 The Star, 15th November 1986.
160 P. Ramasamy, 'Politics of Indian representation in Malaysia' 361.
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component, the MIC.164 Again, Ramasamy’s analysis can be compared with 
editorials in the mid -1980s when concerns were voiced to keep Maika and 
MIC separate’.165 It was noted that Samy Vellu conducted the second AGM 
of Maika when D. P Vijendran was the company chairman.166 It was also 
noted that several of the other directors were also MIC leaders.167 This 
posed difficulties in separating politics from business. The editorial noted that 
while decisions had been taken to invest in a television network there was no 
sense of accountability to shareholders. Questions such as ‘Who was the 
vendor? Was any valuation done? What was the objective of the purchase? 
How did Datuk Samy Vellu get involved in the purchase?’168 remained 
unanswered. The lack of consultation, information dissemination and the 
authoritarian style- leadership was to mire Maika and several other MIC 
initiatives in scandal and mismanagement.
By 1992, Maika Holdings was reported to be MIC’s ‘biggest embarrassment 
by continuing to be firmly in the red’169 despite an economic boom spanning 
five years. Maika managed to report after- tax profits for 1985 and 1986 
largely because Maika’s managers kept the money parked in banks rather 
than investing it. When Maika did begin venturing out, the ‘company began 
haemorrhaging’.170 The group suffered a loss of RM532 025 in 1987, RM 521 
811 in 1988, RM 3.09 million in 1989 and RM 4.69 million in 1990.171 Maika 
initially began with shares offered at RM 1 each and by the early 1990s, the 
shares could barely fetch 30sen each but no one was interested in buying.
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Also almost 17 000 shareholders defaulted on their United Asian Bank (UAB) 
later Bank of Commerce , leading a legal firm Shook Lin and Bok to issue a 
writ against Samy Vellu for RM 17 million as he stood personal guarantee for 
many poor Indians.172 It was analysed that Maika would have sunk if not for 
its initial cash pile and the share allocations of public floatations173 Most 
analysts credit the Maika nemesis to ‘the group being run in a peculiar 
fashion’174 and poor investment decisions. In the Maika group’s 1990 
accounts an appropriated profit of RM 1.16 million was reported with the 
possibility of bringing total accumulated loses to RM 4.8 million.175 In 1987 
Maika Holdings Berhad extended a loan to an unnamed corporation that was 
yet to be repaid in the early 1990s although it had a legal charge on a long­
term leasehold property of the corporation as security on this loan.176 A tie- 
up with Patel Holdings to supply tin and palm oil to India financed by Maika 
Commodities with almost RM 5 million was suspect as the proceeds were 
collected by Patel Holdings but Maika was yet to realise any returns in the 
early 1990s. Strange investments were made in chopstick manufacturing and 
the acquisition of Anthonian book stores with the later incurring a loss of 12.5 
million.177
Gomez also highlighted the Maika-UAB controversy and the acquisition of 
Batu Lintang.178 He explains that one of Maika’s primary aims was to obtain 
a banking license.179 When the Indian government announced its interest to
172 Ibid.
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divest in UAB in 1985, Samy Vellu led a Maika delegation to India to 
negotiate a takeover. This met with local censure from Tengku Ariff 
Bendahara, arguing that Samy Vellu had not consulted the bank’s board.180 
Maika tried to acquire UAB by purchasing local investor shares in the bank.
In 1986 it secured ownership of Asian Holdings Bhd which held 6 percent 
ownership of UAB’s equity and later Maika attained almost 8 
percent.181 However, UAB itself proved to not be a sound investment as the 
bank ‘s share price began to fall because of a revamp of the bank’s top 
management. By 1984 UAB had suffered losses totalling RM 20.9 million. By 
the end of 1986 UAB losses were RM 350.5 million, which wiped out the 
bank’s shareholders’ funds.182By 1989 Maika’s stake in UAB had gone down 
to 4 percent.183 In October 1986, Maika made another poor investment of RM 
9.59 million in Batu Untang, a Kuching- based property involved in rubber 
and palm oil production. Maika invested in Batu Lintang anticipating a 
general offer for Batu Lintang shares and expected a windfall by buying into 
the company but the offer never came, and the Batu Lintang Company was 
suspended for a long time from trading on the KL Stock Exchange.184
However, it was the Telekom share issue that put Maika in the spotlight for 
interrogation. In May 1992, Samy Vellu refuted allegations of irregularities in 
the sale of Telekom Malaysia shares allotted to Maika Holdings Bhd and 
three other firms. 185Opposition Leaders Lim Kit Siang debated the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1992, accusing Samy Vellu of ‘ resorting to criminal action 
by diverting the nine million shares to three companies instead of giving it to
180 . .Ibid.
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Maika Holdings’.186 Kit Siang contended that the transfer of shares to the 
three companies had made Maika Holdings shareholders ‘bankrupt’.187 The 
chronology of events is as follows. Telekoms was privatised in October 1990, 
issuing 2billion shares at RM 5 each. In September 1990, Samy Vellu 
approached the government for an allocation of 10 million shares for the 
benefit of the Indian community. However, it was reported that at the same 
time Samy Vellu had no confidence in Maika in absorbing all 10 million 
shares; ‘ I could have given all the shares to Maika Holdings if not for their 
past business records. They don’t deserve 10 million shares because of the 
dismal performance of the Maika management’.188 This statement was 
ironic. As mentioned earlier, Samy Vellu micro- managed MIC and MIC led 
projects such as Maika by even super- ceding the company chairmen at 
AGMs. Based on Samy Vellu’s instructions, the shares were relocated 
between Maika (1 million), Advance Personal Computers (APC) (three 
million), SB Management Sdn Bhd (three million) and Clearway Sdn 
Bhd(three million).189 Samy Vellu claimed that this was done in consultation 
with the chief executive of Maika, Rama Iyer. But Rama Iyer protested that 
Maika had already arranged a RM 50 million bank loan for the full 
share.190This was to infuriate Samy Vellu later and he would direct the Board 
of Directors of Maika Holdings to immediately demand the resignation of 
Rama Iyer.191 Samy Vellu was upset that Iyer kept insisting that the 10 
million shares were for Maika when they had been allotted to MIC.192 Samy 
Vellu refuted the allegations that the three companies were linked to his
186 New Straits Times, 15th May 1992.
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brother- in- law and son.193He instead claimed that the net proceeds from the 
share sale of the three companies were channelled to the MIED in three 
instalments between November 1990 and April 1992.194 Maika shareholders 
instead voiced a feeling of complete betrayal. ‘Even if the money was 
donated to the college, it is up to Maika share holders to decide’.195
As a result of the Telekom share issue, Samy Vellu along with others such 
as MIC Vice president M.Mahalingam, Maika Holdings chairman 
Pasamanickam and Samy Vellu’s son were directed to declare all properties 
under the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance 22 of 1970 to the Anti 
Corruption Agency (ACA).196 The ACA also raided the offices of the three 
companies.197 The ACA interviewed people with links to the companies and 
Maika and examined books and documents of MIC and Maika. This further 
sparked a controversy surrounding Samy Vellu’s personal wealth .-he owned 
several villages in South India , 32 000 hectares in land holdings and 
properties in Australia.198
After the Telekom affair, Maika’s image as a corporate company could not 
sink further. Earlier it had been reported that Maika Holdings Bhd had AGMs 
with ‘blows, kicks and punches thrown and abusive language hurled in fierce 
intermittent scuffles between two groups of shareholders. Federal Reserve 
Unit personnel were called in to control the 3000 shareholders...’199ln 1989, 
DAP Member of Parliament, Karpal Singh, had exposed allegations that D.P 
Vijandran, Director of Maika Holdings, had appeared with scores of women, 
on a pornographic videotape. Vijendran had to resign as Maika chairman and
193 New Straits Times, 16th May 1992.
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deputy speaker.200 Sarny Vellu had also shown irregularities in the 
management of other organisations affiliated with the MIC. In 1988, Indians 
who had invested in Koperasi Pekerja Jaya (KPJ) in the hope of getting 
houses had dismal hopes of recovering their money. Tamil Osai reported 
KPJ declaring losses in 1988 had stalled some 19 housing projects despite 
promises from Samy Vellu that the housing projects would be ready in two 
years.201 Housing projects in Masai, Johor, shutdown operations without any 
explanation. To quell public sentiment, Samy Vellu publicly stood guarantee 
for every sen deposited in KPJ and promised to return the money of 
members who had requested a refund.202 In 1991, former Gunung Rapat 
MIC branch chairman, R. Perumal, filed a writ in the High Court against 
Samy Vellu demanding that the MIC president submit a full statement of 
account on the RM 7 million in public donations collected for the Vanto 
Academy.203These were among the eight orders sought in the writ dated 
October 19 1990 and served on Samy Vellu’s lawyers. Even as Works 
Minister he endured a string of troubled government projects such as the 
North- South Highway , Pergau dam project204 , Sultan Ismail hospital in 
Johor Bahru, Temerloh Hospital in Pahang and the Middle Road II Highway 
sudden closure. Samy Vellu’s family was also allegedly involved in personal 
scandals205 that became public knowledge, tarnishing Samy Vellu’s 
professional image as a community leader.
MIC and Samy Vellu do not exist in a vacuum...
Samy Vellu’s ruthlessness in handling opposition within the party and the 
Indian community, mismanagement of community funds through mega
200 Doug Tsuruoka, 'Sex, loses, videotape,' Far Eastern Economic Review, 13th August 1992.
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projects like Maika and other cooperatives, and relative impotency in 
negotiating minority rights for the Indian community led many Indians to view 
him in a disreputable light. The question remains as to how Samy Vellu was 
not only allowed to exist but to thrive in the Malaysian political system. The 
answer lies in examining the Malaysian political system and Samy Vellu’s 
political masters in the UMNO.
Samy Vellu rose to power as president of MIC about the same time Dr 
Mahathir Mohamad became Prime Minister in 1981. Mahathir had an 
autocratic style of governance.By concentrating power in the Prime Minister’s 
hands, he encouraged the mixing of business and politics which was to fuel 
money politics and political patronage in business. The tolerance for big 
projects at tremendous costs and big losses through scandals created a 
Malaysian political milieu that became accepting of slip ups, blunders and 
excesses that go beyond good governance.
Mahathir retained the upper hand when dealing with factionalism and 
opposition to him within, and outside of, UMNO. This was demonstrated with 
the factions that developed according to Team A, led by Mahathir and 
Ghaffar Baba and Team B led by Tengku Razaleigh and Musa Hitam , both 
leaders who had been demoted to less prominent portfolios within the UMNO 
before the 1986/87 UMNO elections . Team B highlighted issues of 
corruption at the higher levels of power, focusing on Mahathir’s chosen 
Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin and his activities.206 When Team B lost 
the elections Mahathir conducted purges of all Team B supporters within the 
party and at lower levels of both state and federal governments . 207 The 
tussle was then pursued through legal means that led to the renaming of 
UMNO into ‘UMNO baru’ and the creation of a new political party against 
Mahathir’s UMNO, Semangat 46’208 which was to later recede into political
206 Gordon P. Means, Malaysian politics: the second generation (Singapore; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 20.
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oblivion. At several junctures of his career Mahathir made constitutional 
amendments to curb the powers of Malay royalty and the power of the 
Malaysian Judiciary, making it subservient to the powers of the Prime 
Minister. Mahathir denounced organisations such as Aliran, the Consumers 
Association of Penang (CAP), and others including opposition parties DAP 
and PAS as enemies of State, since they questioned government policy.209 
He also did not hesitate to employ the Internal Security Act (ISA) in 
Operation Lalang in detaining protestors who had been sparked off by the 
promotion of non- Chinese educated teachers. There was also the shocking 
incident of Mahathir incriminating his Deputy Prime Minister, friend and 
neighbour, Anwar Ibrahim, on charges of sodomy, removing him from power, 
since Anwar had begun to question and posit an alternative recovery plan 
from Mahathir for Malaysia during the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s.210
Many writers such as Milne and Mauzy211, Means212, Gomez213 and 
Shome,214 have discussed the life and times of Mahathir with mixed feelings 
over the impact of his political rule in Malaysia. Barry Wain215 in his more 
recent biography of Mahathir explains how ‘Dr Mahathir plunged UMNO 
deep into the corporate world ...They turned the party into a vast 
conglomerate, with investments that spanned almost the entire economy, 
inducing a profound change in the nature and role of UMNO’.216 Wain goes 
on to claim that ‘Malays joined UMNO not so much to do community service
209 Means, Malaysian politics, 194.
210 See Wain, Malaysian maverick, Weiss, Protest and possibilities and Milne and Mauzy, Malaysian 
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anymore but to make contacts and get the contracts that would bring easy 
profits , the phenomenon was known as money politics’.217 In his chapter ‘A 
volatile mix of business and politics’, Wain explains how the use of an 
‘UMNO political Fund’ led to UMNO associations with several companies 
such as Fleet Holdings and United Engineers (Malaysia) Bhd and Hatibudi 
Sdn Bhd, amongst others that revealed UMNO officials mixing private 
business interests with UMNO’s business and a series of highs and lows in 
the profit -making venture. Apart from that, Mahathir is also known for having 
tolerated tremendous losses in the tin trade in the mid 1980. This was the 
Bumiputra Malaysia Finance Ltd (BMF) scandal /affair that led to losses in 
billions, and the ‘forex fiasco’.218 It did not help that Mahathir was also 
spending hundreds of millions if not billions in mega construction projects 
including the Petronas twin Towers, RM 8 billion Multimedia Super 
corridor219 and PutraJaya. Given this context, it is easy to place Samy Vellu 
as a typical Malaysian politician whose political strategies and economic 
initiatives for the Indian community demonstrated that he was a product of 
the system rather than an anomaly.
Furthermore, Samy Vellu was operating in a civic space that had further 
tightened as Mahathir, a proclaimed ‘Malay ultra’,220 took over power. 
Negotiating for Indian rights was a personal issue within the close friendship 
Samy Vellu had with Mahathir.221 As author of the book/manifesto The 
Malay Dilemma’ , Mahathir had clearly articulated his partiality towards the 
Malays as ‘ the rightful owners of Malaya’222 and the ‘definitive people’223 of
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the country ‘ who both need and have a right to expanded programmes to 
guarantee their special rights and to assure the economic control of the 
country’.224 Mahathir’s beliefs were played out when he set up a National 
Economic Consultative Council (NECC) to initiate relevant action after the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) terminated in 1990. After 1990 he endorsed the 
National Development Policy (NDP), which contained the same objectives 
as the NEP to fulfil targets of Malay corporate ownership with slight changes 
in standards and expectations.225 His initiatives in furthering Islamic policy 
could also be seen as crystallising Malay identity in Malaysia. Means writes 
that ‘Dr Mahathir expressed the view that for the Malays, Islam was a 
powerful source of identity which he likened to nationalism’.226.AIthough his 
initiatives in establishing institutions such as Islamic banking and the 
International Islamic University were partly a response to the Islamic 
resurgence in Malay society and political competition from the opposition 
Islamic party PAS, facilitated the ‘other-ing’ of non-Malay minorities who 
gradually witnessed a growing lack of intolerance in judicial complexity and 
the cultural place of their non- Muslim practices (more in chapter 6).
By the 1990s, Mahathir’s 1982 election slogan, ‘Clean, Efficient and 
Trustworthy’227 had begun to ring hollow. Weiss writes that the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-1999 plus the Anwar factor was catalyst for the 
Malaysian people to start opening up spaces of dialogue through protest and 
cyber activism that began to question the Malaysian political system. This 
was the Reformasi movement that witnessed the aligning of protestors and 
NGOs, and the establishment of Opposition Coalitions such as the Barisan 
Alternatif (BA) that began agitating for governmental reforms.228 The
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Reformasi was vital in generating a culture of criticism towards the Barisan 
Nasional of which MIC and Sarny Vellu were a component. Although Weiss 
characterises the Reformasi activists as ‘y°un9> middle class Malay men’229, 
Indian professionals, educationists and lawyers also formed organisations 
such as the GCC ( Group of Concerned Citizens) and Prim , (Parti 
Reformasi India Malaysia) to question MIC and champion Indian minority 
rights in Malaysia. It was obvious that though Samy Vellu maintained an iron 
grip on the MIC internal structure, his leadership of the Indian community in 
Malaysia was a hollow position for many. Chapter 5 and 6 will demonstrate 
that alternative organisations emerged to cover areas that MIC had failed to 
address in aiding the community and that development in the Malaysian 
political and cultural context such as the rise of Islamisation had become too 
large a phenomenon for Samy Vellu and MIC alone to address efficiently.
Conclusion
When expounding on the Indian plight in Malaysia, many ordinary 
Malaysians, Malays and Indians point to Samy Vellu as ‘the beast’ who is 
responsible for all of the Indian community’s problems. For the Malays 
interviewed , this is a comfortable explanation to expunge their conscience 
by saying that ‘We gave Samy Vellu everything ...Samy Vellu is a very rich 
man ...he messed it up and it is not our fault’. Indians dismiss his thirty years 
as a lost opportunity. Indians argue that his political style of concentrating 
power in his own hands and his cronies did not allow opportunities to flow 
down to the common Indian man on the street. Also he did not allow capable 
men to manage MIC projects out of fear that they may one day threaten his 
position. But as this chapter demonstrates, Samy Vellu’s tactics in 
suppressing opposition, his autocratic style of management, the 
overwhelming ambition to execute big projects at tremendous cost and the 
heart ache that Maika turned out to be are actually symptomatic of the 
political style of his political masters in Barisan Nasional. In comparing the 
leadership style of both Mahathir and Samy in suppressing rivals, tinkering 
with the system to retain an upper hand and mismanagement of big projects,
229 Ibid., 134
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Samy does not come across as being an exception to the Mahathir -led, 
Barisan modus operandi. Samy Vellu was simply operating within a system 
which he was a part of.
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Chapter 5- Alternative spaces to the MIC
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), as a component party of the Barisan 
Nasional, (BN) occupied a virtual monopoly of the political space and 
representation of the Indians in Malaysia. Yet as we have seen, MIC was 
operating within limited parameters of a divided and numerically small 
Malaysian Indian electorate and within a political milieu that propagated 
affirmative action for the majority Malay population. Furthermore, MIC was 
headed by leaders who were unable to inspire and lift the Indian community 
from the problems that they inherited at Independence. Malaysian politics 
was also not known for a rigorous opposition to the incumbent National 
Front. Nonetheless, there was an organic emergence of non-governmental 
organisations, some weak attempts at establishing alternative political parties 
to the MIC and a few Indian politicians who became parliamentarians on the 
ticket of opposition non- communal parties in Malaysia. As civic space for 
non-Muslim, Malay minorities became even more restricted with the rising 
Islamisation in Malaysia, individuals and organisations in the Hindu Indian 
community became more vociferous in highlighting discrimination against 
Hindus and Indians in the area of human rights, conversion cases and Hindu 
temple demolitions. This chapter will explain the opposition in Malaysia and 
the creation of the interstitial organisations that questioned the BN/MIC, 
which eventually led to the establishment of alternatives to the MIC such as 
the Hindraf.
The Malaysian opposition
To place and assess the role of Indians in and the negotiation of minority 
rights by the opposition in Malaysia, it is important to first reiterate at this 
juncture the Malaysian political milieu and the compromised position of the 
Malaysian political opposition, and second to understand the trajectory of 
development of the Malaysian opposition. This will enable an understanding 
of why Indians and Indian political parties in the opposition, although they 
were placed strategically to question initiatives of BN/MIC, have only been 
able to negotiate limited outcomes for the community.
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Malaysia has been dubbed a ‘quasi democracy’, ‘semi-democracy’, ‘pseudo 
democracy’ even ‘soft authoritarianism’ and an ‘illiberal democracy’.1 Wong 
and Othman argue that for the last fifty years Malaysia has been an ‘electoral 
one-party system’.2 Characteristics of this system would be a dominant party 
like the UMNO or the UMNO -led coalition of the Alliance and later the 
Barisan National. The dominant party constrains opposition through 
controlled or manipulated elections and in such circumstances the ‘state -  
party boundary is blurred’.3 Within these limited parameters it was, and still 
is difficult for a credible Malaysian opposition to operate. From its inception in 
May 1946 to oppose the Malayan Union, to the resounding endorsement the 
UMNO led Coalition, Alliance, received in the 1955 elections, the Alliance 
and later the Barisan National has continued to dominate at the Malaysian 
polls, losing a significant majority only in 1969 and 2008. With Malays being 
the majority, the central concern was the contest for the Malay vote. By 
1964, Alliance’s vote had dropped to a majority of only 51.8%. Alliance faced 
its main competition from the Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS) which championed 
Malay- Muslim interests.
In September 1963, Malaya was merged with Singapore, Sabah and 
Sarawak to become Malaysia. The prime motive was to check Singapore 
from becoming increasingly communist.To maintain a majority Malay 
population, Sabah and Sarawak, being populated by groups who were also 
considered to be Bumiputera, were added to the equation. The significance 
of this merger was that it inducted Singapore’s People’s Action Party, (PAP) 
into the politics and rivalries of the Federation. PAP was not admitted into the 
Alliance. Instead, an Alliance party was started in Singapore to challenge 
PAP in the 1963 elections. In return PAP contested in nine constituencies 
against the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), though winning only one 
seat. The admission of PAP into Malaysian politics challenged the very
1 Wong Chin Huat & Norami Othman, "Malaysia at 50-An 'An electoral One party state'" in 
Governing Malaysia, ed. Abdul Razak Baginda (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Strategic Research 
Centre, 2009), 2.
2 Ibid.,3.
3 Ibid.
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premise on which Malay (an) nationalism had been built on, an ethnic 
national consciousness in favour of the Malays. PAP and its founder leader 
Lee Kuan Yew espoused a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ in which the country 
belonged to Malaysians as a whole and not to any particular community. In 
early 1965, PAP formed the Solidarity National Consciousness, soliciting the 
support of the People’s Progressive Party, the United Democratic Party and 
other political groups in Sabah and Sarawak .This incited the hostility of the 
Malays who once again felt that their indigenous rights were being 
questioned. In response, Tunku Abdul Rahman expelled Singapore from the 
Malaysian Federation. But Vasil writes that the PAP had already ‘ succeeded 
in awakening and articulating the non- Malay communities to a degree that 
the entire non-Malay opposition had failed to achieve over a much longer 
period of its existence and efforts’.4
The expulsion of the PAP gave rise to the formation of the Democratic Action 
Party (DAP) in March 1966 to continue as the champion of ‘Malaysian 
Malaysia’. The DAP pursued an anti- communal approach to politics that 
drew support mainly from the non- Malay population. In the run- up to the 
1969 elections, UMNO considered them the only credible opponents, and 
their fears were not unfounded. Tunku Abdul Rahman attempted to slander 
DAP’s political strategies as mischievous, aimed at creating hostilities 
between Malays and non-Malays. Nonetheless, Alliance suffered losses at 
the 1969 elections, securing only 47.95 % of the votes compared to 57.62% 
of the votes in the 1959 and 1964 elections. MCA was trounced at these 
elections with DAP taking the prize for the non-Malays with 15 seats. Alliance 
also lost the state of Penang to another Chinese- led party, Gerakan, and the 
states of Perak and Selangor saw hung assemblies. This was a shocking 
defeat for Alliance and it culminated in racial riots on May 13th 1969 between 
primarily the Malays and the Chinese. DAP and Gerakan were made to 
shoulder the official blame for inciting an assembly of UMNO supporters.
4 R.K.Vasil, Ethnic politics in Malaysia (New Delhi: Radiant publishers, 1980), 158.
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The racial riots were actually an opportune moment for the Young Turks in 
UMNO, Mahathir Mohamad, Syed Nasir Ismail and Ghafar Baba, who were 
strongly pro- Malay. They began demanding a new approach to Malay 
paramountcy. They began to discredit and undermine Tunku Abdul Rahman 
as Prime Minister for his conciliatory approach towards non- Malays. In light 
of MCA ‘s crushing defeat at the 1969 elections and UMNO’s relative 
strength at the polls , it was declared that UMNO was the power base for the 
Alliance and that the composition for the new cabinet should reflect the 
popular base of each of the three parties.5 This would have effectively 
diminished the political clout of the non- Malay components within the 
Alliance. The implications of this moment in history, the narrowing of civic 
space for non- Malays in Malaysia, have been explained in chapter three. 
However it is crucial here to point out how the leaders of UMNO, under the 
auspices of the National Operations Council, were able to effectively render 
political opponents impotent for a significant amount of time. In 1971, the 
government initiated efforts to amend the Malaysian Constitution. The 
amendment sought to empower the parliament to pass laws prohibiting the 
questioning of the constitutional provisions relating to the national language, 
special position of the Malays, the sovereignty and status of the Malay rulers 
and citizenship. It also revoked the immunity from judicial proceedings 
enjoyed by members of Parliament and state assemblies with regard to what 
was said in the legislatures. Members of the opposition in DAP or the 
People’s Progressive Party (PPP) who attempted to question this 
amendment were silenced as being ‘ruthless, tricky, smooth, suave, slick 
political rogues.’6
The leaders of UMNO also conceived the idea of the National Front (Barisan 
Nasional). Apart from the coalition with MCA and MIC, UMNO co-opted 
opposition parties beginning with Sarawak United People’s Party, Gerakan, 
PPP, and finally PAS. Apart from strengthening UMNO’s or BN’s position in
5 Ibid.,178.
6 Ibid.,192.
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parliament ,as these pacts brought in parliamentary seats , the new premier, 
Tun Razak, also wanted to reduce politicking so as to focus on the national 
agenda of improving the economic status of the Malays and to promote 
Malay unity and UMNO’s dominance. Vasil, however, writes that the new 
arrangement under BN reduced the influence of the MCA and MIC,as now 
there were other non- Malay political parties with the Front to secure non- 
Malay votes.7 Through this manoeuvre, the only opposition left standing were 
the DAP, Social Justice Party and the Iban Sarawak National Party. Hence, 
the creation of an electoral one- party system.
According to Chin Huat and Othman this one party system was then 
maintained through certain strategies. First was through the control of 
enfranchisement. Upon Independence with Chinese and Indians gaining the 
citizenship, Malay percentage of the population fell to 56%. The Alliance, 
pressured by PAS to attract Malay votes, tightened citizenship procedures 
for non-Malays in 1960 and 1962. The second was through changes in 
international and interstate boundaries. The merger and separation with 
Singapore demonstrated the need to manipulate the percentages of the 
Chinese population in Malaysia and in 1969, when Selangor was returned 
with a hung assembly the Chinese majority Kuala Lumpur was carved out of 
Selangor in 1974 to keep it a Malay majority state. The third strategy was the 
delineation of constituencies.Since 1955, this was done to give advantage to 
Malay- dominated areas as well as to discriminate against Malay- based 
opposition. Finally, there was a tolerance of electoral irregularities with the 
existence of phantom voters, improperly registered names, contamination of 
electoral rolls and the failure to prevent multiple voting.8 These attempts plus 
the strict regulations and censorship of, press and media in Malaysia9
7 Ibid.
8 Wong Chin Huat & Norami Othman, "Malaysia at 50-An ' An electoral One party state'",18 -
27.
9 See Garry Rodan, Transparency and authoritarian rule in Southeast Asia: Singapore and Malaysia 
(London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
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presented very little opportunity for opposition to be able to present an 
alternative to the Barisan Nasional.
In the late 1990s a number of factors colluded to create the era of Reformasi 
(Reformation) in the Malaysian political arena. Weiss extrapolates key 
aspects of mobilisation and reform in an illiberal democracy 10 by observing 
events such as the financial crisis, the sensational fall of Anwar Ibrahim from 
power in UMNO, rising Islamisation as an anti -thesis to Western 
modernisation and effects of reforms in neighbouring countries like 
Indonesia. Weiss states that the Reformasi launched by Anwar in 1998 and 
continued after his arrest spawned a political space generated by new Civil 
Society Agents (CSA) such as NGOs, a new political party, Keadilan, and 
several coalitions such as the Barisan Alternatif (BA). The Reformasi 
movement was also unhampered by lax internet regulations to encourage 
the Malaysian Multi Media Super corridor. Immediately after Anwar’s arrest, 
some 50- odd websites emerged supporting the case of the sacked Deputy 
Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and calling for greater transparency in the 
governance of Malaysia. This led to the emergence of the famed Malaysian 
news website Malaysiakini and the proliferation of bloggers such as Jeff Ooi. 
It was indisputable that a space of communication and dialogue had opened 
up that had inadvertently led to an evolution of political processes in 
Malaysia. It has been a well- known fact that the local print media and 
television networks of Malaysia were state- owned and managed.Even 
though the Malaysian government was to later instigate suits and impose the 
Internal security threat against bloggers and websites that were considered 
dissident, the web had become a platform of discourse that was beyond 
state management. Organizations such as Bersih (clean) emerged to 
question the Malaysian electoral process and a rally culture became more 
common in the Malaysian context. This is not to say that there were no 
organizations before Reformasi that called for greater accountability of 
government practices. Apart from SUHAKAM, the Human Rights 
Commission of Malaysia which was established by Parliament under the
10 Meredith Weiss, Protest and possibilities: civil society and coalitions for political change in 
Malaysia, 23.
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Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999, Act 597, there was also 
the NGO , Suaram (Suara Rakyat Malaysia), (Malay for ‘Voice of the 
Malaysian People’) , a human rights organization in Malaysia which was 
created in 1987 after Operation Lalang, when 106 opposition, unions, activist 
leaders were detained without trial under the Internal Security Act. The 
Reformasi incited in the Malaysians a spirit of standing up and questioning 
an otherwise authoritarian regime. The Indian organisations that were to 
emerge during or after this era, such as Prim, GCC and even Hindraf, were 
informed by these political processes and modus operandi.
Indian parties and parliamentarians in the Malaysian opposition
In the early years after Independence, there were few opportunities for 
Indians to be represented in the political arena outside the sphere of the 
MIC. There were Indians in opposition parties and some scuttled attempts to 
form parties by break away factions from the MIC. But the Indians in these 
opposition parties did not necessarily lobby solely for Indian communal rights 
although they were in a better position on several occasions to highlight the 
plight of the Malaysian Indians.
The People’s Progressive Party (PPP), founded in 1953, cannot be termed 
an Indian party, although it has had Indian leaders and drawn support from 
initially the Chinese labouring class and later Indians. PPP’s founders were 
also founding members of the Perak Labour Party.11 Their initial objectives 
were confined to the state of Perak and to contest all elections at the state, 
municipal, town councils’ and town boards’ level. Although Dr S. Kanapathy 
-Pillai was the first president of the PPP, it was the Seenivasagam brothers, 
lawyers of Ceylonese descent, who enjoyed the limelight for the party. The 
key man behind the formation of the party was D.R Seenivasagam, the 
younger brother who had obtained his law degree from England. Before the 
formation of the PPP, he was the vice -  president of the Labour Party.
11 The Straits Times, 8th January 1953.
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The Seenivasagam brothers and the PPP received the mandate they were 
seeking in the polls as an opposition party. In March 1959, S.P 
Seenivasagam, the older brother, won the Ipoh Town Council by- election to 
give his party a clear majority over the Alliance in the Council.12 In May 
1959, although the Alliance swept into power in the State Legislative 
Assembly, PPP proved the strongest opponents against the Alliance. D.R 
Seenivasagam, secretary general of the PPP, was returned in the Pekan 
Bahru by a significant majority of 1756 votes.13 S.P Seenivasagam also won 
a seat in the same elections. In 1963, PPP won 18 seats as the strongest 
opposition against Alliance in the municipal and town councils elections14. In 
1969, Dato S.P Seenivasagam was returned to Menglembu parliamentary 
seat and Kuala Pari state seat.15
The PPP stood for the rights of the common man. In 1958 D. R 
Seenivasagam declared that if PPP ever got the opportunity to form the new 
state government, they would ensure that no person would live in the fear of 
being detained without trial, that citizens would not be arrested under the 
banishment laws, Chinese and Indians would get a fair chance of continuing 
their education in their own languages and that PPP would resist the Razak 
education policy whereby the Chinese in Chinese schools had to take their 
examinations in English.16 In 1959, D.R Seenivasagam represented the PPP 
when he fought for multilingualism in the Perak State Assembly. He felt that 
although Malay was the official national language, in the recent years the 
Indians and Chinese had asked for multilingualism and that necessary 
amendments would have to be made to the constitution to enforce this. 
However, the PPP bid for multilingualism was defeated by an overwhelming
12 The Sunday Times, 1st March 1959.
13 The Malay Mail, 28th May 1959.
14 The Straits Times, 24th June 1963.
15 The Straits Times, 12 May 1969.
16 The Straits Times, 31st March 1958.
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majority in the Perak Assembly.17 Considering some of the issues the PPP 
lobbied for, Ramasamy rightly classifies them as ‘not an ethnic but multi 
racial party’.18
PPP’s political fortunes began to slide after the premature death of D.R 
Seenivasagam. In March 1974, S.P Seenivasagam decided that PPP should 
merge with the Barisan Nasional. His explanation was that ‘I don’t think that 
anybody in his senses can hope to have a non- Malay government. The only 
alternative is to have a combined Malay and non- Malay government.’19 
Whether S.P Seenivasagam was reading the writing on the wall after the era 
of the New Economic Policy, ushering affirmative action for the Malays or he 
was trying to increase the clout of the restricted political base of the PPP, the 
decision to merge cost him heavily at the polls. It was reported that the 
people of Ipoh, opposition- oriented as they were, refused to accept PPP as 
part of the National Front and voted against him in the 1974 General 
Elections. S.P Seenivasagam lost his presidency of the Ipoh Municipality but 
was later made a Senator.20 However he, too, was to pass away shortly. The 
Seenivasagam brothers were considered a legend in some circles for their 
oratory and fiery speeches in parliament and they were considered the spine 
of the PPP. With their passing, the party had no effective leadership to rely 
on.
In 1994, a lawyer, M. Kayveas, primarily known for effective public relations, 
tried to revive the PPP. He changed the party’s name to PPP (Baru) or new, 
but the new title did not catch on with the public and press. He ordered a new 
party logo, wrote a new constitution, restructured the leadership and shifted 
the party’s headquarters from Ipoh to Kuala Lumpur. He also engaged full­
time party workers, organised events such dress parties and spent money to 
make PPP prominent. However, Kayveas’s PPP did not draw the grass root
17 The Straits Times, 6th October 1959.
18 P. Ramasamy, 'Politics of Indian representation in Malaysia', 367.
19 The Straits Times, 25th March 1974.
20 New Sunday Times, 30th July 1978.
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support he had expected.21 After enduring numerous court cases due to 
internal bickering, Kayveas frequently drew on the ethnic card to woo Indian 
supporters from the Gerakan and even the MIC. Today it has lost its multi 
racial standing and is considered predominantly an Indian party.22 PPP also 
no longer enjoys the political significance it enjoyed during the era of the 
Seenivasagam brothers.
In 1976, Badrul Zaman, president of the then newly formed Kongress Indian 
Muslim Malaysia (KIMMA), claimed that it was necessary for a political party 
to represent the claims of the Indian Muslims.23 It claimed to be pro -  
government but never succeeded in gaining entry to the Barisan Nasional 
coalition and was deemed an opposition party. It also met resistance from 
the Muslim league in Penang and Province Wellesley whose president, S.M 
Shaik Alauddin, objected on the grounds that the newly registered KIMMA 
would divide the unity and solidarity of the Indian Muslims in Malaysia.24 MIC 
came out strongly against KIMMA, falsifying KIMMA's claim that it 
represented 500,000 Malaysians of Indian Muslim origin. Samy Vellu, who 
was acting president of MIC in 1977, was keen to assert MIC’s dominance as 
the only recognised political party to represent Malaysian Indians.25 In its 
efforts to gain recognition in the political arena KIMMA also faced leadership 
problems caused by the sacking of seven of its national executive committee 
due to internal politicking.26 The party faced a split in factions in 1980 over 
the decision to keep lobbying for acceptance into the Barisan Nasional 
coalition and was relegated into political oblivion within a short span of time. 
As an editorial in the Straits Echo pointed out, ‘At best, KIMMA is seen to be 
a superfluous entity on the local scene, but in its bid to attract to its fold
21 P. Ramasamy, 'Politics of Indian representation in Malaysia', 367.
22 Ibid.
23 The Star, 14th October 1977.
24 Straits Echo, 30th July 1979.
25 The Malay Mail, 15th October 1977.
26 The Star, 10th May 1980.
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Indian Muslim members of the MIC, KIMMA is also seen to be potentially 
disruptive of the unity of an important segment of the body politic.’27
Other failed endeavours in creating Indian political parties were the 
Democratic Malaysian Indian Party (DMIP) by former MIC leader and party 
crony of Samy Vellu, V. Govindaraj, and the All Malaysian Indian progressive 
Front (IPF), formed by M.G Pandithan, a former MIC party leader sacked by 
Samy Vellu in 1988. Of the two, IPF, formed in 1990, was a more significant 
political organisation as it reflected factionalism in Indian politics according to 
caste and class lines. Pandithan, originally from a modest class and caste 
background, drew grass root support from mainly Tamils of the same class 
affiliation as himself. But again IPF did not have the funds, resources and the 
support from the Barisan Nasional Coalition it had hoped for, and even 
though it sought alliances from the PPP and KIMMA to shore up its power 
base, IPF existed largely on the periphery of Malaysian Indian politics.
Apart from the Seenivasagam brothers, there were other individuals who 
played a part on the side of the Malaysian opposition. V. David was one such 
example. V. David was born in financially modest circumstances. His father 
had a small farm and a herd of cattle. David’s major contributions and 
popularity emerged through his efforts in trade unionism. In 1953, he formed 
the Selangor Mills Workers Union (SMWU). In 1955, the union’s name was 
changed to National Union of Factory and general Workers (NUFGW).ln the 
1959 General Elections, David became the youngest member of parliament 
under the Labour Party ticket. The Labour Party was unfortunately 
deregistered in 1960 and David went on to join the Democratic Action Party 
(DAP). In 1978 David was elected to parliament for the Damansara 
Constituency and later returned in 1986 and again in 1990 for Puchong.
David was also very active in the Malayan Trade Union Congress (MTUC).28 
Judging from David’s profile, he was a primarily a labour activist and not just 
a representative of Indians in parliament. Although on several occasions he
27 Straits Echo, 17th August 1979.
28 K George , Aliran Monthly Vol. 25.
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was known to highlight the plight of the Indian plantation worker in parliament 
by focusing on issues of the South Indian Labour Fund, state of estate 
hospitals, low cost housing and other welfare related concerns.29
Two other prominent Indian opposition members of parliament were Karpal 
Singh and M. Kulasegaran. Singh was a lawyer by training who became a 
parliamentarian on the DAP ticket in 1974. Singh was esteemed for his 
contributions particularly in the Jelutong Constituency. Karpal Singh was 
known for being outspoken in parliament and exposing corrupt practices 
within the BN such as the North -South highway scandal and the Vijendran 
pornographic videotape scandal. He has faced several suspensions from 
parliament and was detained under the Internal Security Act in 1987. M. 
Kulasegaran, elected in 2004 as a DAP parliamentarian for Ipoh Barat,
Perak, has been more explicit in taking up the issue of the marginalisation of 
Indians in Malaysia. He openly objected to the demolition of Hindu temples , 
he was present on site to negotiate terms in the Moorthy case (to be 
explained later) and spoke up when the 9th Malaysia Plan was announced, 
expressing relief that Indians had not been ignored in the economic plan .
But Indians in the opposition could take up the marginalisation of Indians 
only as a side issue. From the Seenivasagam brothers to M.Kulasegaran, 
they each had obligations to their parties’ political mandates that did not 
focus on one particular ethnicity and MIC retained the monopoly of 
representing the Indians in an ethnicised Malaysian political milieu.
Malaysian Indian NGOs and organisations.
The Malaysian Indian community developed and established its own 
organisations to deal with its cultural, social, economic and political issues. 
While there are organisations such as The Temple of Fine Arts located in 
Jalan Berhala in Brickfields, Kuala Lumpur and the Temple of Fine Arts 
Penang, which concentrate on the Indian cultural and aesthetical 
developments of the Indian youth and community of Malaysia, and 
organisations that were set up to promote a section of Malaysian Indian
29 Dr V. David, Era of trail, (Peninsular Malaysia: Transport Workers Union, 1984).
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identity like the Malaysian Dravida Association and Persatuan Telegu 
Malaysia, this chapter will concentrate on the organisations that lobbied for 
Indian communal rights in Malaysia. There are two categories to focus upon, 
the religious and non-religious organisations in Malaysia. Since the recent 
hiatus of 2006 in the active lobbying for Indian and particularly Hindu rights, 
the mandates and activities of many Indian organisations have become 
enmeshed. This has also encouraged close cooperation amongst the 
organisations to lobby in a united fashion.
There are several Hindu organisations in Malaysia that reflect the diversity in 
Hindu practices amongst the Indians such as the Malaysia Hindu Dharma 
Mamandram , Hindu Youth Organisation and Saiva Siddhanta Mandram but 
the Hindu Sangam and the Hindu Sevai Sangam have played a major role in 
Malaysian Hindu Affairs . The person who initiated the founding of the Hindu 
Sangam was K. Paramalingam KMN. He was a barrister- at- law and was 
then the Director General of the Public Trustee Department. He was assisted 
by K. Ramanathan B. A BL., a lawyer by profession and an ardent Hindu. K. 
Ramanathan was the president of Malaysian Indian Congress from 1950- 
1951. K. Paramalingam held a meeting on 15th April 1963 and formed an Ad- 
Hock Committee that met six times and prepared the ground work to form an 
organisation for Hindus in Malaysia. In January 1965 the ad-hock committee 
organised a seminar for all Hindu organisations at the famous Maha 
Mariamman temple, High Street, Kuala Lumpur. At this seminar the 
Malaysian Hindu Sangam (MHS) was established. The MHS’s core mandate 
was to co-ordinate Hindu religious activities, undertake religious education 
and to represent the Hindu community at the national and international level. 
MHS also extended into state and district councils to promote these 
objectives.30 Hindu Sangam became the spokesman and representative 
body for the Hindus in the country over several issues such as helping to 
coordinate the Gujarat earthquake relief in 2001, taking a stand in the ration 
of coconuts and the paying of a fee during the annual mega event for Tamil
30 http://www.hindusangam.org.mv/about-us/mhs-history accessed February 2011.
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Hindus in Malaysia, Thaipusam.31 With increasing Islamisation in the country, 
MHS also started voicing the Malaysian Hindu populations’ stand on several 
issues. In 2001, the president of Hindu Sangam, Vaithiligiam, expressed 
concern over the increased propagation of hudud law amongst Malaysian 
political parties.32 MHS raised opposition over the demolition of Hindu 
temples in Malaysia and proposed that MHS be consulted before Hindu 
temples are relocated or demolished.33 MHS also spoke up when the status 
of Muslim conversion cases was unclear and Hindus were made to forcibly 
abide by Islamic practices (more to be explained later).
The Hindu Sevai Sangam (HSS) was started in 1983 by Ramaji.34 The initial 
mandate of the HSS was to impart Hindu philosophy, ‘Shakta’, in Malaysia, 
especially amongst the youth and children. There was and still is an 
emphasis on religious classes for youth, training camps, seminars and 
prayer meetings at temples and houses. In the published profile of the HSS, 
it is declared that HSS’s formation was also inspired in uplifting Malaysian 
Indians who were particularly affected socially, culturally and economically by 
the fragmentation of estates (more on this later). As a result HSS started the 
SEWA project which provided free tuition classes, blood donation drive 
camps, free medical check-ups, visits to hospitals, orphanages and juvenile 
homes, adoption of children from single parents or broken homes and the 
running of foster homes. The HSS, as it will be explained later, played a 
significant role in the Hindraf cause.
Non- religious Indian NGOs focused primarily on the social issues of the 
Indian community. One such area of concern was education. The elite of the 
Indian community had long felt that education was the key to self­
31Malaysiakini, 12th April 2001, 'Coconut debate intensifies as Thaipusam approaches', 
Malaysiakini, 22nd Jan 2005, 'Thaipusam fee irks temple devotees.'
32 Malaysiakini, 3rd April 2001, 'Religious council members deny BN pledge.'
33 Malaysiakini, 17th July 2003, 'Committee to protect Hindu temples formed.'
34 An interview with a senior staff of the HSS in 2009 revealed informally that HSS was inspired by 
the ideals of the Hindu RSS in India.
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improvement. The Education Welfare and Research Foundation Malaysia 
(EWRF) and the Sri Murugan Center (SMC) have been notable in promoting 
the educational welfare of the Malaysian Indian Community. EWRF was 
founded in 1978 by activists who felt the deteriorating socio-economic 
position of the Indians had to be addressed through promoting educational 
support and facilities.35 In 1978, it launched Higher School Certificate 
Classes (HSC Classes) and Kindergarten classes. Soon it began to develop 
branches and centres around the country. Recently, it has diversified in its 
range of activities including organising camps, having Centres for Career 
Counselling and Guidance, a Junior Club, organising English language 
classes for juniors. The Sri Murugan Centre established in 1982 by Dato Dr 
M. Thambirajah had a simpler objective.36 Its main concern was to prepare 
students for the STPM (Form Six) examinations. These are the qualifying 
examinations for entry into the local universities. However, 30 years after 
these organisations had been established, the professionals running these 
organisations expressed a sense of disenchantment and dismay. This was 
because even though Indian students had done well in important 
examinations, the ethnic quota system had kept them out of prestigious 
faculties at the universities such as medicine and engineering. Another 
reason for disenchantment was that Indian graduates who had attained the 
relevant qualifications were still not able to get jobs in the government and 
even local firms in the private sector.37
S.Nagarajan writes about the issue of estate fragmentation due to 
developments in the state economy moving away from rubber production 
and venturing into Oil Palm Cultivation38. Estate fragmentation led to the
35 EWRF, Annual report 2008/2009.
36 http://www.smc.com.my/AboutUs.jsp accessed Feb 2011.
37 Interview with Mr S. Pasupathi, President EWRF Central Committee 2008/2010.
38 S.Nagarajan, 'Marginalization and Ethnic relations : the Indian Malaysian experience' in 
Multiethnic Malaysia : past, present and future, ed. Lim Teck Ghee et al. (Petaling Jaya, Malaysia : 
Strategic Information and Research Development Centre ; Kuala Lumpur: MIDAS, UCSI University, 
2009).
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displacement of Indian plantation communities who then moved into squatter 
settlements in urban areas. This had negative economic as well as social 
impact on the newly displaced Indians. Initial problems were associated with 
the living conditions and welfare of those still residing on estates, the forced 
evictions from estates and the lack of adequate compensation to estate 
workers upon eviction for the generations of hard labour exacted on these 
plantations. An organisation called the Alaigal39 was established by several 
social activists to help estate children with tuition classes. Over time, as 
Indian communities in Klebang Estate, Kampung Chekkadi and other such 
estates began to face forcible evictions without compensation, Alaigal was 
called upon to lobby on their behalf by writing petitions and even picketing. 
On several occasions Alaigal activists faced arrest for their activities. Later 
the Parti Socialis Malaysia (PSM), with a strong Indian membership and 
leadership, was formed to champion the same issues. The activities of 
Alaigal and later PSM were effective not only in drawing attention to the 
under privileged Indian estate workers’ plight but also taught the Indian 
community skills on how to picket and conduct demonstrations. This 
enhanced the civic consciousness amongst Indians as deserving citizens 
and could possibly explain the readiness to congregate in the unexpectedly 
large numbers that they did on November 25th 2007 in Kuala Lumpur for the 
Hindraf Rally. Also, as explained earlier, the Reformasi in the late 1990s had 
transformed the political milieu in Malaysia and Malaysians in general had 
lost the fear of questioning an otherwise authoritarian regime. Marginalisation 
of the Indian minority had also escalated as Indians began to coexist in 
urban areas with the Malays, which led to ethnic clashes such as the 
Kampung Medan incident of 2001 and the atmosphere of rising Islamisation 
in Malaysia.
39 Jayakumar Devaraj, Speaking Truth to power; A socialist critique of development in Malaysia, 
(Malaysia, Richardson printmart, 2002).
The Kampung Medan incident as described by Nagarajan40 and Wilford41 
was sparked by neighbourhood incidents such as one involving an Indian 
motorcyclist kicking the chairs and tables arranged for a Malay wedding that 
were blocking his way, and another of mistaken identity with Malays 
attacking Indians gathered at a funeral, and Indian neighbours quarrelling for 
compensation over a cracked windscreen of a van. Violence flared on the 
evening of March 8th 2001 when armed Malays were seen attacking Indians 
along southern Petaling Jaya, in the Taman Desaria , Taman Medan ,
Taman Dato Harun and Taman Lindungan Jaya.42 The violence continued 
for a week with 6 fatalities and 50 injured 43 The portrayal of the clashes in 
the media angered Indians as they were portrayed as the aggressors and the 
Malays as the victims, when police statistics had revealed that most of the 
victims were Indians. Nagarajan claims that there was also resentment 
amongst the Indians by the stereotype perpetuated by some politicians and 
government leaders that Indian gang culture flourished in such settlements 
and that this had incited Malay settlers to react with anger and mistrust. In 
the aftermath, Indian organisations emerged to offer help and seek redress 
for the sufferings of the victims.
One such group was the Group of Concerned Citizens (GCC). In March 
2001, GCC presented a memorandum to the government to confront the 
problem of racism which it claimed had resulted in the recent clashes.44 In 
July 2001, Charles Santiago, a spokes person for the GCC, urged the 
government to not abandon the Kampung Medan clash victims and to keep
40 S.Nagarajan, 'Marginalization and Ethnic relations: the Indian Malaysian experience', 369.
41 Andrew, Willford, 'Ethnic clashes, squatters and Historicity in Malaysia' in Rising India and Indian 
Communities in East Asia, ed. Kesavapany et al. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008) 436.
42 S.Nagarajan, 'Marginalization and Ethnic relations: the Indian Malaysian experience', 379.
43 Ibid.
44 Malaysiakini, 20th March 2001. 'A group of NGOs took the government to task for failing to 
confront racism'.
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their promises of providing adequate housing and compensation.45 The GCC 
handed RM 500 each to 20 victims of the clash as temporary relief and 
requested the Welfare department to provide special training for the victims 
who had lost their limbs in order for them to find alternative employment. The 
department was also requested to pay a fixed monthly sum of RM 1500 to 
the victims as all the affected families had lost male breadwinners.GCC 
organised a press conference whereby victims of the clash chastised MIC for 
not fulfilling their promises to assist them in the aftermath of the tragedy.46 
GCC was henceforth highlighted for its continued struggle for minority rights 
when in March 2002 it demanded adequate protection for minorities 
especially through legislation to protect culture and education as well as act 
against discrimination.47
Another organisation that voiced its concern over the Kampung Medan 
Clashes was Parti Reform Insan Malaysia (Prim). Prim was not a definitive 
political party, despite its attempts to be part of the Opposition Coalition- 
Barisan Alternatif, as much as it was a human rights, welfare- oriented 
organisation .Its main actor, P.Uthayakumar, was later to become a key 
protagonist in the Hindraf movement along with his brother. Prim started off 
working with other related NGOs questioning deaths in police custody and 
other such human rights violations. However, with regards to the Kampung 
Medan clashes, it maintained a tougher position, demanding that the 
Malaysian Human Rights Commission (Suhakam) conduct an inquiry.48 
When that was not forthcoming, Prim took out a lawsuit against Suhakam 
over its failure to investigate the Kampung Medan clashes.49 Prim also 
sought international attention for the Kampung Medan incident by
45 Malaysiakini, 16th June 2001. 'Don't abandon racial clash victims, gov't told'.
46 Ibid.
47 Malaysiakini, 9th March 2002. 'Govt urged to formulate laws to protect minorities'.
48 Malaysiakini, 23rd April 2001. 'Racial clashes inquiry: Suhakam may hold one, claim 'Prim".
49 Malaysiakini, 25th May 2002. 'Kg Medan: put it in writing and lawsuit will be dropped, Suhakam 
told'.
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approaching President George Bush, highlighting the silence of the 
Malaysian authorities to deal with the issue.50 Effectively it can be observed 
that the Malaysian Indian community had gradually been building up its 
tenacity to resist a restrictive civil space that was further hastened by the 
heightening of Islamic practices in Malaysia.
Islam in Malaysia and the reaction of the non-Muslim minorities
In October 2001, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, then Prime Minister of Malaysia, 
declared that Malaysia was already an Islamic State.51 In July 2007, the 
Deputy Premier, Datuk Seri Najib Razak , affirmed this when he announced 
at the opening of the ‘International Conference on the role of Islamic States 
in a Globalised World ‘ that we have never, never been secular....we are an 
Islamic state’. 52 The reaction to these announcements was resistance by 
obviously non-Muslims but some Muslims as well. It was clear to the political 
spectators in Malaysia that these announcements were another manoeuvre 
by the UMNO party to beat the opposition PAS party in the Islamisation race 
and secure the support of the majority votes of the Malay electorate in 
Malaysia. Another dimension to this strategy is linked to the fact that Islam 
forms an integral aspect of Malay identity as defined in the Constitution. 
Since UMNO has always been known as the champion of Malay rights and 
identity, declaring Malaysia an Islamic state would portray UMNO as having 
remained steadfast in its original commitment to being the most effective 
protector of Malay dominance and rights (ketuanan Melayu).
Non-Muslim advocates argue against the Islamic discourse by frequently 
quoting the intentions of the departing British government at Independence 
(the creed of the Reid Commission), the attitudes of the founding fathers
50 Malaysiakini, 10th May 2002.' Prim urges Bush to raise racial clashes Mahathir'.
51 Peter G. Ridell, 'Islamisation, Civil Society and religious minorities in Malaysia in Islam' in 
Southeast; Political Challenges for the 21st century, ed. K.S Nathan et al.(Singapore, Institute of 
South East Asian Studies, 2005) 164.
52Dzulkifli Ahmad, 'The great Malaysian paradox" in Religion under siege, ed, Nathaniel Tan, et al 
(Malaysia, kinibooks, 2008.) 127.
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such as Tunku Abdul Rahman and the ‘social contract’ that bound the 
Malays with the non- Malay communities. Lim Kit Siang , Opposition Party 
Leader, DAP, retaliated in 2007 to Datuk Najib’s comments, citing the first 
three Prime Ministers and their commitment to keeping Malaysia a secular 
state as agreed in the ‘Merdeka social contract’. 53Lim Kit Siang quotes the 
first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, on his 80th birthday celebrations 
in 1983 stating that Malaysia was set up as a secular state with Islam as the 
official religion and ‘ The constitution must be respected and adhered to . 
There have been attempts by some people who tried to introduce religious 
laws and morality laws. This cannot be allowed. The country has a multi 
cultural population with various beliefs’.54 This is reiterated in K.J Ratnam’s 
work, which quotes the Tunku as having said,’ Our country has many races 
and unless we are prepared to drown every non-Malay, we can never think 
of an Islamic administration.’55 Basing his findings and arguments through 
examination of the report of the Reid Constitutional Commission , the White 
Paper on the Constitutional bill, Parliamentary proceedings and newspaper 
reports and judgements handed down by the courts in the immediate post 
independence period , Fernando56 takes a historical approach when 
stipulating that Islam as a religion of the Malay federation was very 
reluctantly added to the Malayan Constitution taking into account the 
concerns of non-Muslims and the Sultans, who feared that their own power 
as asserted through overseeing the practice of Islam would be usurped by 
the Federal government. Instead Fernando quotes two former Chief 
Justices, Lord President Tun Mohamed Suffian Hashim and Tan Sri 
Mohamed Salleh Abbas, as having declared that ‘Islam was made the official 
religion primarily for ceremonial purposes, to enable prayers to be offered in
33 Lim Kit Siang, 'Lina Joy case biggest P.R. disaster for Malaysia' in Religion under siege ed,
Nathaniel Tan, et al (Malaysia, Kinibooks, 2008.) 9.
54 Ibid.
55 K.J Ratnam, Communolism and the Political process in Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: University of 
Malaya press, 1965.)
36 Fernando, Joseph M. 'The position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia' in Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 37 (2 June 2006) 249-266.
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the Islamic way on official public occasions, such as the installation or 
birthday of the Yang Pertuan Agong, Independence Day and similar 
occasions’. Opponents of the UMNO position that Malaysia is an Islamic 
State are presupposing their arguments on Malaysia still being a secular, 
democratic state whereby there is space for political lobby and equal rights 
for non-Muslims. But observers of Malaysian politics have noticed that, 
especially since the era of Islamic resurgence in Malaysia, noticeably from 
the 1970s onwards, the Dakwah movement, coupled with state policies since 
the era of Dr. Mahathir as Prime Minister, the boundaries between Malaysia 
being a secular state or theocracy have become somewhat blurred. Critics of 
the UMNO government argue that the UMNO- BN regime welcomes this 
secular -religious ambivalence in Malaysia as a strategy ‘to keep the nation 
divided and subdued’.57
Although there have been advocates for an Islamic state since the nationalist 
struggle for independence in the form of PAS and its predecessors , most 
scholars on the dakwah movement point to the emergence and success of 
Islamist organisations such as the Tabligh groups , Darul Arqam and 
especially the ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia) organisation as being 
responsible for the trend of Islamic resurgence amongst particularly the 
newly emergent, fast urbanizing Malay middle class since the enforcement 
of the NEP (New Economic Policy), post- 1969. But this is not to dismiss that 
the local kampong (village) religious leaders and teachers also played a 
crucial role in propagating Islam to the rural, Malay underclass. The impact of 
the dakwah movement was visible in the increased popularity of Islamic 
attire, decline in social communication between the sexes, greater display of 
piety among Malaysian Muslims through the practice of haj (pilgrimage), 
zakat (donation) and prayers. However, the quest for greater piety was most 
visible in the heightened insistence on Halal foods and products.
57 Dzulkifli Ahmad, 'The great Malaysian paradox', 127.
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Muzzafar58 observed that the dakwah movement was to inevitably lead to the 
Malay Muslims asserting a more ‘separate and distinct identity’ to the point of 
exclusivity. This was further heightened when the Islamic resurgence 
received state patronage particularly under Mahathir as Prime Minister. 
Mauzy and Milner59, write in the 1980s that, ‘ten years ago Islam was just 
one of the emotional issues used by PAS, the major Malay opposition party, 
to win the political allegiance of the rural Malays away from the dominant 
government party, UMNO. Now Islamist politics is centre stage. Since the 
mid -1970s the country has experienced progressive Islamisation, a process 
which has picked up momentum under the Mahathir administration’. 
Previously, under the first three Prime Ministers, the Malaysian government 
tried to keep Islam out of mainstream politics; at best certain concessions 
were made such as the establishment of PERKIM (Pertubuhan Kebajikan 
Islam se Malaysia) by Tunku Abdul Rahman in 1960. However, Mahathir 
attempted to co- opt the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia as a state- led trend, 
especially, after Anwar Ibrahim, leader of ABIM, joined UMNO. It has been 
explained already how Mahathir launched government projects that marked 
the UMNO patronage of Islamisation in Malaysia.
Non-Muslim minorities in Malaysia were caught in a dilemma when reacting 
to the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia. Post -1969, they were caught by the 
constitutional amendments that forbid the discussion of Malay rights and 
identity in Malaysia, which would include Islam. Zainah Anwar reveals that 
the initial ‘shroud of silence’ from non-Muslim quarters was due to the fact 
that non-Muslim opposition party leaders , especially from the Democratic 
Action party (DAP), were silenced whenever they tried to raise objections or 
questions about Islamic practices. She writes that, They were usually 
drowned by the jeering and thumping by the UMNO Muslim backbenchers 
who claim that Chinese MPs as non-Muslims do not have a right to talk
58 Chandra Muzaffar, Islamic resurgence in Malaysia, (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti Sdn. Bhd., 1987), 
Preface.
59Diane K Mauzy and R.S Milne. 'The Mahathir administration in Malaysia : Discipline through 
Islam' in Pacific Affairs, Vol 56 , No 4 , winter 1983-1984, 617-648.
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about Islam. Thus they are prevented from playing their law making role 
when it comes to Islamic matters.’60 Mauzy and Milner posit the suggestion 
that the portrayed apathy and even acceptance of non-Muslim communities 
to the initial processes of Dakwah was actually a reaction in fear of speaking 
up. They write that Chinese political leaders ‘fear a Malay backlash if they 
publicly express their concern’61 and that it was better to support the UMNO 
moderates versus the PAS fundamentalists. However over time even this 
non-Muslim strategy was to give way as it became obvious to them that in 
reacting to the fundamentalists, UMNO might be conceding too much in the 
name of Islam and ‘ the onslaught is to become greater and most 
oppressive’.
Non-Muslims have felt the pressures of rising Islamisation primarily through 
the ambivalence and lack of clearly defined boundaries between the 
jurisdiction of Islamic laws (syariah) and civil law. This takes us back to the 
argument if Malaysia has now moved towards being a theocracy, or at least 
behaving like one, foregrounding Islamic law. This dilemma about jurisdiction 
of the law was most obviously felt by non-Muslims in issues of conversion 
and apostasy. It was contemplated in the late 1970s to extend Muslim law 
over all Malaysians regardless of religion especially in the matter of sexual 
offenses, such as Khalwat (compromising proximity) and zinah( adultery). 
Barraclough62 writes that the government was pressured to establish a 
committee to investigate the possibility of punishing non-Muslims involved 
with Muslims who transgress Islamic law on matters of sexual morality. The 
Straits Times on July 27 1979 registered a protest by Lim Kit Siang who 
stated, ‘that the committee ... infringes a fundamental constitutional provision 
that non-Muslims would not be brought under the purview of Muslim laws
60 Zainah Anwar, 'Law making-in the name of Islam: Implications for democratic Governance' in
Southeast; Political Challenges for the 21st century, ed. K.S Nathan et al.(Singapore, Institute of
South East Asian Studies, 2005) 125 .
61 Diane K Mauzy and R.S Milne. 'The Mahathir administration in Malaysia: Discipline through
Islam', 638.
62 Simon Barraclough, 'Managing the challenges of Islamic revival in Malaysia: A regime
Perspective' in Asian Survey, Vol 23 , No 8 , August 1983 , 958 -975.
196
and customs...’63 The Constitutional provision being referred to is Article 11 
that states, ‘Every person has the right to profess and practise his religion.’ 
This is further supported by Article 8 of the Constitution that proclaims all 
persons to be equal before the law and prohibits discrimination on the 
grounds of religion, race, and descent.
However, there have been numerous cases to show that the 
abovementioned constitutional provisions have often been transgressed. The 
most controversial and publicised of these cases have been the Lina Joy 
case in 2007, Maniam Moorthy’s case in 2006 and Subashini’s case in 2006. 
Lina Joy alias Azlina Jailani, born a Muslim but a convert to Christianity, 
attempted to get the classification of Islam removed from her National 
Registration Identity Card (NRIC). When the National Registration 
Department (NRD) instructed her to obtain the relevant papers (a certificate 
of apostasy) from the Syariah Court, she by- passed the procedure by filing a 
suit in the High Court. On 30th May 2007, the Federal Court issued a 2-1 
judgement holding that Joy was not entitled to an NRIC without the word 
Islam. This episode drew international attention, with the press decrying its 
claim to a multi- religious and multi- cultural society when freedom of religion 
was not allowed. The Lina Joy case also became a focal point for tensions 
between Muslims and religious minorities. Some Muslim organisations such 
as the PEMBELA (Organisations to the defence of Islam) and ABIM 
expressed relief with the judgement that justice had been served but the 
response from the Muslims was not homogeneous. The World Muslim 
Congress declared that it was unlslamic to keep someone a Muslim against 
their wishes. Most non-Muslim organisations such as the Hindu Sangam 
and the Council of Churches criticised the judgement, citing the violation of 
Article 11 of the Constitution. The point of contention was the process 
through which Lina Joy would have had to undergo if she was to apply for 
certificate of Apostasy from the Syariah Court, which entailed detention at a 
Rehabilitation Centre for at least a year whereby she would be indoctrinated 
against leaving the Islamic faith. This would have caused her separation from
63 Quoted in Simon Barraclough, 'Managing the challenges of Islamic revival in Malaysia: A regime 
Perspective'.
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loved ones, leave from job and career obligations and inevitably would have 
incurred psychological trauma.
Some have argued that the Lina Joy case was an internal matter amongst 
Muslims and keeping their believers within the fold. This cannot be claimed 
in the cases of Maniam Moorthy alias Mohammad Abdullah, a former soldier 
and member of the Malaysian team which scaled Mount Everest in 1997. 
Described by his wife as a Hindu at the time of his death in 2005, she was 
prevented from burying him as one after Syariah courts ruled that he had 
converted to Islam in 2004, even though there was no documentary evidence 
of this conversion in his military identity card. When Moorthy’s wife filed an 
application with the Civil courts to allow her to claim Moorthy’s body , the 
High Court rejected her application , claiming it had no jurisdiction over the 
matter and that she ( as a non-Muslim) should revert to the Syariah Court. 
This same confusion over the role and jurisdiction of Syariah and civil courts 
was displayed in T.Saravanan and Subashini’s case. In 2006, T.Saravanan, 
a Hindu, converted to Islam after which he proceeded to file for divorce in the 
Syariah courts and claimed custody over his two children with R. Subashini. 
Subashini being a non-Muslim applied for an injunction from the High Court 
to prevent Saravanan from dissolving their civil marriage in the Syariah 
Court. Once again the legal system conceded in the direction of Muslim 
rights with the Court of Appeal rejecting her appeal.64 A more severe case in 
reflecting the curbed constitutional rights is Revathi Mossosai’s case. A 
practising Hindu but born to Muslim parents and registered as a Muslim with 
a Muslim name, she is married to a Hindu husband and was raised by a 
Hindu grandmother, and later gave birth to a daughter who is also Hindu. In 
January 2007 when she applied to be officially recognised as a Hindu she 
was sent to a Muslim rehabilitation centre where she was forced to wear a 
Muslim headscarf, recite Muslim prayers and eat beef, which is anathema to 
Hindus.
£4 Nathaniel Tan & John Lee, Religion under siege; Lina Joy, the Islamic State and Freedom of 
Faith (Kuala Lumpur: Kinibooks, 2008), 137.
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Critics observe that these measures in dealing with issues of conversion are 
more a concern for Malay identity than Islamic orthodoxy in Malaysia. Many 
non-Malays regard the Islamic resurgence as an expression of Malay 
insecurities rather than an indication of greater religious piety65, while critics 
of the government claim that it is more about politics and the politicisation of 
religion. It is about maintaining Malay-Muslim hegemony and the power of 
the ruling coalition party. It is about preserving the special privileges 
accorded to Malays in the name of national unity and ethnic ‘tolerance’. More 
importantly it is about having the Malay majority rule the country without 
contest, ever. Therefore since Islam is inextricably linked with Malay 
ethnicity, maintaining Muslim rights in Malaysia is more of a matter of 
policing ethnic boundaries.
Besides curbing individual constitutional rights, certain policies and 
legislation have also had a negative impact on non-Muslims such as policies 
that include different allocation ratios for mosques and non-Muslim places of 
worship, with preference given to the building of mosques. Federal legislation 
passed in 1989 forbade the use by non-Muslims of forty-two Islamic terms.
In 1991 this list was reduced to four terms including Allah, Kaabah, Baitullah 
and So/af.66 On 2nd November 2001, the issue was raised in Parliament over 
the shortage of burial ground for non- Muslims. Another piece of legislation 
forbids Muslims to possess a copy of the Bible, while non-Muslims are not 
allowed to possess a Quran. Restrictions have been placed on non-lslamic 
religious literature and or media, while public television and radio airtime has 
increasingly given coverage to Islamic symbols, prayers and programs. The 
latest endeavour in this direction has been to censure the practise of Yoga 
amongst Muslims as the yoga postures are practised together with specific 
Hindu mantras and are meant to induce a meditative state (which is 
considered unlslamic). Islamic practices and symbols are also pervasive in 
the public sphere with the broadcasting of the call to prayer (azan) from
65 Simon Barraclough , 'Managing the challenges of Islamic revival in Malaysia : A regime 
Perspective', 966.
66 Peter G. Ridell, 'Islamisation, Civil Society and religious minorities in Malaysia in Islam', 167.
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mosques which have been known to extend to lengthy recitations of the 
Quran and sermon over the loudspeakers.
Farish Noor67 describes the situation of non-Muslims in Malaysia along the 
Muslim -Kafir (Unbeliever) divide. He employs concepts which are familiar to 
those who engage in post -colonial thought, such as ‘the Other’, 
differentiation and alterity. Borrowing from Spivak and Said, Noor employs 
the term ‘Other’, usually used in context to describe how colonialist scholars 
/Orientalists viewed the colonised so as to naturalise differences and justify 
colonial rule, to the Malay -Muslim hegemony in Malaysia. He points out that 
the Malaysian propensity to think in terms of binaries such as Non- Malay 
/Bumiputera with the Islamic resurgence has only hardened into Muslim -  
Kafir or Muslim -Other. Although he problematizes this binary, stating that 
ethnic categories are never simple homogeneous entities to be reduced to 
such binaries, nonetheless he reflects the realities of majoritarian Malay 
communal impulses to view the ‘towkay Cina’ as the’evil kafir’.
Non -  Muslims in Malaysia have been under no illusions about their position 
vis a vis the Muslims in Malaysia. Abu Bakar notes that initial non -Muslim 
silence in response to dakwah gave way to the formation and resurrection of 
numerous non -Muslim organizations.,of which the most consolidated non -  
Muslim response was the formation of the Malaysian Consultative Council of 
Buddhism, Christianity, Hindus and Sikhism in 1984. For the Hindus, the 
most recent incarnation of resistance against Malay -Muslim hegemony has 
been the formation of the Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf). Hindraf, which 
includes the Hindu Sevai Sangam, Vivekananda Youth Movement, Tamil 
Foundation, Malaysian Indian Youth Council and others, was formed in 
response to the December 28 2006.High Court decision on Moorthy’s 
conversion case.68 Moorthy, who had become paralysed from the neck down 
after an accident seven years ago, had died on December 20th from injuries
67 Farish A. Noor, From Majapahit to Putrajaya: searching for another Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: 
Silverfish Books, 2005).
68 Malaysiakini, 13th January 2006. 'Hindu groups flay PM over 'eye wash'.
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sustained after falling from his wheelchair. A tussle ensued between the 36- 
year-old former army commando’s widow, S Kaliammal, and Islamic religious 
authorities, who claimed that the Moorthy had converted and should be 
buried according to Islamic rites. Kaliammal claimed that her husband was a 
practicing Hindu but the Syariah Court ruled that he was a Muslim while the 
High Court said it had no jurisdiction over the matter. Subsequently Hindraf 
lawyers appealed to reinstate non-Muslim minority rights that had been 
affected by such ambivalent cases with regards to conversion. The Hindu 
Rights Action Force (Hindraf) vowed to bring the issue to the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) and secured appointments and meetings with foreign 
officials, statesmen and international bodies in Washington, New York and 
London.69
Another cause that had been taken up by the Hindraf was the demolition of 
Hindu temples. According to Nagarajan, Hindu temples which had been part 
of the Malaysian landscape for more than 150 years faced demolition as new 
townships emerged on plantations. These temples that were being built long 
before the post- Independence state and property legalities came into 
enforcement were in many instances forcibly demolished or bulldozed with 
statues of the Hindu deities being smashed and without proper ceremonial 
closure for the Hindu communities concerned. Nagarajan cites the first major 
dispute in Perak in the early 1990s when 70 temples were demolished on a 
week’s notice to make way for road projects.70 Between February and June 
2006, the local authorities demolished 15 Hindu temples in Kuala Lumpur, 
Selangor and Negri Sembilan. Emotions began to run high amongst the 
Hindus when a 107 year- old Hindu temple was demolished in Kuala Lumpur 
in May 2006 by city hall workers protected by police in riot gear.71 Hindraf 
argued that every new development should allocate land for places of 
worship for the various faiths in the country and that in Malaysia there was
69 Malaysiakini, 21st February 2006.' Conversion row: Hindu group goes international'.
70 S.Nagarajan, 'Marginalization and Ethnic relations: the Indian Malaysian experience', 378.
71 Ibid.
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no legal provisions for this to be done in new townships and increased 
urbanisation is whereby more Malaysian Hindus are slowly moving or being 
relocated. The Hindraf also urged the government to legislate laws to 
recognize and protect Hindu temples in the country.72 The Hindraf submitted 
an appeal meant for UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to immediately ask 
the Malaysian government to stop demolishing Hindu temples and recognize 
them as legitimate places of worship.73 Hindraf filed lawsuits against the 
government and conducted protests to stop the demolition of Hindu temples. 
In the next chapter we shall see when these acts of resistance were 
unheeded by the Malaysian government how a rising sense of expectations 
and anxiety amongst Indians in Malaysia led to the Hindraf rally and the 
makkal sakti (people’s power) phenomenon that was to have a huge impact 
for Malaysian society and politics.
Conclusion
For a very long time, Malaysian Indians did not have an alternative to the 
MIC. The reasons for this were that in an ethnicized political environment, 
the majority Malays accepted only MIC as the representative of the Indians. 
There were no credible alternatives to the MIC, and MIC through the efforts 
of leaders like Samy Vellu discredited any possible options, as seen in the 
case of KIMMA. It took a sea change in the form of the Reformasi to alter the 
mindsets of the Malaysians, who were originally afraid to question the 
incumbent government, which created a momentum within the Indian 
community to start resisting the tightening of civic space that made it difficult 
for them to even worship, let alone negotiate social welfare rights. The 
emergence of organizations like Alaigal , GCC and PSM were important 
precursors to the Hindraf and Makkal Sakti phenomenon as explained in 
Chapter 6 .
72 Malaysiakini, 22nd June, 2006.' Hindraf: Enact laws to protect temples.'
73 Malaysiakini, 16th August 2006. 'UN urged to stop demolition row.'
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Chapter 6 - The Hindraf Phenomenon
The Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf), a coalition of Indian and Hindu 
organisations in Malaysia that was formed in 2006 as a result of the Moorthy 
conversion case, was also a reaction to the culmination of circumstances 
which include the demolition of Hindu temples, other ‘body-snatching’ cases 
besides Moorthy and conversion controversies whereby Hindu families and 
individuals suffered consequences due to blurred boundaries between 
Syariah and civil legislation. But there were also non-Hindu concerns such as 
the deaths of Indians in police lock- ups, the low socio-economic status of 
Malaysian Indians and the marginalisation of Indians in educational, 
professional and economic opportunities. This chapter will examine the 
stream of narrative that Hindraf created from its inception, and activities such 
as conducting road shows, the November 2007 rally and the post- November 
2007 rally events that reveal in a microcosm the reality of the Malaysian 
Indian community. The Hindraf phenomenon, can be seen as an 
organisation or even a movement, considering the participation of many non­
partisan Malaysian Indians in the 2007 rally in the processes of its 
negotiation with the UMNO- led Malaysian state. It exposed the dialogue of 
the Indian minority community with itself as well as with Malaysia, which still 
persists as a ‘host’ land for the Indians despite their having been being 
settled in the country for centuries.
Hindraf emerges
The Hindraf rally of November 2007 drew attention to the personalities
behind Hindraf, their aspirations for the Malaysian Indian community, their
ability to consolidate and unify the community on an unprecedented level and
their ability to captivate the attention of the international media. However, as
anticipated, the Hindraf rally and the efforts of key protagonists, such as P.
Uthayakumar and his brother Waythamoorthy, were criticized by the
Malaysian government and drew mixed responses from the Malaysian
opposition and the larger Malaysian public. Before the rally, three Hindraf
leaders, Uthayakumar, Waythamoorthy and Ganabathirau, were taken into
police remand, though released later under the charge of ‘inciting racial
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issues and arousing the anger of other races’1, even before the rally had 
been conducted. Najib Razak, then deputy Prime Minister, claimed that 
Hindraf as ‘anyone who fanned racial sentiments and instigated the people 
would be charged in court as their actions breached the country’s laws.’2The 
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), information chief, M. Saravanan, labeled 
the Hindraf a stooge of the Malaysian opposition since the DAP chief, Lim Kit 
Siang, had made an appearance at an impromptu Indian gathering at Shah 
Alam.3 Leader of opposition PKR , Anwar Ibrahim , described the Hindraf 
rally as ‘a safety valve for long smoldering Indian Malaysian grievances.’4 
But in the same vein he asserted that Hindraf should consider a more 
balanced and inclusive approach and that its complaints should be focused 
on the UMNO BN-led coalition government which was guilty of serious 
abuses of power and continued to neglect not only the Indian poor but also 
other groups as well.5 Newspaper editorials on the 26th of November 2007 
interestingly revealed the attitudes of the government -controlled ethnic 
media communities. The Chinese and Tamil Dailies such as Sin Chew Daily, 
Nanyang Siang Pau and the Makkal Osai snubbed the Hindraf rally in their 
editorials. The New Straits Times English daily called the rally an illegal 
gathering but urged the government to engage with the needs and concerns 
of the Indian community while the Malay dailies of Berita Harian slammed the 
Hindraf protestors for affecting businesses and scaring tourists and 
investors.The Utusan Malaysia called on the government to take stern action 
to stop street demonstrations.
In November 2007, Hindraf came into the international spotlight by publicly 
submitting a petition to the British High Commission. The petition was to urge 
Her Majesty, the Queen of England to appoint a Queen’s Counsel to
1 Malaysiakini, November 24th 2007. 'Najib: Hindraf leaders charged for arousing anger.'
2 Ibid.
3 Malaysiakini, November 24th 2007. 'MIC: Hindraf is stooge of the opposition.'
4 Malaysiakini, November 25th 2007. 'Anwar: Hindraf rally a safety valve.'
5 Ibid.
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represent Malaysian Indians in a suit against the British government. Since 
the class action suit was a bid to claim monetary compensation, the Deputy 
Internal Security Minister Mohd Johari Baharum took the symbolism of the 
suit too far by claiming that Hindraf was manipulating innocent people. He 
was quoted claiming that Hindraf was luring people in the rural areas with 
money. PAS, the Islamic Opposition party, finally came out saying that 
Hindraf had hurled ‘extreme accusations’ by using terms like ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ and they wanted the government to take action according to the 
law.6 Malaysian Islamic students in Egypt informed Information Minister 
Zainuddin Maidin, who was in Cairo for a working visit ,that they were upset 
with the Hindraf protest for taking their grievances to the Queen of England 
instead of the Malaysian Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Maidin accused Hindraf of 
portraying themselves as still being under British colonial rule and not as 
citizens of an independent and sovereign Malaysia.7
The socialist perspective of the Hindraf campaign as presented by 
Jeyakumar Devaraj and the Party Socialis Malaysia was that Hindraf was 
playing into the hands of the main beneficiaries of the Bumiputera policy by 
lobbying for only ethnic Indian rights. Devaraj felt that the top UMNO leaders 
were uncomfortable that the general perception among the Malays was that 
the Bumiputera policy was benefiting only a few and this might affect their 
chances at the upcoming polls. This might lead the UMNO leaders to 
resurrect the ‘ketuanan Melayu’ (Malay hegemony) stance and further 
instigate the general Malay population to heighten racial boundaries or use 
gangster groups to provoke a racial incident that would be useful for the 
UMNO/BN in the next elections.8 Devaraj, instead, propagated a national- 
level mobilisation of all Malaysians rather than of Indians alone. Nathaniel
6 Malaysiakini, December 3rd 2007. 'PAS slams Hindraf, accusations extreme.'
7 Malaysiakini, November 29th 2007. 'Zam: Our students in Egypt peved with Hindraf.'
8 Jeyakumar Devaraj, Malaysia at the crossroads, A socialist perspective (Malaysia: Parsosma
Enterprise, 2009), 20.
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Tan’s9 open letter to Uthayakumar- ‘One Step Away from Gandhi’ suggests 
the same secular, non-ethnic approach to the ‘Indian problem’.10 Tan admits 
in the letter that Uthayakumar had ‘succeeded where none have before in 
uniting the Indian Malaysian community, inspiring them to leave behind their 
fears and to stand up bravely in pursuit of justice and a better life’. But Tan 
also implied that Hindraf added to the polarization already evident in 
Malaysian society due to the BN’s racially divisive politics. He asked 
Uthayakumar not to take the fight of the Indians alone but to join all 
Malaysians in their struggle and to moderate the Hindraf stance. Yet at the 
same time he also admitted that the Indians had turned cynical about how 
other movements in Malaysia had failed to champion the cause of the Indian 
Malaysian community sufficiently.
The above responses treat the Hindraf rally of November 2007 as an 
episodic event and fail to situate it in the larger context of Malaysian Indian 
experience. While the critique of Devaraj expressed fear that Indians might 
be used as bait for UMNO leaders to stir trouble to bolster their own position, 
government officials have ridiculed the class action suit by claiming the 
Hindraf demands as a hoax to cheat poor Indians of money, and accussing 
the Indians of violating the Constitution that protect Malay special rights.
From the opposition to the incumbent government to the Malaysian on the 
street, there has been a failure to realize the tightening of civil space over the 
last fifty years for minorities through public policy which had been 
heightening Malay supremacy and Islamisation. The Hindraf phenomenon 
simply represented the desperation of the Indians which had led them to 
even disavow the social contract at Independence which privileges the 
Malays and demand equal rights and citizenry. The Indians have realised 
that they are not the only poor community in Malaysia and while Malays 
remain poor due to the lack of implementation of the bumiputera policy, the
9 A Malaysian Chinese-lndian Peranakan politician and blogger. A member of Parti Keadilan Rakyat,
he was the editor of a book on the conflict between former Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir
Mohamad and Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, titled Mahathir vs. Abdullah: Covert Wars and
Challenged Legacies and published in early 2007.
10 Hindraf .Org accessed. October 2009.
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Indians face total neglect.11 Nathaniel Tan’s request that Uthayakumar and 
Hindraf should give up walking alone, only lobbying for Indian and Hindu 
rights, and instead fight for a Malaysian cause that affects all Malaysians was 
meaningless. Hindraf had been dubbed racialist and religious fundamentalist, 
but the Malaysian national, political, economic and social framework is based 
on ethnic principles that privilege one ethnicity, the Malays, above others. 
This has institutionalized social hierarchies within the Malaysian context 
which would be fought against in any other libertarian democratic setting. To 
expect the Hindraf to fight against corruption in the Malaysian government or 
any other national cause in a non- specific sense would indicate that Hindraf 
would have lost focus and the situation would be like trying to fit a square 
peg into a triangular hole.
At what point did the Hindraf consolidate? What was the catalyst? 
Ramachandran Meyappan of the Hindu Sevai Sangam claimed that he was 
the one who coined the term Hindraf.12 Ramachandran, or Ramaji as he was 
popularly known, stated that Hindraf began with 48 Indian NGOs meeting 
and deciding to work together after the ‘body snatching’ incident of Projek 
Malaysia Everest 1997 expedition member M.Moorthy, who had allegedly 
converted to Islam without the knowledge of his family. At that meeting, P 
Waythamoorthy was appointed Hindraf chairman as he had legal expertise to 
challenge and create opposition legally. Waythamoorthy then introduced his 
brother Uthayakumar, who had been lobbying for Human Rights and equal 
rights for Indians through police watch and Prim.13 As the organizers of 
Hindraf met more regularly, they decided to set up a legal team to collate 
documentary and historical evidence to file a class action suit against the 
British government, demanding compensation for the British government’s 
failure to protect minority rights at the decolonization moment. According to 
Ramaji, it was the Hindu Sevai Sangam which spent Malaysian ringgit 70
11 Malaysiakini, November 29th 2007. 'BN leaders reaction to Hindraf Rally ridiculous'.
12 Sunday Star, 26 July 2009.
13 Ibid.
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000 to send Uthayakumar, Waythamoorthy and Regu to the London archives 
to access documents of the Reid Constitutional Commission.14
The Hindraf leaders were to bring their interpretation to the declassified Reid 
Commission documents from the Public Records Office, in London. They 
highlighted the 131 written memoranda of different organizations that, 
according to the Hindraf leaders, ‘represented the will and wishes of the 
Malayan population which were primarily equality and equal opportunities for 
all Malaysians irrespective of race or religion’.15 Based on the Reid 
Commission papers ,Hindraf argued that there should be an equal 
opportunity 1) in the grant of state land 2) admission to public and 
administrative service 3) to trade and to do business , licenses , permits 4) 
primary, secondary , skills training , university and overseas university 
education 5) no special privileges for the Malays 6) No discrimination against 
any ethnic community based on race or religion 7) the retention of all their 
places of worship, in particular Hindu temples , crematoriums and burial rites 
8) freedom of religion 9) Malaya to be a secular state and not an Islamic 
State 10) right to mother tongue education, in particular Tamil schools to be 
fully aided 11) minimum wage for the lowest paid, and 12) equal recognition 
as sons of the soil for all Malaysians.16 Uthayakumar in his publication, 
‘Malaysian Political Empowerment Strategy: the way forward’, claimed that 
‘the seeds of the Hindraf people power Makkal Sakthi’ were planted at the 
Klang dinner forum in June 2007 and took off formally at the Selangor 
Chinese Assembly Hall forum on 28th July 2007 whereby the research 
findings of the trip to the London archives, complied in a book ‘50 years of 
Constitutional violations by the UMNO controlled Malaysian government’ was 
launched. The turnout of Malaysian Indians at the Chinese Assembly Hall 
was larger than expected compared to previous meetings and assemblies 
that Uthayakumar and others had planned. This large turnout was an
14 Ibid.
15 Document presenting 18 point Indian demands of the Hindraf.
16 Ibid.
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indication to the Hindraf leaders that there was now going to be growing 
support for their cause.17 Uthayakumar and his team, consisting of people 
such as Manoharan, Kenghadharan , Vasantha Kumar and Ganabatirau, 
were speakers at road shows conducted to garner support and inform the 
Malaysian Indians of the Hindraf cause . Perhaps this could also explain the 
large turnout at the rally of November 2007.
On August 12th 2007, Hindraf presented to former Prime Minister Badawi a 
18- point memorandum. There was no response from the government to 
these 18 points, Hindraf and its leaders then proceeded to organize and plan 
the rally of November 2007. A letter dated 15th November 2007 was also 
sent to Prime Minister Gordon Brown, of the United Kingdom. It was in this 
letter that the famous allegations of ‘ethnic cleansing’ were made towards the 
Malaysian government by the Hindraf. In this letter, Hindraf identified 
themselves as ‘commonwealth ethnic Indians’ so as to come under the 
purview of British concern. They claimed persecution by Malaysian 
‘government- backed Islamic extremists violent armed terrorist’ who 
destroyed the Kg Jawa Mariaman Hindu Temple. Hindraf appealed to 
Gordon Brown to move an emergency U.N resolution condemning ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ in Malaysia. The letter to Brown highlighted specifically the 
Kampung Medan incident when over 100 Indians were slashed and killed. 
This is referred to by P. Uthayakumar as a ‘mini genocide’ in the letter. It was 
also claimed that every week, one person on average was killed in a ‘shoot -  
to- kill’ policy by the police and every two weeks, one person was killed in 
police custody. Of concern to the Indians was that 60% of these victims were 
Indians though they form only 8% of the Malaysian population. Also every 
three weeks, one Hindu temple was demolished in Malaysia. The language 
of Hindraf in this letter could be perceived as extreme in its accusations as 
some Malaysians and the government have disputed the term ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ or ‘mini genocide’, as they felt they cannot be compared to 
Bosnia or Rwanda where the racial and hate crimes and violence did display 
genocide and ethnic cleansing . However, it could also be argued that
17 Interview with P. Uthayakumar, March 2010.
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Hindraf representing the Malaysian Indian community could have used the 
term ‘ethnic cleansing’ as they had become desperate in their need for 
recognition for equal rights and also desperate to capture international 
attention since they were being snubbed by the local Malaysian state.
Hindraf lobbies for Indian-Hindu rights
The M. Moorthy case instigated the formation of Hindraf, partly because 
Moorthy was a high profile member of the Indian community, being part of 
the Malaysian Everest Team. In turn, the Hindraf presented, from a 
Malaysian Indian standpoint, the grievances of the non-Muslim minorities 
over the blurred boundaries between civil and syariah proceedings in two 
documents: 1) The proposals of the Hindraf to combat the unjust decision of 
Kuala Lumpur High Court dated 28th December 2005 which ruled Moorthy’s 
case as a matter for the Syariah law;18 2) Moorthy’s struggle in terms of 
procedures for conversion to Islam, procedures on renunciation, the issue of 
court jurisdiction over these conversion cases and the constitutional crisis 
caused as a result of blurred court jurisdiction.19
The first document, which was presented on 28th of December 2005 to the 
Kuala Lumpur High Court, ruled that the High Court had no jurisdiction in the 
matter of Kaliammal, the wife of late M.Moorthy, who brought legal action 
against the Majlis Agama Wilayah Perseketuan and the Director of Kuala 
Lumpur General Hospital. A team of lawyers comprising A. Sivanesan , M. 
Manoharan , K Gengadaran , P Waythamoorthy , Kulasegaran and Mohan 
Gandhi, represented Kaliammal at the Kuala Lumpur High Court hearing on 
the 27th and 28th December 2005 . They argued that the late Moorthy had 
never embraced Islam and that his pay slips and Identity Card reflected his 
Hindu name. Until the time of his death, he had never performed 
circumcision and at all times he had practiced Hinduism by participating in 
Hindu festivals and prayers. Therefore based on these arguments the Majlis
18 Hindraf memorandum titled ' Hindu Rights Action force : A joint committee of Malaysian Hindu 
NGO's to combat the unjust decision of Kuala Lumpur High Court dated 28th December 2005/
19 Hindraf memorandum titled ' Moorthy's struggle , Islam, procedures for conversion, procedures 
on renunciation, jurisdiction , constitutional crisis, prepared by Hindraf.'
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Agama Wilayah Persekutuan did not have the right to claim the body of the 
late Moorthy and the Syariah Court order dated 22nd December 2005, 
according to Kaliammal’s lawyers, was null and void. With the High Court 
ruling that it had no jurisdiction over Moorthy’s case, Hindraf argued that this 
had grave consequences for non- Muslim citizens of Malaysia since they did 
not have the right to challenge decisions made about them by a Syariah 
courts. Hindraf puts forward that this is ‘fundamentally wrong ‘as Syariah 
courts are inferior to civil courts, which were a creation of the Federal 
Constitution, due to the fact that Syariah Courts do not listen to both parties. 
In the proposals of Hindraf to counter the High Court decision, Hindraf 
pledged a local and international campaign. The local campaign was to 
create a petition to be submitted to the Yang Di Pertuan Agong to sack 
Judge Md Rauf and launch an email and sms campaign as well as hold 
nationwide road shows to create awareness of cases such as Moorthy’s .In 
terms of the international campaign, Hindraf wanted to help Kaliammal lodge 
an official compliant with the United Nations Human Rights Commission.
In the second document, Hindraf discussed the legal implications of 
Moorthy’s case in greater detail. There was a struggle between Kaliammal 
and the Federal Territory Religious Department (JAWI) over Moorthy’s body. 
Since the High Court ruled it had no jurisdiction over the matter, which was a 
High Court case, Moorthy’s body was buried according to Islamic rites. His 
widow managed to get all the financial benefits posthumously. The 
significance of the Moorthy case is that non- Muslims in Malaysia do not get 
their say if they are embroiled in family situations when one member of the 
family has converted and there are ramifications in financial matters, burial 
rites and custody rights. The High Court refused to give a hearing to 
Moorthy’s family, claiming that the case was under the jurisdiction of the 
Syariah court. Since Kaliammal was a non- Muslim she could not bring her 
case to the Syariah court and was therefore denied a hearing. In the issue of 
estate and inheritance a Muslim convert may dispose of one third of his 
estate by will provided two conditions are satisfied : 1) the disposition is to a 
koranic heir: 2) the disposition must not benefit a person opposed to Islam .
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The remaining two thirds of the estate is disposed according to Islamic law. 
The Islamic Office, (Jabatan Agama Islam) would issue a certificate, Sijil 
Farid. The distribution would be according to Sijil Farid.20 This means that 
Moorthy could only make a will on one- third of his property. The rest of his 
property had to be administered according to Islamic law. This also covered 
his provident fund and insurance claims. If Moorthy’s infant children were 
deemed to be Muslim then their custody would be determined by Islamic law, 
with the likelihood that since Kaliammal is not a Muslim, she might lose the 
custody of her children.
The loopholes amidst the blurred boundaries between civil and syariah 
courts are many. If a non- Muslim is identified as a Muslim and it is disputed, 
a suit cannot be brought to the civil courts to challenge the case. It is also 
very easy to allege that someone has converted to Islam. For example, there 
were no documents to prove Moorthy’s conversion, only two words of his 
army colleagues. There could be a variety of situations where a non- Muslim 
could be wrongly classified as a Muslim, such as being caught in a sexually 
compromising position (Khalwat) with a Muslim and then being forced to 
convert, and mistakes in entering data over religion into birth certificates and 
the Identification Card (Mykad) is also commonplace.21 If a person’s personal 
documents erroneously say that he or she is a Muslim, then that person falls 
under the Syariah court.22 There are also great difficulties in renouncing 
Islam. Islam prohibits converting out of Islam, which is punishable by death 
according to the Koran, but according to Malaysian Syariah law, ‘Any Muslim 
who willfully either by his action or words or in any manner claims to 
denounce the religion of Islam or declares himself to be non-Muslim is guilty 
of an offence of deriding the religion of Islam and shall on conviction be liable 
to a fine not exceeding three thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
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not exceeding two years or to both’.23 This is very harsh if someone is caught 
in Islam due to administrative glitches or social circumstances.
The Hindraf legal team lobbied fora re-examination of Article 121 (A) of the 
Federal Constitution. In 1988 the Malaysian Constitution was amended to 
include Article 121(A) that says civil courts have no jurisdiction over any 
matter that falls within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts.24 This has 
caused a dual legal system whereby people of especially non- Muslim 
religious identification could become embroiled in such cases as 1) non- 
Muslims mistaken for Muslims 2) Muslims wanting to get out of Islam 3) non- 
Muslim spouses of Muslims 4) children who have one parent who is a 
Muslim and the other a non- Muslim and 5) non- Muslim parents or siblings 
of Muslims. Hence, considering the jurisdiction of the Syariah court the 
abovementioned do not get a right to a hearing, which imposes a sense of 
inequality and social hierarchies within the Malaysian social fabric.
The second pressing issue for the Hindraf was the demolition of the Hindu 
temples. On 24th March 2006 Hindraf sent Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad 
Badawi an open letter, ‘Hindu temples /shrines continuously haunted by 
unscrupulous demolishment.’25 In this letter Hindraf invokes Article 11 of the 
Malaysian Federal Constitution which guarantees the freedom of worship 
and religion in Malaysia. Hindraf also points out that the Federal Constitution 
‘unreservedly declares this state to be secular’.26 However, there were 
impediments to Article 11 with the demolition of the Sri Ayanar Satishwary 
Alayam Hindu Temple that was erected some 60 years ago. The Hindraf 
state that the temple had some 3000 devotees and was a place of service 
and welfare for the public that organized charitable and spiritual events and
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Open letter, dated 24th March 2006, addressed to Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dato Seri
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, 'Hindu temples/shrines continuously haunted by unscrupulous 
demolishment' by P. Waythamoorthy, chairman of Hindraf.
26 Ibid.
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even public forums from time to time. According to Hindraf, the act to 
demolish the temple by state authorities was considered, ‘a most deplorable 
repulsive and regrettable act’ and ‘barbaric and satanic’ considering that the 
Malaysian government is ‘aggressively and vehemently advocating racial co­
existence, national unity, mutual respect and appreciation between multiple 
races in the country.’ There was great emotional outpouring in this letter as in 
the other letters sent out to the Prime Minister and other officials.27 One 
wonders if these emotional outbursts are a strategy to incite sympathy from 
the relevant authorities or simple a demonstration of shock and outrage at 
the mentioned occurrences.
On 10th May 2006, Hindraf sent another letter to the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Law, Mohamed Nazri Bin Abdul Aziz, ‘Another Unlawful Act of 
‘Cleansing’ about the demolition of the 110 year- old ancient Hindu shrine 
located at Midlands Estate Seksyen 7 Shah Alam by Shah Alam City Hall on 
9th May 2006’.28 In this letter Hindraf pointed out that in their perspective the 
government was not demolishing temples to make way for development but 
that the ‘Mayor of Shah Alam is unlawfully engaged in a silent agenda to 
‘cleanse’ ancient Hindu shrines’.29 This put the demolition of Hindu temples 
into direct co- relation with Hindu ethnic marginalization due to rising 
Islamisation in Malaysia. Hindraf accused the government authorities of 
using obsolete laws to justify the demolition of these Hindu temples. For 
instance the notice of demolition for the Hindu shrine issued on the 19th April
2006 states that the demolition was intended to be of an ‘illegal squatter 
building’.30 Hindraf questioned the moral/legal authority of City Hall to 
interpret a shrine that was built 110 years ago (before the existence of the
27 See Appendix 1.
28 Letter addressed to both Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, and the Minister of Law, 
Mohamed Nazri Bin Abdul Aziz, dated 10th May 2006, Another Unlawful Act of 'Cleansing' 
demolishment of 110 year old ancient Hindu shrine located at Midlands Estate Seksyen 7 Shah 
Alam by Shah Alam City Hall on 9th May 2006' by P. Waythamoorthy, chairman of Hindraf.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
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City Hall) as an illegal squatter building. Once again there was a clear 
expression of a high intensity of emotional outpouring of the Hindraf on 
behalf of the Indian community as the letter reveals that the shrine 
management had appealed to the Chief Minister of Selangor seeking his 
assistance and an NGO, the Consumer Association of Klang, had made 
appeals to City Hall. The letter states that ‘despite these the City Hall had 
arrogantly and deliberately proceeded to demolish the ancient Shrine. It 
appears the Shah Alam City Hall Mayor acted mala fide and on frolic of his 
own with ill intentions to cause racial hatred , anger and humiliation among 
the non- Muslim population in Malaysia’.31 Here we witness the ethnic 
binaries being confirmed between Muslims and non- Muslims in the 
Malaysian context and the pressure sustained by non- Muslims regarding the 
demolishing of their temples since Muslims mainly form the authorities in 
Malaysia.
The Hindraf petitioned the Prime Minister for social justice.lt called on him to 
1) arrest and charge the Mayor of Shah Alam 2) to issue a stern written 
directive to all State Governments /Chief Ministers /City and Local Councils 
to immediately halt any form of cleansing /demolition of places of worship 3) 
to instruct the Culture Arts and Heritage Ministry to immediately take positive 
steps to protect ancients shrines belonging to non-Muslims 4) appoint a 
minister to oversee matters pertaining to religious rights and freedom of non- 
Muslims 5) provide and allocate sufficient funds for the building , 
maintenance and upkeep of places of worship belonging to non-Muslims 6) 
provide and allocate sufficient funds for the building , maintenance and 
upkeep of places of worship belonging to non-Muslims and 7) seriously 
implement existing legal provisions for the erection and building of places of 
worship for non- Muslims in new townships.32 While these demands for 
reconciliation over Indian communal hurt due to the demolition of Hindu 
temples, especially heritage site Hindu temples, seem reasonable in the
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
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context of good governance and an egalitarian social and political scenario, it 
seems unrealistic in Malaysia. Given Malaysia's trajectory towards hardening 
ethnic boundaries with affirmative action policies for the Malays and the 
declaration of Malaysia as an Islamic state by Prime Ministers and important 
members of the cabinet, the UMNO government would find these demands 
unreasonable and as they have done in the past, ignore several if not all of 
the memorandums and letters of appeal sent to important dignitaries and the 
government.
Several of the letters such as the ones to the Sultan of Selangor and 
Attorney General of Malaysia were telling of the emotions and causes of 
grievances of the Indian community over the temple demolition issue.33 The 
Indians were alarmed at the rate at which Hindu temples were scheduled for 
demolition. For example, within two and a half months, 12 temples were 
demolished, deities stolen and smashed and the roads to the temple closed. 
The letter to the Sultan of Selangor dated 3rd August 2006 also pleaded that 
the further 11 Hindu temples in Selangor scheduled to be demolished in the 
next four and half months be stopped.34 The letter dated 28th June 2006 to 
the Attorney General explains how Hindu deities were smashed before the 
devotees in the demolition of the Hindu temple Om Sri Balakrishna 
Muniswarer on 8th June 2006. It also described the Royal Police Force 
colluding with gangsters and a Malay Muslim mob during the demolition as 
an intimidation tactic against the Hindus present.35 Hindraf highlighted in this 
letter that the caretakers of these temples were mainly ‘downtrodden, poor, 
uneducated, ignorant and a defenseless class of the Indian ethnic 
community that could not defend themselves against the sledgehammers
33 Letter addressed to Sultan Sharafuddin Idris Shahjbni almarhum Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz 
Shah Al-Haj, dated 3rd august 2006 by P. Waythamoorthy, chairman of Hindraf. Letter addressed 
to Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail, dated 28th June 2006 by P. Waythamoorthy, chairman of Hindraf.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
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that were used to destroy the Hindu deities before their eyes’.36 The letter to 
the Attorney General also explains that the offers for the relocation of Hindu 
temples were unreasonable. For example, the 60 years old, Om Sri 
Balakrishna Muniswarer Temple was located on a piece of land 
approximately 20 000 square feet and was scheduled to be demolished to 
make way for a highway development project. The temple serves 800 
devotees of mainly the laboring class. The relocation land assigned to the 
temple was a piece of land measuring 10’ x 10’ which the Hindraf felt was 
‘nothing but a calculated attempt to humiliate and belittle the Hindu faith and 
customs and its labouring class devotees’.37 The Hindraf also questioned 
why pre-Independence Hindu temples had not been made into temple 
reserves, gazetted and had the temple land alienated by the government 
before allowing the developer to acquire the said land, as is being done for 
Muslim places of worship.38
When the letters and memoranda sent out by Hindraf did not elicit a 
response from local authorities, Hindraf approached International 
organizations such as the United Nations. In a letter dated 16th August 2006 
to the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, the Hindraf explained 
the crisis of Hindu temple demolition in Malaysia.39 It was explained that it 
was an imbedded belief amongst the Hindu -Tamil community that they 
should not live in a village that does not have a temple. The Hindraf 
described the Hindu-Tamils as a temple building community. As the Hindu 
migrants settled in different parts of Malaya, various temples were built in 
those areas , therefore it was not surprising that a community in a Rubber 
Estate of 100 acres would have twenty temples in that area . This was 
because the migrant Hindu population originated from various clans and
36lbid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Letter addressed to Kofi A.Annan, dated 16th August 2006 by by P. Waythamoorthy, chairman of 
Hindraf.
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villages and each clan and village had its own deity with its own unique style 
of worship. The consecration of these temples was allowed and encouraged 
by the colonial masters as not only the spiritual lives but also the social lives 
of the Hindu Tamil estate workers were centered around the temple. 
Problems ensued after Malayan/Malaysian Independence when estates 
belonging to British land owners were bought over by private businessmen 
and companies and later acquired by the government using the Land 
Acquisition Act for development purposes. When the land was acquired by 
the government or sold to private developers, these temples were not given 
recognition as sacred places of worship of the minority Hindu Tamil 
community. Instead, they are declared buildings of illegal squatters and 
demolished. Hindu temples remained without a status, unlike mosques and 
madrasahs. Hence one witnesses the unequal treatment as meted out by the 
government towards the different races and religions that reinforced social 
hierarchies and Malay Muslim supremacy.
The retort of the Malaysian authorities to these allegations was that there 
were too many Hindu temples in the country, which hampered development. 
The Indian community, too, acknowledged this and issued planning 
guidelines for ‘Places of Worship for Non -Muslims: primarily Hindu 
temples’.40 These guidelines explain the significance of the Hindu places of 
worship, their priests and Hindu pooja (prayer). The main point made was 
that of Agamas (specific categories) of religious texts which gave detailed 
guidance regarding temple building and temple worship. Hindu Agamas 
(scriptural instructions) specify that Hindu temples should be built in a fertile 
place with a clean environment, central location and accessible to the 
devotees. While these guidelines informed the government, they were also a 
polite protest against the numerous times Hindu temples have been 
relocated next to an oxidation tank, mining land, or transmission line or river
40 Planning guidelines for 'Places of Worship for Non -Muslims: primarily Hindu temples' submitted 
by a coalition of Hindu organizations, submitted to the Malaysian government in 2006.
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reserve41. Despite this amount of protest, temple demolitions continue on 
state land that is under the charge of the UMNO or the Opposition.
Nagarajan describes the low morale of the Malaysian Hindu community in 
quoting a devotee, ‘Why do they have to tear down our temples? We are 
poor and our only comfort is our temples and now we are losing that also’. 42
The 18 -point document demands drawn up by the Hindraf began by 
examining the Reid Commission of 1957, which advised the Malaysian 
Federal Constitution. Hindraf s reading of the Reid Constitution led them to 
argue that a ‘Common Nationality’ was stipulated for the whole of the 
Federation, with equality and equal opportunity for all Malaysians irrespective 
of race and religion. Based on the findings of Uthayakumar, Waythamoorthy 
and Regu during their trip to the London Archives, the Hindraf issued a 
statement, ‘...the Malaysian Federal Constitution, which is the supreme law 
of Malaysia as drawn out by the Reid Commission in 1957 was passed by 
the inaugural Malayan parliament and which formed the basis of independent 
Malaysia’, implying that the Malaysian Federal Constitution was / is premised 
on equality instead of affirmative action. And that Hindraf argues that the 
UMNO-controlled government had actually flouted the Malaysian Federal 
Constitution for the last 50 years.43
The Hindraf articulated their argument thus:
Over the last 50 years since independence in August 1957, the United 
Malays Organization (UMNO) controlled Malaysian government with their 
majoritarian might, and backed by the police , Attorney General‘s 
Chambers, Judiciary , civil service and the media have continuously violated 
the Malaysian Federal Constitution by their racist and Islamic extremist 
policies and which in effect have created an apartheid system ala Malaysia 
and especially resulting in the degeneration of the at least 70% of the ethnic
41 Ibid.
42 S.Nagarajan, 'Marginalization and Ethnic relations: the Indian Malaysian experience' in 
Multiethnic Malaysia: past, present and future, 378.
43 Document presenting 18 point Indian demands of the Hindraf.
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minority Indians to become the underclass of Malaysia who end up in the 
poor and hardcore poor category . The rest of the 29% raised above the 
poor and hardcore category wholly and / or substantially through their own 
efforts, sacrifices and labour with no or little assistance by the UMNO 
controlled government. The 1% of the cream thrives away.44
The use of the words ‘ majoritarian might’ , ‘ Racist and extremist policies’ , 
‘apartheid system’, ‘ resulting in the degeneration ...’ reveals that the 
negotiation processes between the Hindraf and Malaysian government had 
broken down . With the Malaysian government ignoring their memoranda 
and letters of protest, the dialogue was non- existent. Instead there was a 
sense of inflamed emotional finger- pointing at the UMNO. In referring to the 
Reid Commission, it is as though the Hindraf was looking to a point of 
genesis to correct the imbalances in the distribution of national resources 
and to hold the Malaysian government accountable. Hindraf had failed to 
realise that, as in all institutions, state and communal identities, the 
Malaysian national identity, as determined by the UMNO- led government, 
has evolved. BN has had to alter the state image to cope with mounting 
pressures from the Islamic opposition party, PAS as well as the Malay- 
Muslim middle class that has increasingly started to participate in more rigid 
Islamic practices. Based on the discourse of the 18 -point demand, Hindraf at 
best can be seen as a pressure group that through its refutation of the social 
contract, Malay special privileges,is testing the boundaries of the state to 
concede more to the Indian minority community. And while the November 
2007 rally displayed that Hindraf was able to draw unprecedented support 
from the Indian community, despite state counter measures and repression 
of the Hindraf spokesmen, a sense of pessimism prevails that the task in 
attaining equal rights is an insurmountable one.
The 18- point demands45 reveal that the issues of the Indian community’s low 
economic equity in the Malaysian economy, neglect of Tamil education in the
44 ibid.
45 See Appendix 2
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state, and the lack of professional and business opportunities for Indians has 
become compounded with the struggle for Hindu rights. But the 18-point 
demands, according to Malays, are framed within hyperbolic terms which 
according to PKR, opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, ‘would scare the Malay 
community’.46 For instance, clause number 5 ) requires that state to ‘extend 
and implement with immediate effect to Indians the affirmative action plans , 
grants , scholarships , loans etc as extended to Malay Muslim citizens with 
the view to providing equal opportunities for higher education , university 
education , admission to foreign universities ...’ or clause number 6) that 
‘20% of the Government’s top most level postings (Secretaries Generals ), 
Middle Level Management ( Directors) and management level( Managers ) 
postings and the same for the private Sector’ be reserved for Indians or in 
clause number 12) in demanding a RM 1,000,000.00 compensation for each 
and every citizen killed , permanently maimed or injured in the Kampung 
Medan tragedy. There is also an explicit critique of the MIC when Hindraf 
refers to them as the, ‘Mandore’, a term borrowed from the colonial era 
referring to the supervisor of workers who primarily did the bidding of the 
British planters or the colonial regime. In this context, the MIC are referred to 
as ‘mandore’ implying that they have been the lackeys of the UMNO, who 
control the Indian masses for the BN. Clause 7, requires ‘the UMNO to stop 
“playing politics” through the ‘Mandore’ system by dishing out on piecemeal 
and / or peanuts basis or merely public and /or newspaper announcements 
and declarations by the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) who have no or 
very little power or say in the UMNO controlled Malaysian government’. This 
demonstrates the disillusionment the Indian community has had with the MIC 
and its leaders as already explained in Chapters 3 and 4 and reveals the 
Hindrafs desire to be the alternative voice for the Indians in Malaysia .
46 Dialogue between Anwar Ibrahim and staff and students of the Australian National University, 
Asia and Pacific Department, November 2010.
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On September 12th 2007, 40 Malaysian Indians led by the Hindraf group 
gathered outside the Parliament building to submit a protest note to the 
Prime Minister.47 The group was protesting the 2008 Malaysian Budget 
which the Hindraf felt did not offer anything to the 70% ‘hardcore’ poor 
Indians. Uthayakumar, as the spokesman of the group, noted that the 
Indigenous Malay group, Orang Asli, had been allocated a generous share of 
the budget but the Indians had been snubbed. He also voiced concern that 
no provision had been made for a minimum wage of RM 1000 a month and 
that the scheme of five- year maternity leave to bring up ‘quality children’ was 
extended only to the civil service, which is largely controlled and staffed by 
Malays. Hindraf appealed to the Prime Minster to allocate RM 990 million of 
the budget to Tamil schools in the country and another RM 2 billion to help 
the ‘hardcore’ poor in the country.48 This demonstration was a precursor to 
the rally in November. Its significance lies in the fact that despite the Hindraf 
sending a letter to the Prime Minister to receive the protest note or to assign 
a Minister to receive the note, the request was snubbed. The group was also 
stopped at the entrance to the road leading up to the Parliament Building.
The fact that the Hindraf was continuously ignored by the Malaysian 
government for its numerous memorandums, protest notes and 
demonstrations probably drove Hindraf to enacting symbolically larger and 
larger acts of protest to gain national and international attention. Further, the 
trajectory of Hindraf’s protests lends credence to the theory of 
multiculturalism theorist Charles Taylor who postulated on,
‘the need, sometimes the demand for recognition’. The need, it can be 
argued, is one of the driving forces behind nationalist movements in 
politics. And the demand comes to the fore in a number of ways in 
today’s politics , on behalf of minority or ‘subaltern groups’, in some
The Saffron Rally
47 Malaysiakini, 12th September 2007. 'Message to PM: Don't neglect poor Indians.'
48 Ibid.
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forms of feminism and in what is today called the politics of 
multicu ltura lism49
In the case of Hindraf, the Malaysian state refused to recognize their position 
to represent Indians, therefore the unwillingness to enter into any dialogue 
with the group and this remained the case even after the November 2007 
Rally. Instead, punishment in the form of actions of the Federal Reserve Unit, 
police arrests, murder charges and Internal Security (ISA detentions) were 
meted out in response to defiance to the state.
On November 3rd 2007, the police cordoned off a temple in Banting, 
Selangor, which was a venue for a forum organised by the Hindraf. The 
forum was on ‘50 years of marginalization and discrimination of Indians’ and 
was the tenth of its kind. Previous forums had been held in Semeyih, Teluk 
Intan, Seremban, Klang, Sungai Petani, Butterworth, Kluang, Chaa and Port 
Dickson.50 At this event the show of state force was evident .There were 300 
policemen in the vicinity of the temple and they were backed by Federal 
Reserve Unit trucks and numerous other police vehicles, including two 
helicopters. The police then persuaded some 500 people gathered near the 
shops surrounding the temple to leave but many stayed to hear the Hindraf 
leaders speak through a loudhailer at the roadside at about 8 pm.
On November 17th 2007, the Hindraf announced that it was aiming to gather 
100,000 protesters to hand a petition meant for Queen Elizabeth through the 
British High Commission.51 The petition would urge the Queen to appoint a 
Queen’s Counsel to represent Malaysian Indians in a suit against the British 
government. The suit of one million pounds sterling for each of the two 
million Malaysian Indians was filed by Waythamoorthy, the chairman of 
Hindraf. The suit was filed over Britain’s alleged failure to protect the minority 
community’s interests during the Independence talks. The British High
49 Charles Taylor. Multiculturalism a nd " The politics of recognition": an essay, with commentary by 
Amy Gutmann ,ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 25.
50 Malaysiakini, 3rd November 2007. 'India group forum stopped by police/
51 Malaysiakini, 17th November 2007. 'Indians to petition Queen E via British envoy.'
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Commissioner had been informed and police permits for a rally had been 
applied for. Within two days the local authorities reacted by raiding the 
offices, belonging to Waythamoorthy and Uthayakumar looking for a 
seditious document entitled ‘50 years of violation of the Federal Constitution 
of the Malaysian government’.52 The police did not find anything but took 
photographs of the offices making the two brothers feel that their safety was 
under threat. The MIC subsequently asked the Indians to stay away from the 
rally while the official police permit for the rally was rejected.
There were appeals by Opposition parliamentarians, such as DAP’s M. 
Kulasegaran, to grant the police permit as it was the Constitutional right of 
the Hindraf to hold the rally but to no avail. On 23rd November 2007, three 
key leaders, Uthayakumar, Waythamoorthy and V Ganapathy Rao, were 
arrested.53 The Cheras police chief also received an unprecedented court 
order banning all Hindraf supporters from attending the rally at the British 
High Commission. The order named Hindraf lawyers as defendants and was 
issued under Section 98 of the criminal procedure code, applicable to urgent 
cases of nuisance.54 The Hindraf leaders who were arrested were later 
released on bail within two days. However, Waythamoorthy refused to post 
bail of RM 800 in protest against the government using the police. Although 
Rights groups such as the Aliran and Opposition parties such as PKR 
condemned the arrests, the government continued its clamp down. 
Roadblocks were erected on several highways to ensure that Indians from 
out of state would find it difficult to attend the rally.
On 24th November 2007, Hindraf leader P. Uthayakumar made it known 
publicly that he and his fellow members were prepared to face arrest for their 
cause but at the same time asserted that Hindraf, after holding numerous 
rallies, had a track record of peaceful protests and the police therefore need 
not fear for the planned rally the next day. Instead he requested the
S2Malaysiakini, 19th November 2007. 'Police raid offices of two Hndraf lawyers.'
53 Malaysiakini, 23rd November 2007. 'Three Hindraf leaders arrested.'
54 Malaysiakini, 23rd November 2007. 'Cops obtain rare court order against Hindraf.'
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authorities to let Hindraf members present the memorandum intended for the 
British authorities and ‘go home peacefully’.55 Despite this reassurance, the 
next day, even hours before the rally was scheduled to take place, the police 
had already begun firing tear gas and chemical -laced water to disperse 
crowds of Indians located in parts of Kuala Lumpur. According to 
Uthayakumar, the Malaysian police had fired tear gas at those sleeping in 
the Batu Caves Temple even as early as 4 a.m. It was estimated that the 700 
Indians that had gathered at Batu Caves were arrested.56
The rally was scheduled to begin at 9 a.m. The police had cleared the vicinity 
of the British High Commission of protestors. But by 9.30 a.m. the crowd 
surrounding the Twin Towers KLCC had increased to between 10 000 to 15 
000.57 There was a large number of Malaysian Indians from different parts of 
the country gathered at Kuala Lumpur from the night before for the rally 
despite a tight police cordon to seal off the city. Malaysiakini reported from 
the site by quoting individuals like lawyer Haris Ibrahim, a member of the Bar 
Council monitoring team, who was ‘stunned by the heavy handed police -  
action against the protestors’.58 Hindraf leaders naturally protested alleged 
police brutality. For instance, A. Sivanesan condemned the police for turning 
Kuala Lumpur ‘into a war zone.’59 Sivanesan claimed that ‘things were 
getting out of hand. We blame the police. They have beaten women and 
children’.60 DAP Member of Parliament, M. Kulasegaran, was upset with the 
crackdown stating that ‘Over the last 50 years Indians have been 
marginalised in the country. And now we want the same rights as enjoyed by 
other communities ’.61 After six hours of confrontation between the Hindraf
55 Malaysiakini, November 24th 2007. 'Hindraf: Let us hand petition and go home.'
56 Malaysiakini, November 25th 2007. 'Tear gas fired at defiant protestors.'
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
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supporters and the police, the police eventually allowed the Hindraf to submit 
the petition but they rejected the offer. This protest maneuver was very much 
in line with Gandhian style of civil disobedience. Gandhian style politics was 
also displayed through the symbolism the protesters displayed through 
wearing saffron headbands or T-shirts. Dozens more were wearing placard -  
posters of Gandhi himself. When the crowd was discharged, through 
chemical- laced water cannon, they defiantly returned to their original 
positions chanting ‘We want justice’ in English or Tamil. Warnings were given 
to the crowd before water cannon was discharged after which plainclothes 
policemen were sent in to arrest several dozen Hindraf protestors. According 
to the bar council team, police detained more than 400 people during the 
rally.62 A telling interview quoted in Malaysiakini with a Hindraf protestor 
gives some insight to why the crowd was agitated and adamant in their 
protest, unlike the stereotypical image of the docile Malaysian -Indian , 
Tamachelvey said tha t, ‘ We felt very hurt after watching VCDs how the 
government would destroy our temples. We are Malaysians but our 
government treats us like foreigners’.63 The religious suppression of the 
Hindus was a much more emotive for the Indians than just the 
marginalisation of the community in terms of job, business and educational 
opportunities.
After the rally, there was a show of force by the Malaysian government 
towards the Hindraf leaders .Although the three key leaders, Uthayakumar, 
Ganapathy Rao and Waythamoorthy, were discharged from their sedition 
case one day after the rally as the persecution had failed to submit the Tamil 
transcripts of the alleged seditious remarks 64 , 89 protesters were charged 
for allegedly taking part in an illegal gathering and defying police orders to 
disperse.65 On 29th November 2007, Ganapathi Rao was rearrested but
62 Malaysiakini, 25th November 2007. 'Hindraf to submit petition in London.'
63 Malaysiakini, 25th November 2007. 'A Gandhi -  inspired mas civil disobedience.'
64 Malaysiakini, 26th November 2007. 'Hindraf trio discharged from seditition.'
65 Malaysiakini, 28th November 2007. '89 protestors charged with illegal gathering.'
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released on bail 8 hours later under the Sedition Act over a speech he had 
made at a Hindraf forum at a Chinese primary school in Seremban66. On 
December 4th 2007, 26 Hindraf supporters were charged for murder when a 
policeman was assaulted with bricks and iron pipes during the rally.67Another 
5 were added to the attempted murder charge the next day.68 On December 
6th 2007, the 31 Hindraf protestors charged with attempted murder against 
the policemen were denied bail on the grounds of Internal Security reasons 
and based on the severity of the charges which also included mischief.69 
Newspapers were advised by the Internal Security Ministry to play down 
news on the Hindraf.70 On December 11th 2007, Uthayakumar was arrested 
and immediately charged with sedition for the letter to Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown, dated November 15th 2007 on the Police Watch website.71 As soon 
as Uthayakumar posted bail of RM 50 000 he was rearrested and his office 
was raided the next day looking for seditious material.
Post -rally Response
On December 13th 2007, the Malaysian government finally enforced its 
Internal Security Act and took five Hindraf leaders into detention without trial. 
The five leaders were P. Uthayakumar, M. Manoharan, R . Kenghadaran, V. 
Ganabathirau and T. Vasantha Kumar. The Inspector-General said the 
arrests, under Section 8(1) of the ISA, were made against the five for 
carrying out activities that threatened national security. The five were sent to 
Kamunting detention centre in Taiping Perak to be detained for two years, 
without undergoing the 60- day investigation period.72 The ISA was a 
regulation enforced by the British during the Emergency era to clamp down
66 Malaysiakini, 29th November 2007. 'Arrested Hindraf leader Ganapathi freed.'
67 Malaysiakini, 4th December 2007. 'Attempted murder charge for Hindraf protestors.'
68 Malaysiakini, 5th December 2007. 'Five more face attempted murder rap.'
69 Malaysiakini, 6th December 2007. 'Bail denied for 31 Hindraf protestors.'
70 Malaysiakini, 5th December 2007. 'Ministry clamps down on Hindraf coverage.'
71 Malaysiakini, 11th December 2007. 'Hindraf leader faces fresh seditition charges.'
72 Malaysiakini, 13th December 2007. 'ISA crackdown : 5 Hindraf leaders detained.'
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on the Malayan communists, however the Act was continued post -  
Independence, enforced as a tool of the state to suppress opposition to the 
incumbent government. For many Malaysians, the ISA flouts the basic 
fundamentals of Human Rights and should be discontinued.
The ISA detention of the ‘Hindraf 5’ immediately drew flak from the 
Malaysian opposition. DAP secretary general Lim Guan Eng condemned the 
detention as an act of desperation. He urged the government to give the 
Hindraf an open trial so that proof and evidence could be brought to public 
attention.73 The then Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi defended the 
detention, claiming that the Hindraf were a threat to national security and 
safety. He claimed that between public safety and freedom of action, he 
would choose public safety. He also said that the Malaysians were not dumb 
but if Hindraf wanted to speak up there were proper procedures for this.74 
This last claim of Badawi was disingenuous as it has been established that 
Hindraf had sent numerous memorandums and tried to engage the 
Malaysian government in dialogue several times to no avail. Meanwhile, 
Malaysian Indian supporters of the Hindraf had begun responding to the 
arrests by protesting outside police headquarters, Bukit Aman in Kuala 
Lumpur.75 On 14th December 2007, a number of Indian non- governmental 
organizations (NGOs), in the presence of Samy Vellu of the MIC met with the 
Prime Minister at PutraJaya in a closed door meeting. In that meeting the 
Indian NGO representatives expressed sympathy for the Hindraf cause by 
asking the government to review the use of ISA against the Hindraf 5 and to 
charge them in an open court instead.76
The ISA detention of the Hindraf 5 had several ramifications. First, the 
Opposition was quick to capitalise on the unleashed Hindraf fury. On 
December 14th 2007, PKR chief, Anwar Ibrahim, engaged in ‘Samy (Vellu)
73 Malaysiakini, 13th December 2007.' ISA dragnet: Gov't is desperate.'
74 Malaysiakini, 14th December 2007.' PM: ISA action is justified.'
75 Malaysiakini, 13th December 2007. 'Police disperse Hindraf supporters at BkT Aman.'
76Malaysiakini, 14th December 2007. 'Charge them in court: Indian groups tell PM at special meet.'
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bashing’ at a ceramah( gathering). He directed jeers and insults at the MIC 
chief and although laying the caveat that there were some things that he too 
did not agree with the Hindraf, he sympathized with their cause for fighting 
for the Indian poor and the Hindu temples that they were demolishing.77 The 
Hindraf phenomenon was also to impact on the dramatic turn of events for 
the BN government in the ‘March 8th’ 2008 elections when otherwise 
ambivalent Hindraf leaders in supporting outcomes in elections actually 
came out on March 3rd 2008 and told their supporters to vote for the 
opposition and deny BN its two-thirds majority in parliament. The Indian 
slogan ‘makkal sakti’ (people’s power) was a rallying cry for not just the 
Indians but also many non-Indian candidates in the opposition.
The BN government did lose its two- thirds majority. Samy Vellu, dubbed the 
unshakable stalwart of the MIC, lost his Sungai Siput seat to Jeyakumar 
Deveraj and an unprecedented number of Indians became parliamentarians 
on the opposition ticket, with one of the most prominent being Prof. 
Ramasamy who was appointed deputy Chief Minister of Penang. 
Manoharan, legal adviser to the Hindraf and also one of the Hindraf 5 
detainees, was put up for elections. His wife campaigned for him and he 
managed to win the Kota Alam seat in Klang with a 7184 vote majority.78 
Hindraf chairman Waythamoorthy was quick to demand the prize for 
supporting the Opposition in the elections .The Opposition won 36 out of the 
56 state seats in Selangor and Waythamoorthy did not mince his words 
when he said that the Indian community had supported the Opposition and 
now it was time to repay the community by making Manoharan a Deputy 
Menteri Besar of Selangor. This reveals that Hindraf were very motive 
centred in their actions, their prime concern being only the Indian community. 
This reflects a sense of focus but also disillusionment that anyone else 
understood and sympathized with the Hindraf cause. All returns for the 
Indian community had to be negotiated and bargained for.
77 Malaysiakini 14th December 2007. "Samy -  bashing' at PKR ceramah.'
7SMalaysiakini, 9th March 2008.' Hindraf : make ISA detainee S'gor deputy MB.'
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The second ramification of the ISA detention of the Hindraf 5 was that, the 
ISA clampdown kept the Hindraf saga and struggle alive in the local and 
international media. The international lobby for the Hindraf cause had 
already started in early December 2007 after the rally. Waythamoorthy 
began to travel to India and then to London to inform and garner support for 
the Malaysian Indian cause. His meeting was with the Tamil Nadu leaders, 
Chief Minister Karunanidhi and opposition leader Selvi Jayalalitha.79 Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh received a letter from Hindraf urging him to take 
immediate action considering the Malaysian government crackdown against 
the Hindraf cause. After New Delhi, Waythamoorthy hoped to meet with 
Gordon Brown’s aid. This trajectory of international lobby was particular to 
Hindraf as they chose to appeal to the authorities of the homeland of their 
original migration, South India and to the former colonial masters, England, 
to mediate on their behalf with the Malaysian authorities. With the ISA clamp 
down, the United States raised objections but were hastily rejected by 
Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak who asked the Americans to give a fair 
detention to those in Guantanamo Bay first.80 On 1st February 2008, 
Waythamoorthy, together with 200 Hindraf supporters, held a peace protest 
in London. The supporters from all around the United Kingdom gathered 
opposite 10 Downing Street holding placards showing support for Hindraf 
and its leaders.81 On 22nd April 2008, the Hindraf urged the United Nations to 
appoint a special rapporteur to specifically look into the plight of the Indian 
community in Malaysia.
The Hindraf displayed an ability to mobilize, though to a lesser extent, to 
protest the ISA detention of their leaders and the exile of the Hindraf 
chairman to London. On 16th December 2007, the police stopped Hindraf 
supporters from gathering at the Kamunting detention camp where they were 
to hold prayer meetings with family members of the detained. The police had
79 Malaysia kin i, 1st December 2007.' Hindraf lobby goes global.'
Z0Malaysiakini, 15th December 2007.' Gov't rejects US criticism of detentions.'
81 Malaysiakini, 6th February 2008.' Hindraf takes cause to the UK.'
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Federal Reserve Unit (FRU) trucks on standby but used persuasion with the 
gathering of Indians to disperse.82 They were told to adjourn to a nearby 
temple to pray instead. On 27th December 2007, Thanenthiran, who had 
begun to coordinate Hindraf activities in the absence of leadership, 
announced the intention to launch a campaign to collect one million 
signatures to pressure the government to release the Hindraf 5 under ISA 
detention.83 From within their detention centers, the Hindraf 5, decided to 
stage a hunger strike to protest their unlawful detention. The strike which 
was to last for five days began at 7.30 a.m on 20th January 2008.84 On 23rd 
January 2008, 130 Hindraf supporters decided to go on a week long hunger 
strike to join the Hindraf leaders in detention themselves.85 Subsequently, 
Uthayakumar’s health began to deteriorate rapidly in detention from heart 
ailment, diabetes and even fear of being fed food with beef (which is 
anathema to Hindus). The treatment meted out to P. Uthayakumar and his 
health condition was picked up in the media and it helped to portray a sense 
of martyrdom in promoting the Hindraf cause.
The following form of protest in using the symbolism of roses and valentines 
was in the vein of demonstrating a sense of peaceful protest but given the 
government’s response to the November Rally, the Hindraf leaders must 
have anticipated an equally negative response. In analyzing Hindraf’s 
motives or tactics, one witnesses acts of courting martyrdom to either 
demonstrate the extreme nature of their cause or/and the demonstration of 
self sacrifice to attain attention for their cause . On 22nd January 2008 86, 
Waythamoorthy’s daughter, Vwaishhnnavi, fronted the protest by delivering a 
letter informing the Prime Minister of the Hindraf intention to stage a 
demonstration whereby Vwaishhnnavi , accompanied by hundreds of other
82 Malaysiakini, 16th December 2007. 'Hindraf 5: Supporters pray for freedom/
83 Malaysiakini, 27th December 2007. 'One million signature campaign to free Hindraf 5/
84 Malaysiakini, 10th January 2008. 'Hindraf 5 to go on hunger strike/
85 Malaysiakini, 23rd January 2008. '130 Hindraf supporters on hunger strike/
86 Malaysiakini, 22nd January 2008. 'A Hindraf valentine: 'Mr PM, take my roses."
231
children would be handing flowers to the Prime Minister at the Parliament 
House . The cause was to lobby for Malaysian Indian rights but also to seek 
the release of the Hindraf 5 from ISA detention. On 13th February 2008, the 
police denied a permit for the Hindraf Rose protest on the grounds of 
‘security and public order’. Nonetheless the Rose rally still occurred at Jalan 
Raja Laut. The crackdown on the Rose rally was equally severe as police 
fired tear gas chemical- laced water cannons to disperse the crowds. About 
200 people were arrested and roads leading up to the venue were closed 
before the event.87 Once again the signal that was given to the Hindraf and 
its supporters was that negotiations were off and the Malaysian government 
was not prepared to engage in dialogue with the Hindraf. Another attempt to 
engage in dialogue with the Prime Minister was during a Hari Raya Open 
House at the Putra World Trade Centre in Kuala Lumpur. The Prime Minister 
allowed about 200 Hindraf activists into the event but expressed 
disappointment with their behavior which he felt flouted the spirit of Hari 
Raya. He claimed that they failed to shake hands with some of the Cabinet 
Ministers and they were chanting slogans to abolish the ISA.88 These rebuffs 
over the Hari Raya visit were made public in the media to portray the image 
of Indians as sullen and disrespectful.
The ISA clampdown was also strategic in creating tension within the Indian 
community. By placing the Hindraf leaders in ISA detention, there developed 
internal dissension and opportunists like Samy Vellu were able to benefit.
The ISA clampdown became too hard for some of the Hindraf 5 detainees to 
bear and the ramifications began to show when Vasanthakumar, the Hindraf 
secretary, accused P. Uthayakumar, the legal adviser, over the misuse of 
Hindraf funds.89 The police report was lodged at the very detention centre the 
Hindraf 5 were detained at. Uthayakumar’s lawyer, N. Surendran, provided 
an insight into the situation when he said that the accusations against his 
client should not be taken seriously as Vasanthakumar had lodged the report
87 Malaysiakini, 16th February 2008. 'Rose protest: All but 9 released'.
88 Malaysiakini, 6th October 2008. 'PM rebukes Hindraf over nosiy Raya visit'.
89 Malaysiakini, 14th January 2008. 'Hindraf vs Hindraf: Police report made against Uthaya.'
232
under detention and the circumstances did not permit credibility to the report. 
On 22nd January 2008, K. Vikneswary, wife of Vasanthakumar, dismissed 
speculations that her husband was a police officer, a plant by the 
government. She also claimed that Vasanthakumar had denied that public 
funds collected by P. Uthayakumar had been misused.90
Since the Hindraf leaders were under detention and the chairman, 
Waythamoorthy, was in exile, the Hindraf movement lacked leadership. A 
leadership crisis erupted with the Hindraf 5 allegedly denying that they had 
appointed RS Thanendran to take over the reins in their absence.91 A two 
page statement was released with the signatures of the Hindraf 5 saying that 
Thanendran had self -proclaimed the leadership of Hindraf and that he had 
to return the funds collected for the Hindraf cause to the public .92 
Waythamoorthy expressed surprise that such a statement had been released 
and confirmed that he had appointed a ten-member interim committee to run 
the day to day affairs of the Hindraf, and Thanendran was the movement’s 
coordinator. Thanendran’s take on the accusations was that four of the five 
Hindraf leaders under detention had been bought over and he claimed that 
Uthayakumar’s signature had been forged.93
After the March 8th elections, Samy Vellu did a dramatic turnabout and on 
March 30th 2008, he called for the release of the Hindraf 5 and announced a 
‘rebranding of the MIC’. This was perhaps a rethinking of perspectives or 
possibly a strategy to win the Malaysian Indian support. Samy Vellu also 
claimed that two families of the Hindraf 5, Manoharan and Kenghadharan, 
had approached him for assistance. He promised to speak on behalf of the 
Hindraf 5 to the Prime Minister.94 The Malaysian Indian public immediately
90 Malaysiakini, 22nd January 2008. ' My husband not a turn coat.'
91 Malaysiakini, 15th February 2008/ Leadership crisis in Hindraf.'
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Malaysiakini, 30th March 2008. 'Samy calls for Hindraf 5's release.'
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understood that Samy Vellu wanted political mileage out of this maneuver95 
and the Hindraf 5 called on him to apologize. Hindraf chairman 
Waythamoorthy said that Samy Vellu’s call to free the Hindraf ‘was appalling’ 
and asked for an apology for failing to oppose the arrest of the Hindraf 
leaders, misleading the government and public that Hindraf was in the first 
place a threat to national security, misleading Hindrafs struggle for his own 
political survival, denying the 18 points of Hindraf as absurd and claiming 
that the Indians were not marginalized.96
The struggle ensues
When Uthayakumar and the remaining Hindraf 5 were finally released in 
early 2009, Makkal Sakti had cooled momentarily. Uthayakumar remained 
aloof from the other Indian leaders and individuals linked to the original 
Hindraf while his brother Waythyamoorthy is still in exile. He publicly stated 
that he needed time to rethink strategies for the Malaysian Indians. When he 
finally announced his Human Rights Party as the political arm of Hindraf, he 
had began to disassociate with the Pakatan Rakyat (PKR) state 
governments , his only alternative political power base to the BN, over land 
allocation issues for Indian schools and cremation grounds as well as the 
destruction of the Kampung Buah Pala Indian settlement. The by-election 
victory at Hulu Selangor for the BN coalition party, MIC reveals the lengths at 
which the Najib government would go at wooing back the Indian vote. From 
giving out generous temple grants down to dishing out free mutton curry 
meals to Indian voters. The Hulu Selangor victory was crucial for Najib in 
restoring confidence in the MIC. An interview with the newly elected MP, 
Kamalanathan, revealed that MIC was back on the political map of Malaysia. 
He expressed confidence in MIC saying that it was an established party 
since Independence. He branded the success of Hindraf episode of 2007 as 
one that had banked on effective ‘emotional marketing’ that had fizzled out. 
Kamalanathan believes that Indians should understand that in any
95 Malaysiakini, 1st April 2008.' Hindraf tells MIC chief to apologise.'
96 Ibid.
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multicultural country such as Malaysia, minorities would always encounter 
limitations. Rather than taking to street protests, tact, diplomacy and 
negotiation were the way forward.
Conclusion
The Hindraf phenomenon reveals that deliverance has yet to come to the 
Indian community in Malaysia. The feelings of resentment with the 
government are high because there is a sense of betrayal that from the 
indentured days to the present generation, Malaysian Indians feel that they 
have been loyal in their contributions to the Malaysian soil. Yet there is still 
no recognition and placement of opportunities for the Indian community. 
Hindraf expresses the desperation that now even their right to their own 
religion is denied as their temples are being snatched and their right to Hindu 
rites of passage are not being recognised due to blurred boundaries between 
Islamic and Civil law. The saffron rally was a demonstration of this 
desperation which met with even more governmental suppression instead of 
open dialogue. Although Hindraf‘s might has been weakened since by BN 
manoeuvres through the employment of ISA detentions , creation of new 
Indian political organisations under leaders like Thanendran, splintering 
Hindraf s support base and the rejuvenation of MIC party spirit through 
Kamalanathan’s victory in Hulu Selangor, the Hindraf Rally of November
2007 has set a precedence in the history of Malaysian Indians . It has given 
a clear signal to the powers that be in Malaysia that Indians are no longer 
content to be dubbed a docile community. They want equality, freedom to 
worship and culture and opportunities in Malaysia. Given the entrenched 
Malay hegemonic political mileu of Malaysia, this is a tall order, but Hindraf 
symbolises the current Malaysian Indian spirit that the ‘people’ are prepared 
to take matters into their own hands, are no longer prepared to recede to the 
old ways and are keen for a better future.
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Conclusion
The Hindraf demonstration and class action suit of November 2007 that 
appealed to the British government for redress of their problems in 
postcolonial Malaysia instigated my research path to go ‘in search of a navel’ 
that would explain the Malaysian Indian community’s woes. Like the Hindraf, 
who believed that the genesis of their problems was larger than an 
immediate event or reason but lay with the British colonial authorities who 
had bestowed Malays with privileged rights , I too looked for answers 
examining a span of five decades ( if not slightly longer) examining 
circumstances , epoch- making moments, heroes and also villains within and 
without the community to understand why the Indian community in Malaysia 
had taken fifty years to protest a plight that was already evident at 
Independence . Short of looking ‘for the beast or the nature of the beast’ that 
had caused the plight of the minority, non-Muslim, Indian Community of 
Malaysia, I began to realise as I poured through newspapers, conducted 
interviews and examined documents in musty archives, that it was going to 
be simplistic to reduce the entire phenomenon to one single cause . There 
was no particular method to the madness which was mired in not just the 
internal challenges of the Indian community but could also be attributed to 
the systemic failures of the Malaysian political milieu and lack of good 
governance.
Irregardless of whether if I was wearing the lenses of an insider or an 
outsider to the Hindraf phenomenon and the Malaysian Indian plight, I 
realised it would have been foolhardy to arrive at blame or judgement over 
the situation.Politicians , Indians or Malay, had an electorate to 
appease.Power brokering and management within the relevant party 
structures has remained a challenge and too often being ‘in the heat of the 
crucial moment’ was too difficult to bear for community leaders to have made 
well thought- out decisions and policies. The case for scholarly humility is 
thus clear in the words of Brij V. Lai are apposite, ‘Open -mindedness and 
clarity; certainly; but I would add another attribute; sympathetic 
understanding. I have seen enough of politics at work from close range,
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enough of the role of contingency, emotion and sheer stupidity play in human 
affairs so as not to rush to judgement. I have seen enough decision making 
done on the run, in the heat of the moment, without the privilege of leisurely 
reflection and detailed research , to approach the past with a proper sense of 
humility.’1
The fact that the Indian labouring class did not have the capacity to rally 
beyond bread and butter issues rather than ideational or ideological, even 
class solidarity to have been effective agents for the community at large , the 
knee- jerk reactions of the Indian middle class at the point of decolonisation 
and confusion over new national identities , legal papers and flux of capital to 
be able to negotiate effectively for Indian minority rights at a crucial moment, 
Sambanthan’s overly acquiescing nature to the Malay supremists and inept 
internal organisation of the only representing party of the Indians , MIC, 
Manickasavagam’s untimely death and Samy Vellu’s Machiavellian 
politicking and mismanagement of community projects. The Indian ethnicity 
is a complex one entailing sub-ethnicities, caste, regional and linguistic 
divisions, which meant that unifying Indians into a political entity would 
always be a challenge with the ever -looming threat of inherent factionalism. 
This was worsened by the fact that Malaysian Indians did not have their 
political house in order, hence crippling their ability to deal with Malay 
hegemonic practices and poor governance evident in Malaysian crony 
capitalism. Furthermore, Malay autocrats such as Tun Razak and especially 
Mahathir Mohamad left very little political space for a credible opposition to 
emerge, establishing a ‘one party electoral system’ through the creation of 
the Barisan Nasional and later even a judiciary and royalty made subservient 
to the powers of the Prime Minister. Hence, Indian parliamentarians in 
opposition parties and even Indian NGOs had very little opportunity to 
negotiate minority rights effectively and NGOs operated within their limited 
and specific areas of concern of education, religion, social welfare or human 
rights separately. There was very little scope for an umbrella Indian 
organisation, political or non- political, to emerge that could address the
1 Bij V.lal, In the eye of the storm: JaiRam Reddy and the politics of Postcolonial Fiji (Canberra, 
AustralianNational University Press, 2010), Introduction XV.
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community’s challenges and issues in a holistic manner and be an 
alternative force to the MIC.
Malaysian Indians whom I interviewed claim that ‘the people’ had already 
begun taking matters into their own hands with the emergence of 
organisations like Sri Murugan Centre and Alaigal , when capable 
individuals, sincere in their motives in helping the community, identified areas 
of concern and set up organisations or took initiatives to improve their lot. 
However, I feel that the courage to make ‘a push’ for rights was built up from 
the Reformasi era of the 1990s. It was then that Malaysians in general began 
questioning governance, corruption and autocracy in Malaysia.
Coincidentally timed with the IT revolution and knowledge-based era, the 
Reformasi witnessed the proliferation of websites and bloggers opening up 
new areas of resistance and information dissemination. It also informed the 
newly emerging Indian- educated modes and methods of protest within a 
recent generation of Malaysians who were no longer afraid to question and 
challenge areas of concern that were previously impermissible due to the 
Sedition Act established after 1969. Therefore it is not difficult to understand 
Hindraf and its strategies in setting up its own websites, disseminating 
information through phone messages, organising rallies and questioning the 
Reid Commission and inadvertently Malay rights when considered against 
this background.
However, Hindraf has, to express it metaphorically, ‘punched above its 
weight’, in that the Hindu coalition was not fighting an individual, party or 
even organisation. It was opposing an entire way of being. It was questioning 
the entire trajectory of Malayan/Malaysian national identity and national 
consciousness over the last 50 years. Hindraf has declared on several 
occasions that it refutes the ‘social contract’ at Independence that gave 
Malays special rights in exchange for citizenship for non- Malays. Farish 
Noor and Shamsul both acknowledge that Malaysian national identity is an 
on-going project, still in construction as with most other post- colonial
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nations2. But, Noor acknowledges that the running theme through this on­
going project had been ‘ethnic and religious communitarianism’.3 From the 
junior public officer to the Senior- most Minister in Parliament, the language 
of governance has been Malay rights in recruitment, educational 
opportunities, promotional prospects, easy bank loans, investment 
opportunities and more recently, distinction given to the Islamic religion in 
matters of spatial organisation (in the building of suraus and 
mosques),banking, judiciary and state conduct. The inter-ethnic relations in 
Malaysia exist in tiered co-relation, with Malay-Muslim ethnicity at the core 
and other ethnicities on the periphery. Hence Noor’s reflection , ‘If one were 
a Malaysian citizen who happens to be a woman , of Indian origin and a non- 
Muslim to boot, where is one’s place in the national imaginary? The 
discourse of the Malaysian nation-state, developed and articulated primarily 
by Malay men who happen to be Muslim and middle-class, leaves no space 
for such individuals whose existence is not seen as part of the nation’s 
historical tapestry.’4 This would explain the state response to Hindraf as 
‘kurang ajar5 since the state could not fathom anyone or any community so 
forthrightly questioning what has been taken as a given for such a long time.
The Hindraf was literally shut down by the state, its leaders were put into 
Internal Security detention after the November 2007 rally, its remaining 
supporters were splintered into new Indian political parties and organisations 
and the MIC was revamped, albeit on a gradual basis, with Samy Vellu 
stepping down as MIC head and more money promised by the government 
for the welfare needs of the community. Since Uthayakumar, the main 
spokesman of Hindraf was released from detention, he has somewhat 
resurrected the movement by setting up a Human Rights Party. Even as I am
2 Farish A. Noor, "In search of a Malaysian Identity still" in Out of the Tempurung ed.Fong Chin Wei 
et.al.(Sydney,East West Publishing, 2008) & A.B. Shamsul, 'Nations-of-lntent in Malaysia' in Asian 
forms of Nation
3 Farish A. Noor, "In search of a Malaysian Identity still" 20.
4 Ibid. 23.
5 Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi appeared on state television during the November Rally calling
the Hindraf leaders 'kurang ajar'- direct translation as one who has not been taught manners.
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writing this, small groups of Hindraf supporters have been arrested protesting 
the Interlok Malaysian school textbook that allegedly portrays Indians in poor 
taste. Hindraf continually updates the Indians as well as the wider web 
community of opportunities denied, temples demolished and the continued 
Human Rights violations endured by Malaysian Indians through its website 
and outreach programmes.
Malaysian civic space for non- Malay Muslims has tightened over the last fifty 
years and there is very little room for negotiation given blurred judicial 
boundaries between civic and syariah courts as well as between the political 
and judicial realm . Non- Malay Muslims do not have much recourse to beat 
the un-egalitarian modes of existence and practices in Malaysia as the 
majority of the electorate, Malay-Muslims and decision makers, middle class 
Malay Muslims, are privileged within this modus operandi. Even as there is 
dissension in the contemporary Malaysian political arena it is to compete for 
the Malay vote. Hindraf is at best a pressure group which unfortunately no 
longer enjoys the mass support it did during the build up to the November 
2007 rally. Nonetheless, the Hindraf role in creating unprecedented 
awareness of the Indian community’s plight and highlighting the adversities 
of the increasingly Islamised Malaysian state in governing a multi- racial 
Malaysian society cannot be denied. Hindraf may be taken as a fleeting 
phenomenon as its critics argue. But it is also a harbinger of things to come if 
the public space for non- Muslim minorities in Malaysia continues to be 
restricted. Time will tell as it always does.
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YAB Da to Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badav/I 
Prime Minister o f  Malays':-?
Block Utama Bangunan tens hum  
Pusat Pentadbiran Kttraja&u ; ersekutuan 
62502 Putra Java.
Dear Yang Amat Berhormal 
OPEN LETTER
HINDU TEMPLES/SHRINES CONTINUOUSLY HAUNTED BY 
UNSCRUPULOUS DEMOLISH MENT
The Malaysian Federal Constitution is regarded to be a sacred document 
encompassing various established Universal Rights. One o f  those is the 
freedom o f  worship/religion. This is protected and guaranteed by Article ï i 
of the Federal Constitution. Malaysia by nature both pre and post 
independence has been and will continue to be a multiracial society. The 
Federal Constitution unreservedly declares this state to be a secular state.
While freedom o f  worship/religion is enshrined in the Federal Constitution 
however there are clear impediments in the absolute implementation o f  
Article 11. The recent demolishment o f  the SRI AYAN AR 
SATHISHWARY ALA Y AM is the most deplorable repulsive and 
regrettable act. Why was there a need to demolish a place o f  worship and 
bury the defaced statutes on the same land when the said place o f  worship 
was erected some 60 years ago which erection took place prior to the 
existence and formation o f  DBKL and had 3,000 devotees to this date. The 
SRI AYANAR SATHISHWARY ALA YAM has actively participated and 
organized charitable events spiritual events and public forums from time to
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tim e which act has been most useful to Hindus residing in and a/owid the 
locality. The num ber o f  devotees registered with the SRI AYANAR. 
S A T H IS H W A R Y  A L A  Y A M  has steadiK grown over the years, j 'it place 
has been regarded by the Hindus us a sacred place o f  worship which 
possessed special significance and value.
The act to launch a complaint and initiate possible legal actions if  necessary 
by law yer M. M anoharan..«gainst those responsible is a brave daring and 
com m endable act. We urge s'A A s lo urgently direct the Folio: • and the 
A ttorney General Chambers to imm ediately suspend detain and prosecute all 
those responsible for this barbaric and satanic act and sack the Mayor o f  
Kuala Lum pur. The act o f  dem olishm ent has created disharmony hatred and 
racial polarization in the country. This irresponsible behavior will certainly 
rock our cradle o f  harm ony. Those responsible are desperately and 
deliberately inciting and ribbing the Hindus to retaliate. This is a provocative 
act well engineered and designed to destabilize and cause serious turm oil in 
the country.
It is im possible to construct any place o f worship on a plot o f  land 
m easuring 1 0 X 1 0  feet. Presently there is no place o f  worship constructed  
on such plot o f  land bearing such measurem ents. Why must a temple be built 
on a plot o f  land o f  such m easurem ent? W hy must the temple be dem olished  
before an alternative suitable site is found? The act o f  DBKL is very 
em barrassing, rhetoric and tarnishing the good image o f  this country and 
secularism . The actions o f  DBKL undoubtedly portrait religious hatred for 
the H indus. We urge the YAB to intervene immediately to restore order and 
uphold the good spirit and values o f  the Federal Constitution which 
docum ent has been the core o f  unity and harmony. It is important to preserve  
the integrity o f  this docum ent and the harm ony. Therefore the Governm ent 
m ust find a perm anent solution instead o f  continuously demolishing tem ples 
and shrines in thousands belonging to Non-M uslim s.
T his illegal act o f  dem olishm ent is well within the knowledge o f  the 
G overnm ent and the relevant authorities. W hy there were no immediate 
steps and/or actions taken to halt the dem olishm ent? It appears that only M.
m
I;
M anoharan o f  DAP has rail fo salvage and rescue the said SRI A V A N A R  
SA T H IS H W A R Y  A L A  Y AM .  it is also imperative to note that while your 
Governm ent is aggressively and vehemently advocating racial co-existence 
national unity mutual respect and appreciation between multiple races in the 
country it appears that the Government institutions do not observe those 
fundamental rules and principles. We therefore remind your Government to 
take immediate and concrete steps to restore the real spirit o f  A H id e  11 of 
th e  F ed eral C o n s t i t u t e ,  or otherwise the effect o f  the said Article would 
soon run into oblivion. We further emphasize politics and religion are 
explosive m ixtures and i f  left unmonitored could have a catastrophe Hk-o- 
and may cause the collapse o f  a decent State and Government and no 
am ount o f  oxygen could resuscitate the collapse.
Thank you.
Yours Sincerely
P.W aytha M oorthy 
Chairm an
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Appendix 2
MINORITY RIGHTS 
18 Points Indian Demands
50th year Merdeka (Independence) demands by the two (2) million ethnic minority Indians in Malaysia lo 
Y.A.B. Dato’ Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi Prime Minister of Malaysia on Sunday the 12th day of August 
2007 at io.ooa.rn at Seri Perdana, Putrajaya Malaysia.
1. Whereas:
The Reid Commission was appointed by her Majesty the Queen of England and the Conference of Rulers in 
1956 with the view to Malaya (and now Malaysia) achieving independence by August 1957Among the 
primary terms of reference of the Reid Commission were a Common Nationality for the whole of the 
Federation.
2. And whereas
The overwhelming of the 131 written memoranda submitted to the Reid Commission as evidenced by the 
declassified documents from the Public Records Office, Kew, London, United Kingdom which represented 
the will and wishes of the then Malayan population were primarily equality and equal opportunities etc for 
all Malayans irrespective of race or religion as follows: -
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2.1 111 the grant of state land,
2.2 Admission to public and administrative service;
2.3 To trade and do business, licences, permits etc
2.4 Primary, secondary, skills Training, university and overseas!university education.
2.5 No special privileges for the Malays,
2.6 No discrimination of any ethnic community based on race or religion,
2.7 The retention of all their places of worship in particular Hindu temples, crematoriums and burial sites,
2.8 Freedom of Religion,
2.9 Malaya is to be a Secular State and not an Islamic state,
2.10 Right to mother tongue education in'pirticuta'rTaii'ri]"5ClKrolsT0_b'e'ftdly'aided,
2.n Minimum wage for the lowest paid, and
2.12 Equal recognition as sons of soil for all Malayan born.
/
3. And whereas
Based on the aforesaid proposals the Malaysian Federal Constitution, which is the sunreme law of Malaysia 
as drawn out by the Reid Commission in 1957 was passed by the inaugural Malayan Parliament and which 
formed the basis of independent Malaysia.
4. And whereas
Over the last 50 years since independence on the 31st day of August 1957, the United Malays Organisation 
(UMNO) controlled Malaysian government with their majoritarian might, and backed by police, Attorney 
General’s Chambers, Judiciary, civil service and the media continuously violated the Malaysian Federal 
Constitution by their racist and Islamic extremist policies and which in effect have created an apartheid 
system ala Malaysia and especially resulting in the degeneration of at least 70% of the ethnic minority 
Indians to become the underclass of Malaysia who end up in the poor and hardcore poor category. The rest 
of the 29% raised above the poor and hardcore poor categoiy whol]y_and/or substantially through their own 
efforts, sacrifices and labour with no or very little assistance by the HMNO controlled government The 1% of 
the cream thrives anyway.
5. And whereas
The plight of the Indians have been made worse by the racist UMNO mindset having spilled over to even 
almost all of the Opposition parties, NGOs’, Civil society, Malaysian Human Rights Commission (Suhakam' 
Bar Council, the media etc who do not take up the Indian plight for they are deemed to be lacking “politico 
mileage” (race based) and/or no funding.
6. And whereas
The Indians having no or very little opportunities for upward mobility or hope either turn to crime (60% of 
Malaysian detainees are Indians though they are only 8% of population-Suhakam 2005) or end up 
committing suicide which is 1000% higher than Malays (Utusan Malaysia 12.9.2005).
7. And Whereas at a public forum attended by 1,000 over Indians on 28.7.2007 at 7.oop.m at the Selangor 
Chinese Assembly Hall, the participants unanimously resolved to forward their 18 point demands and which 
this peaceful assembly gathered here today on the 12th day of August 2007 at Putrajaya once again 
unanimously resolves to demand as hereinbelow outlined.
And now it is hereby demanded for and on behalf of the two (2) Million ethnic minority Indians in Malaysia 
ironi the UIvunO cuniroiieu Malaysian Government (heir 18 point demands as follows: -
(1) End 50 years of violations of the Malaysian Federal Constitution.
(2) End Racism, end Islamic extremism and end Malay privileges on the 50th year golden jubilee mega 
Independence celebrations of Malaysia on 31st August 2007.
(3) Call for affirmative action plans for all poor Malaysians especially the ethnic minority Indians/A 
Protection of Ethnic Minority Malaysian Indian Act 2007 be passed to secure and safeguard the interests of 
the poor and defenceless ethnic Indian Minority Community.
{4) All 523 Tamil Schools in Malaysia be made fully aided government schools with immediate effect and to 
have equal and same facilities as granted to national schools especially in terms of financial allocations, 
sufficient graduate teaching staff, financial allocation for extra tuition, ample computers, Information 
Technology facilities, school fields, sports, recreational facilities, air conditioned library, textbook loans,
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kindergarten, school uniforms and pocket money for poor pupils, nutritional food programmes, teaching 
aids, school building, infrastructure, film screening room and facilities, financial assistance for poor 
students, rehabilitation classes, non Muslim religious classes, etc. ARM 100 Billion grant <® 20 Billion per 
year with effect from 2007 be allocated to Indians under the 9II1 Malaysia Plan (5 years) for refurbishing the 
existing 523 Tamil schools and rebuilding of the 300 Tamil schools demolished over the last 50 years.
L5) Extend and implement with immediate effect to Indians the affirmative action plans, grants, 
scholarships, loans etc as extended to Malay Muslim citizens with the view to providing equal opportunities 
for higher education, university education, admission to foreign universities, post graduate studies locally 
and overseas, Trade and Skills Training Institutions, Science Colleges especially for each and every Indian 
student from the 70% poor and hardcore'p"ooTlfidilFT) ifttegOty.
(6) Extend and implement with immediate effect affirmative action plans as extended to Malay Muslim 
citizens with the view to provide equal opportunities in acquiring wealth, venturing into business, trade, 
industries, medium and small scale industries, government linked companies, corporate sector, procurement 
of direct government contracts, in acquiring licenses for contractors, blue chip and / or guaranteed return 
shares, lorry, taxi and bus permits, loans and licenses to venture into trade, business banking and the 
corporate sector for each and every Indian from especially the 70% poor and hardcore poor Indian categoiy. 
To this effect the UMNO controlled government allocates RM100 Billion at RM20 Billion per annum with 
effect from 2007 and implements successful strategic schemes in investments for the Indians as 
implemented for the Malay Muslims with the view to the Indians acquiring at least 10% of the nation’s 
equity.
(7) All the aforesaid is to be handled directly by the UMNO controlled government and UMNO is to stop 
“playing politics” through the “Mandore” (supervisor) system by dishing out on a piecemeal and/or peanuts 
basis or merely public and/or newspaper announcements and declarations by the Malaysian Indian 
Congress (M.LC) who have no or very little power or say in the UMNO controlled Malaysian government.
, (8) 20% of the Government top most level postings (Secretaries Generals), Middle level Management 
^Directors) and management level (Managers) postings, and the same for the Private Sectors, and positions 
of District Officers; Foreign and Diplomatic Service positions, civil service positions are reserved for Indians 
for the next 15 years.
(9) The UMNO controlled government makes public and is transparent on all of the aforesaid affirmative 
action plans i.e. the aforesaid education places, licenses, scholarships, grants, loans, permits, licenses, 
opportunities etc by publishing the same in the official website of the Government of Malaysia as and when 
' he same is granted and/or on a monthly basis specifying the Indian beneficiaries thereto.
(10) Stop the indiscriminate unconstitutional and unlawful demolitions of Hindu temples, crematoriums and 
burial sites in Malaysia. All existing Hindu temples, crematoriums and burial sites be granted state land and 
permanently gazetted as Hindu temple reserves as has been done for all Islamic places of worship and burial
. sites. Compensation at RM10 Million per temple be paid by the UMNO controlled Malaysian Government 
for the 15,000 Hindu temples demolished up Lo date over the last 50 years.
Every individual given the Right to practice and profess Religion/s of his/her choice in accordance to 
Standards adopted by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. The State and its Authorities barred 
from interfering in the personal beliefs and conscience of individual citizens. Disputes between Muslims & 
Non Muslims shouid be adjudicated in the Civil Courts.
(11) Stop the victimization and direct discrimination by the Police and all other state authorities of the 
Indians. All Malaysians earning RM 3,000.00 and below are to be fully borne by state funded legal aid for 
•any criminal charges they face.
(12) The UMNO controlled government forms with immediate effect a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the 
Kg Medan Mini Genocide, condemns the violence thereto, apologises to the Indian community on this mini 
penocide, undertakes not to repeat the same in future and pay a compensation of RMi,000,000.00 for each 
and every citizen killed, permanently maimed, maimed or injured in this tragedy.
(13) Each and every Indian especially the Indian poor in the aforesaid 70?& Indian poor and hardcore poor 
category is paid compensation which is to be adjudicated and determined by the United Nations Secretary 
General for the aforesaid 50 years of Constitutional violations by the UMNO controlled government.
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(14) All homeless Malaysians are to be provided affordable homes and not low cost flats by law. A minimum 
wage of RMi.ooo.oo for each and even-’ Malaysian be made law.
(15) A Royal Commission of Inquiry is initiated lo report on the'aforesaid constitutional violations by the 
UMNO controlled government and appropriate recommendations for amongst others further affirmative 
action plans for especially the 70% Indian poor and hardcore poor category.
- (16) All forms of racial and religious discrimination, oppression and suppression of the Indians / Hindus in 
both the public and private sectors are stopped with immediate effect and a Race Relations Commission Act 
2007, an Equal Opportunities Commission ACP2007 and a Freedom ofReligion Commissions Act 2007 be 
passed and powerful Commission thereto be put into force to give effect to anti racism, anti Islamic 
extremism and anti direct discrimination practices by the UMNO controlled government in both the public 
and private sectors.
(17) The UMNO controlled government passes specific laws to give effect to the Independence of the 
Judiciary', the Attorney General’s Chambers, Civil service, Police Force, Army, the Malaysian Human Rights 
Commission and the Malaysian media and for the Opposition parties, NGOs’ Civil Society groups, Bar 
Council and the media not to discriminate and side step Indian issues but instead to voice out the same 
without fear or favour. The Malaysian media is also to be legislated to report the real happenings especially 
on the 70% Indian poor and hardcore poor without fear or favour.
(18) A minimum of 20 Opposition members of Parliament are elected exclusively by the Indian Community 
to represent their interest at the highest political level aDd also as a Parliamentary Democracy check and 
balance and the same is safeguarded and entrenched into the Federal Constitution and which is to be 
increased proportionately with the increase in Parliamentary seats.
Proposer: P.Waytha Moorthy Seconder: V.KRegu 
(Chairman, HindraO (Secretary, Hindraf)
Compiled by P.Uthayakumar legal Adviser, Hindraf based on the ground reality, sentiments, pulse, blood, 
sweat and tears of the Malaysian Indians after 50 years of marginalisation, discrimination, oppression and 
suppression by the UMNO controlled Malaysian Government.
HINDU RIGHTS ACTION FORCE (HINDRAF) 
No. 135-3-A, Jalan Toman 7,
Kemayan Square, 70200 Seremban, 
wegen öembrian Malaysia.
Tel : 06-7672995/6 / 03-22825241
Fax: 06-7672997 Email vvaytha@hotmail.com
Website: http://www.policewatchmalaysia.com/
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